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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines traffic congestion in twentieth-century London. Ideas about 
movement, mobility and circulation in the capital’s streets intersect with a broad 
range of discourses and practices, from planning to policing, and from 
engineering to economics. Within these discourses, characterizations of 
congestion are political acts, and proposed solutions therefore represent political 
as well as geographical and technological world views. The thesis opens with an 
examination of the experience of congestion in twentieth-century London, setting 
up the ‘traffic problem’, before surveying the ways traffic congestion has been 
considered in the history of urban planning, the dominant discourse in which this 
topic is explored. Common themes have emerged from this close reading of the 
planning literature, including geographies of governance and the relationship 
between London-wide bodies and local authorities; technologies of congestion 
and notions of grids, surveillance, verticality and technological progress; 
segregation and control of different classes of people and vehicles; and the politics 
and financing of roads and mobility.  
 The subsequent four chapters therefore examine ‘solutions’ of the traffic 
problem from a set of disciplinary points of view suggested by these themes, 
namely police officers, highway engineers, systems analysts, and political 
economists (although the boundaries between the groups are highly permeable). 
In each instance, detailed case studies of geographical places and technological 
structures are used to ground the discussions of disciplinary discourses and point 
to their limits. A fifth chapter then returns to the professional planning discourse 
and draws together these themes, examining how plans to reduce congestion in 
London have been negotiated into reality. The concluding chapter looks at the 
situation in London today and in the near future. It includes accounts from current 
practitioners in each of the disciplinary fields studied, and gives a sense of the 
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long-term continuity of these wider concerns—the fact that characterizations of 
congestion are themselves historical artefacts which travel through time. 
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Chapter 1. Introducing the Traffic Problem 
 
Grosvenor Place, Belgravia, 16 November 1938. The Evening Standard’s 
motoring correspondent, Robert Walling, is sitting in a traffic jam. Mounted on 
top of his van is a large four-sided clock showing how long his journey is taking. 
Earlier that week he told his readers that ‘London’s traffic is being throttled. What 
is wrong?’ His timed journeys are showing ‘where the blocks occur, for how long, 
the causes, and suggestions for the cure’. After 14 days of investigation he 
concludes that London is ‘jammed’.3 
 
 
Figure 1: Evening Standard van for ‘timing the jams’, pictured in Grosvenor Place, 16 November 
1938 (Evening Standard).4 
  
                                                 
3 Evening Standard, 12 November 1938, 3; and 28 November, 6. 
4 Watch and Clock Maker, December 1938, 297. 
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1.1 Introduction 
‘Vehicle speeds in Central London are falling’, wrote Ruth Bashall and Gavin 
Smith in a 1992 account of London’s transport crisis, ‘and at 10 mph are currently 
little faster than the horse and cart of the turn of the century’.5 This is a common 
refrain and, as will be shown in a later chapter, an accurate one. But it does not do 
much to scratch the surface of the experience of traffic in London, which depends 
on the person doing the experiencing, and varies through time and from place to 
place. Perhaps that is the point of singular statistics: they imprison the breadth of 
experience in a black box and hide it from view, so that the only reasonable 
response can be one of dismay at how bad things have got—at the crisis we find 
ourselves in. No faster than a horse and cart? So much for progress. Yet, for a 
crisis situation, it seems to have been with us for a long time. The epigraph which 
opens this chapter describes a 1938 Evening Standard publicity stunt focusing 
attention on London’s traffic jams.6 During the stunt, both the British Road 
Federation and the House of Lords lamented that the newspaper van did not travel 
any faster than a horse.7  
 The Evening Standard timed trips followed a project in summer 1936 in 
which the Ministry of Transport carried out, for the first time, systematic research 
into traffic speeds and delays caused by congestion in the capital. The newspaper 
stunt might well have been inspired by the Ministry research project, in which an 
Austin Light-Six motor-car, driven by a professional chauffeur, ferried officials 
with stop-watches and clipboards on a series of journeys across four routes 
                                                 
5 Ruth Bashall and Gavin Smith, ‘Jam Today: London’s Transport in Crisis’, in The Crisis of 
London, ed. Andy Thornley (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 37. 
6 Evening Standard, 12 November 1938, 3; 14 November, 11; 15 November, 3; 16 November, 14; 
17 November, 13; 18 November, 23; 19 November, 19, 21 November, 12; 22 November, 18; 23 
November, 12; 24 November, 12; 25 November, 11; 26 November, 15; 28 November, 6 and 15; 
29 November, 11. 
7 Evening Standard, 19 November 1938, 19; 24 November, 12. 
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through the capital.8 The first route ran 12.6 miles from Chiswick in the west to 
Bow Road in the east. The second ran the same length from Hornsey in the north 
to Streatham in the south. The third route ran from Golders Green in the north-
west to Lewisham in the south-east. The fourth was a 22.75-mile route from 
Chiswick around the North Circular Road to Ilford. Journey times were recorded, 
as were the locations and duration of delays and stoppages. The driver was ‘steady 
and competent’, with ‘no inducement to attempt to break records or to take risks’. 
He therefore represented the ‘punctiliously cautious and considerate driver who 
presumably constitutes the bulk of the British motoring community’.9  
 After the officials had spent several weeks plying the routes daily, the 
results showed an overall average speed across the three cross-London routes of 
12.5 mph. But it was the west-to-east route through the City that was the slowest, 
averaging 5.85 mph with the worst journey averaging just 3.6 mph. These 
journeys were ‘painfully slow’ and ‘ceaselessly congested’, according to the 
official report.10 Next-worst was the route from Euston Road south to Trafalgar 
Square, with the slowest journey averaging 6.3 mph. The problems occurred most 
markedly at junctions, and the report listed the most problematic intersections, 
including Ludgate Circus, Bank, Gardiner’s Corner at Aldgate, St Giles’ Circus 
and the junction of Euston Road and Tottenham Court Road. By contrast, the 
circular route avoiding Central London was much faster, with average speeds of 
23.6 mph, meaning it was often quicker to go the long way round. Commentators, 
noting the Ministry of Transport’s 1936 traffic survey work, asked, ‘Is a road 
crisis developing?’11 
                                                 
8 Charles Bressey and Edwin Lutyens, Ministry of Transport Highway Development Survey 1937 
(Greater London) (London: HMSO, 1938), 17–18. 
9 Ibid., 17. 
10 Ibid., 18. 
11 The Manchester Guardian, 18 June 1936, 8. See also, among others, 30 July 1936, 6. 
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 This thesis examines traffic congestion in twentieth-century London, 
focusing largely on the period to about 1980, but with some excursions into more 
recent territory. It surveys the ways congestion has been considered in the history 
of urban planning, and examines a range of alternative ‘solutions’ of the problem 
as well as how they have been negotiated into reality. In doing so, it will decode 
‘the traffic problem’, setting it into wider geographical, political and technological 
contexts.  
1.2 The traffic problem in history 
The answer to the question posed in 1936 about a road crisis seems obvious. It is 
all we talk about when we discuss transport in the capital—the congestion, the 
fact that we go no faster today than in the age of the horse. It is all we have ever 
talked about, as London’s canon of modern-day chroniclers has described. Peter 
Ackroyd, for instance, tracks complaints about the traffic problem back 500 years, 
noting that ‘The state of traffic in the capital was a source of constant complaint in 
the sixteenth century, as it has become for each generation’.12 Stephen Inwood 
notes that there was a brief improvement following the seventeenth-century Great 
Fire, but that ‘in the eighteenth century the traffic problem grew worse again’ and, 
the following century, ‘London’s traffic congestion went from bad to worse’.13 
Calls for something to be done became more insistent in Regency times, as James 
Winter has described, noting ‘officialdom’s growing concern about the traffic 
problem’ in the 1830s, when new traffic legislation expressed the seriousness with 
which it was taken.14 Roy Porter told a similar tale of nineteenth-century traffic 
woe, a time when ‘London’s traffic problems were becoming ominous’ and ‘jams 
could be grim’.15 As the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth and the 
                                                 
12 Peter Ackroyd, London: The Biography (London: Vintage, 2001), 104. 
13 Stephen Inwood, A History of London (London: Macmillan, 1998), 541, 548. 
14 James Winter, London’s Teeming Streets, 1830–1914 (London and New York: Routledge, 
1993), 19, 43. 
15 Roy Porter, London: A Social History (London: Penguin Books, 2000), 273–4. 
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motor car joined the streetscape, the problem just continued to get worse. 
Jonathan Schneer observes that in 1900, ‘London traffic jams were notorious, 
new-fangled horseless carriages and traditional horse-drawn vehicles often 
merging in near gridlock conditions’.16 Jerry White agrees, commenting that 
‘Traffic was one of the enduring problems of the nineteenth century ... and so it 
remained throughout the twentieth’.17 The traffic problem is a refrain, ever-
present in the mouths of Londoners and London historians. We keep returning to 
it when we speak of London. 
 Amid this constant background of general complaint can be discerned 
peaks of concern. Two such peaks will be considered time and again in this study. 
The first was the late 1920s and early 1930s. Joe Moran has noted that this was a 
period of critical importance in the traffic experience, with the foundation of the 
Pedestrians’ Association in the face of growing concerns over road safety, a Road 
Traffic Act which sought to impose responsibilities on motorists, and the 
publication of the Highway Code.18 The Ministry of Transport, with its 1936 
traffic survey, was thus responding to a growing concern about traffic. A second 
peak of concern over London’s traffic was the period from the late 1950s to the 
early 1960s, this time over what Simon Gunn has described as a ‘motor 
revolution’ in the expansion of automobility in urban Britain, when motor 
transport was ‘high on the political agenda’.19 
 One example demonstrates the seriousness with which 1930s 
commentators viewed the traffic problem. In 1933, a former railwayman and 
                                                 
16 Jonathan Schneer, London 1900: The Imperial Metropolis (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1999), 5–6. 
17 Jerry White, London in the Twentieth Century: A City and Its People (London: Vintage Books, 
2008), 12. 
18 Joe Moran, ‘Crossing the Road in Britain 1931–1976’, Historical Journal 49, no. 2 (2006): 478. 
19 Simon Gunn, ‘People and the Car: The Expansion of Automobility in Urban Britain, c.1955–
70’, Social History 38, no. 2 (2013): 221; Simon Gunn, ‘Introduction to Traffic in Towns’, in 
Traffic in Towns: A Study of the Long Term Problems of Traffic in Urban Areas (The Buchanan 
Report), by Colin Buchanan (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), ix. 
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transport writer, Henry Watson, published the book Street Traffic Flow. It was a 
major study of urban traffic congestion, and in order to treat the traffic system as a 
whole, Watson consulted a wide range of bodies, including the Ministry of 
Transport, Home Office, Automobile Association, Society of Motor 
Manufacturers and Traders, National Safety First Association, Pedestrians’ 
Association, National Horse Association, Metropolitan Police, tram and bus 
companies, journal editors, and traffic signal manufacturers, as well as traffic 
specialists in the USA.20 Watson’s study showed the traffic problem in fine grain. 
He differentiated between traffic types and their speeds and handling 
characteristics. He considered the way traffic varied from city to city, between 
residential and industrial districts, by time of day, by season and by weather. He 
also observed the irregular, minute-by-minute variation of flow in busy streets, as 
well as the lateral position adopted by different vehicle classes at a time when 
camber mattered, surfaces were often slippery with oil and horse manure, and 
many streets included tramway tracks. He provided exhaustive data on delays 
owing to obstructions, analysis of flow over different types of junction, accident 
statistics, the effects of traffic signals, of pedestrian crossings, and of parked 
vehicles. He included 21 newly commissioned photographs representing traffic 
problems in London’s streets (such as that shown in Figure 2); 89 graphs, 
illustrations and diagrams; 35 tables of statistics; and an extensive bibliography. 
He concluded his account with an assessment of the economics and politics of 
traffic, considering how time could be given value in order to estimate costs of 
congestion, and whether certain users should be subject to restrictions. 
                                                 
20 Henry Watson, Street Traffic Flow (London: Chapman and Hall, 1933), v–vii. 
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Figure 2: Photograph from Street Traffic Flow showing heavy traffic in Commercial Street with 
extensive parking and horse-traffic, 1933 (Charles Klapper).21 
 Watson’s book gives us a clear sense of the technical problems of traffic. 
Yet it also shows that apparently even-handed representations contain political 
bias. Watson was a railwayman who favoured tram travel, and the book comes 
down strongly in its favour against motor buses. He claimed that: 
For heavy passenger transport the bus is commonly—and in London always has 
been—an overrated proposition, appealing to those impressed by the obvious and 
exceptional, and lacking the perspective and technical knowledge to appreciate 
their shortcomings as compared with tramways.22  
His book was published in the same year that the London Passenger Transport 
Bill was enacted, bringing London’s transport providers under public control and 
sounding the death knell of the tram network in favour of an aggressive expansion 
of trolley and motor bus travel. Watson wrote amid bitter arguments between tram 
and bus promoters which was really an ideological fight between municipal 
socialism and free-market capitalism.23 Street Traffic Flow is an under-
                                                 
21 Ibid., facing 42. 
22 Ibid., 367. 
23 T. C. Barker and Michael Robbins, A History of London Transport Volume Two: The Twentieth 
Century to 1970 (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1974), chaps 11, 12, 15, 16. 
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appreciated gem which was also propaganda in a fierce war for control of 
London’s political economy. 
 An example of 1960s public concern over traffic came with the Oscar-
nominated film Automania 2000, made in 1963 by the acclaimed animators Halas 
and Batchelor, described by the British Film Institute’s animation curator as one 
of the greatest animated films of all time.24 It offered a dystopian vision of a world 
in the year 2000 submerged by motor cars, fuelled by demand for cheap consumer 
goods made possible by ‘scientists’, the villains of the piece. Before long, so 
many cars had been manufactured that it had become impossible to move, and the 
population had been forced to adapt to living in their cars, piled high in the streets 
in a condition of ‘universal immobility’. Figure 3 shows a still from the film.  
 
Figure 3: Still from Automania 2000, 1963, showing motor cars having taken over the streets of 
London (© Halas and Batchelor, courtesy of Vivien Halas).25 
The narrator intoned, ‘In the more densely populated areas of our planet, people 
have been confined to their cars for over five years. The younger children cannot 
                                                 
24 Halas and Batchelor, Automania 2000 [film], 1963; Jez Stewart, ‘The Greatest Animated Films 
of All Time?’, BFI News, Features and Opinion, 24 April 2014, www.bfi.org.uk/news/greatest-
animated-films-all-time. 
25 See clips at www.halasandbatchelor.co.uk/clips.asp?subarea=clips&clip=11. 
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remember the time when it was possible to move around in cars’. The final act of 
the scientist, before he was killed by one of his own creations, was to invent 
sentient cars that reproduced themselves. The car had finally taken over humanity.  
 Automania 2000, like Street Traffic Flow thirty years previously, was a 
political statement rather than a dispassionate assessment of an uncontested traffic 
problem. Halas and Batchelor were commenting on the hubris of the technocrat, 
so greatly lauded in the white heat of 1960s Britain. For them, the problem was 
people, not traffic. That was Watson’s problem too—public transport was a proxy 
for wider political battles over resource allocation in liberal economies. Traffic 
stands for other things. Roads are political and economic spaces as well as 
geographical and physical places, and the solutions proposed depend on the 
problem one sees—and on the world view one holds. Congestion is not a stable 
concept. Talk of the traffic problem encodes wider concerns. The intention of this 
thesis is thus to decode the traffic problem, deconstructing it and rethinking its 
nature, both to better understand traffic in London and to shed light on ways in 
which physical urban infrastructures such as London’s streets have been 
mobilized in political, social and economic discourses. 
1.3 Research questions 
The decoding of the traffic problem will be carried out by considering congestion 
as a complex network which is sociological and political as well as spatial, human 
and technological. This will involve looking at a wide variety of actors and the 
interactions between them, where actors are more than merely people or 
technologies but socio-technical nodes. An examination of the politics of 
congestion will demonstrate that traffic has different values—economic, aesthetic, 
professional, moral—to different people. A series of three research questions 
follows. 
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I. What have been the dominant characterizations of the traffic problem, and what 
alternative characterizations have been obscured by the dominant framings? 
In the popular discourse, the traffic problem is congestion, with average traffic 
speed in London held up as the emblematic statistic of a pathological state. This 
has been translated in the professional discourse as a failure of urban planning, 
with a failure of governance intimately related to it. In the scholarly discourse, the 
dominant characterization of this failure of planning has until recently been based 
on ideas that plans are singular, holistic, stable and have clear authorship, 
although new scholarship is revising this view. Thus, taking this all into account, 
the standard story is that the traffic problem would be solved if congestion was 
reduced and traffic moved faster; this would be enabled by better governance 
allowing planners to get on with their work; and if only Wren and Abercrombie’s 
plans for London had been enacted, the whole problem would have been sorted 
long ago. We’re paying the price today, we are often told. 
 Of course this is a gross over-simplification of the way traffic has been 
characterized but it points up the clear value in problematizing dominant accounts 
and looking to their margins. This thesis looks at plans as unstable artefacts with 
multiple authors and influences. It widens the scope of people who might be 
termed ‘planners’. It casts doubt on the ability of traffic statistics to represent 
reality. By considering alternative characterizations of the traffic problem, such as 
market failure and system failure, it looks beyond professional planning and hard 
road-building to consider softer (though no less physical) interventions such as 
road pricing and traffic lights. And by reframing traffic as a system of movement 
it is possible to shift from ‘congestion’ to ‘friction’ as a means to characterize 
busy streets. 
II. What are the relationships between London’s traffic infrastructure and capital? 
The relationships between London property and capital are manifold and have 
been well-considered. Less common is to consider the capital’s street 
infrastructure—the places between the highly capitalized buildings—as part of the 
same account. This research question is therefore an attempt to place traffic into a 
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wider account of capitalism and the state, specifically the political economies of 
markets. The streets, like the buildings, are saturated with market decisions. If 
Ken Livingstone’s 2003 Congestion Charge scheme is a poster-child for modern 
solutions to congestion, and road pricing a refrain heard as often as the need for 
new roads, what can its history tell us about the Keynesian consensus, 
neoliberalism, Thatcherism, social democracy and the New Labour turn? Where 
does traffic sit with gentrification? What were the relationships between property 
developers and council planners in the shaping of London’s traffic scene? This is 
not a straightforward linear story nor a wholly recent one, and one conclusion is 
that the traffic problem has in part been constructed and mobilized in the service 
of accumulating capital and effecting political change, albeit in an ambivalent 
way. Another conclusion, however, is that capital is just a necessary, not a 
sufficient explanation for the experience of mobilities in London. 
III. What is distinctively ‘London’ about London’s traffic problem, and what is the 
relationship between London and other places? 
The third research question seeks to understand the traffic problem on a variety of 
geographical scales from global to local, as well as understanding how local 
relates to global and vice versa. In one sense, this is a question of geography, or 
rather how London’s topography and form might dictate its traffic problem. It 
does not, for instance, have a gridded street plan. How does this matter? In 
another sense it is a technological question, or how technologies travel. But it is 
most significantly a socio-political question. In answering it, the thesis will 
examine, for instance, how sociological ideas such as racial segregation in the 
USA, Asia and Africa relate to the concept of pedestrian segregation in the City of 
London’s pedestrian walkway network or the guardrails along the edges of East 
London pavements. This type of narrative is a logical outcome from an approach 
informed by ideas of networks. The evidence will suggest that some aspects of the 
London story, while wholly connected to a global network, are unique to the 
capital, while in other ways the case of London can be used as a model for 
thinking about complex urban problems in other cities. 
1. INTRODUCING THE TRAFFIC PROBLEM  27 
 
 
 
1.4 Structure of thesis 
Such a commitment to a critical assemblage approach has led to the following 
thesis structure, which enables a variety of different perspectives to be brought 
into play, both complicating and decoding the familiar refrain of London’s traffic 
problem. 
Chapter 2 provides the scholarly context of this study of the traffic problem. 
First, it offers the history of a metric: how traffic congestion has been numerically 
measured and presented in statistical form over the last century. This responds to 
the familiar refrain, outlined earlier in the present chapter, that traffic today moves 
no faster than a horse. The conclusion is that this may well be the case but it is not 
a meaningful representation of the experience of mobility in London. The traffic 
problem is itself a problematic concept. Instead of dwelling on statistics, this 
chapter looks at how movement and motion in cities has been conceptualized in 
scholarly literatures of technology, infrastructure, networks and mobility. This 
results in seeing traffic as a socio-techno-political assemblage of nodes and 
interrelationships, and as a network which requires long-term performance and 
maintenance as well as novelty and invention. It privileges the study of failed or 
sub-optimal states of infrastructures, partly because failure helps the invisible 
become visible, and partly since sub-optimality should be seen as the normal 
rather than the exceptional state of network operation. And it helps guide the 
focus of study towards the full range of human and non-human actors: as will be 
seen later in the thesis, this can include pedestrians, concrete, drivers, railings, 
planning officers, traffic lights, cops, electronic sensors, shopkeepers, CCTV 
cameras, councillors, licences, scientists, prices and passengers, although the 
problematic and fluid nature of these definitions will be clear. The chapter 
considers the particular history of political governance in London, and the role of 
traffic networks in its constitution and development—those seeking holistic 
political control amid a patchwork of local political structures hold up traffic as 
the problem which only London-wide governance can solve. Then, ideas of flow, 
friction and fixity are considered, leading to an approach which considers mobility 
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as incalculably more than mere unrestricted movement. The review of the 
scholarly context concludes by claiming that a sophisticated approach to the 
traffic problem must take into account all of the following: a wide range of actors 
and points of view, a long time-period of historical study, and both micro-
geographical and macro-geographical perspectives. Finally, the chapter sets out a 
methodological approach in which, following a commitment to a distributed sense 
of traffic problems, well-known sources can be examined in a fresh light, and new 
sources opened up to scrutiny. While the main sources used in this thesis are 
written historical records, Chapter 2 suggests ways in which the influence of 
science and technology studies and material culture studies, together with a 
background in museum curatorship, can generate particular sensitivities to 
material evidence—the technical aspects of a socio-technical network which are 
often hard to recover from written sources. 
Chapter 3 sets out the traffic problem as seen in the dominant planning discourse 
over the period up to about 1980. It offers a survey of canonical plans for London, 
starting with the simultaneous birth of professional town planning and the motor 
vehicle in the 1890s. It considers how each successive plan and planner (from the 
London Society, Raymond Unwin, the Highway Development Survey, MARS and 
RIBA to the Royal Academy, Patrick Abercrombie, the City of London, Traffic in 
Towns and the GLC’s Ringways) characterized traffic and proposed to deal with 
it. The chapter concludes that there is much more to planning—and traffic—than 
the canonical figures and their seemingly stable publications. It finds that we have 
been fed the line that traffic is a big problem needing a big solution by planners 
and politicians seeking aggrandisement, but that the reality is more nuanced. It 
also finds a series of common physical constructions that we have absorbed as 
part of this heroic narrative—segregation, flow, verticality, ring roads, arterials. 
But it also suggests the enduring presence of alternative visions for traffic in 
London proposed by actors who did not buy into the heroic holistic reconstruction 
trope. Taken together, these alternative conceptions of the traffic problem invite 
the selection of four case studies, each in the margins of or in opposition to the 
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dominant planning-centred account, and Chapter 3 concludes with a heuristic 
rationale for their selection. An introduction to each now follows. 
Chapter 4 is the first of the four empirical case studies. It takes as its starting 
point the heroic road-building approach to congestion common in the history of 
London planning—the episode is the 1934 construction of Silvertown Way, 
Britain’s first modern flyover, in east London—but approaches it from outside the 
planning discipline in the world view of the concrete engineer. The episode 
demonstrates the contingency of realizing major projects on the ground as well as 
the meanings encoded in the flyover’s location, elevation, width and timing. It 
demonstrates some of the practical consequences of London’s patchwork political 
governance as well as an engineer’s machine-like approach which sought to 
impose a rational, efficient reinforced concrete gridded road structure on top of—
literally overlaid on—the existing tangle of streets. In this, the Silvertown viaduct 
can be seen as a pragmatic grade-separated attempt to right the wrongs of Wren’s 
seventeenth-century failure to reconfigure London’s street layout. But it also fed 
into a distinctly twentieth century idealistic political response to the rise of 
European fascism—specifically Mussolini’s ascendency in Italy and the 
construction of the Via dell’ Impero in Rome—and acted as a statement of 
democracy and a Labourite commercial imperialism. The chapter makes clear the 
relationship between this apparently isolated concrete structure in east London 
and the holistic engineering ambitions of Charles Bressey and the ideas 
underpinning his Highway Development Survey. And it offers a view of the traffic 
problem that concentrates on marginalized actors: on lorries and vans rather than 
motor-cars; working class drivers rather than affluent motorists; and mundane, 
gritty old east London rather than the tentacular new ribbons heading out to 
suburbia. In doing so, its vision of bright white concrete is somewhat at odds with 
received geographies of 1930s transport modernity. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the Metropolitan Police, specifically its 1930s traffic 
commissioner, Alker Tripp, who is widely reported in the planning literature as an 
éminence grise behind Patrick Abercrombie and Colin Buchanan with his ideas of 
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pedestrian segregation, local neighbourhood precincts and a network of fast motor 
roads. This chapter will look at his rise to prominence as a policeman and how his 
desire to reduce pedestrian injuries and fatalities on the capital’s streets led him to 
devise a London-wide project to fence off pavements from roadways, with a 
network of light-controlled pedestrian crossings enabling walkers to cross the 
roads safely and in a controlled manner, as with the railway network. A desire for 
a grid-plan city surfaces here too, with the project overtly intended to generate 
grid-like temporal behaviour—pulses of movement then stoppage—on London’s 
unruly streets. As with Chapter 4, this chapter shows how London’s governance 
structure frustrated plans for a holistic scheme, with only a single thoroughfare—
the East India Dock Road—being railed off, and without its traffic lights. Yet, the 
chapter shows how Tripp’s plan had a more insidious effect and came in part from 
a more unpalatable sociological belief. Recounting a study trip made by Tripp to 
the USA in 1934, months after the end of the prohibition era and its toxic effect 
on public attitudes to law and order, this chapter suggests that distinctly American 
police cultures of control, together with ideas of racial segregation, were imported 
by Tripp from places such as Chicago into London and saw their realization in the 
subsequent deification of physical segregation in the canonical plans of 
Abercrombie, Buchanan and the rest. The chapter offers evidence for a policing 
strategy that could on the one hand be seen as a benign attempt to save lives 
through the mundane technology of the guard-rail, or on the other hand the 
expression of a racialized and gendered segregationist culture of systematic 
discrimination and isolation in which pedestrians were configured as impure and 
contagious—through promiscuity—leading to a diseased city. 
Chapter 6 offers a clear alternative to the reconstructionist vision of planning, 
engineering and policing. It starts with Colin Buchanan’s 1963 Traffic in Towns 
report and looks for opposition. It has to look hard, as the response to Buchanan’s 
report was largely positive at the time, but, as historians have recently observed, at 
the margins of Traffic in Towns can be discerned a group of economists who 
believed that a crucial point was being entirely missed. For them, the market was 
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the best mechanism to allocate resources, with price the means by which it 
operated. The chapter considers a report commissioned by the Ministry of 
Transport that is not so well known as Traffic in Towns or the other famous 
product of Ernest Marples’s reforming zeal, Richard Beeching’s The Reshaping of 
British Railways. Alongside these two well-known publications was a document 
entitled Road Pricing: The Economic and Technical Possibilities, put together by 
Reuben Smeed with a committee that included Alan Walters, later famed as 
Margaret Thatcher’s chief economist and an architect of neoliberalism. The 
chapter considers in detail the work of the committee, the detail being crucial to 
understanding the subtlety by which the neoliberal project operated. It then 
examines the role played by neoliberal think-tanks in propagating the idea of 
road-pricing, then considering its apparent failure, before seeing it converted in 
the turn towards New Labour, finally being realized by Ken Livingstone as the 
2003 London Congestion Charge scheme. The chapter concludes that the free-
marketization of road use has a longer history than might be assumed, going back 
at least to the 1950s. It also opens up a world of electronic networks, just as 
physical as flyovers and guardrails but less visible. 
Chapter 7 opens out this discourse of electronic networks by looking at the work 
of systems analysts, statisticians, modellers, computer programmers and 
electronic engineers (collectively termed ‘scientists’ to recognize an approach 
framed around experimentation and data) in building a digital network of traffic in 
a 1960s version of today’s so-called smart roads. This, too, was in opposition to 
the Buchanian world of reconstruction, although less dogmatic than the neoliberal 
economists seeking marketization. New mathematical approaches such as 
operational research, and new technologies such as the digital computer—both 
products of the Second World War—played a part in forming a belief that traffic 
could be controlled if it could be measured, modelled and simulated. London was 
the site of pioneering experiments to build a cybernetic traffic control network of 
vehicle sensors, computer programmes and traffic lights in which cars became 
atoms in a simulated system—data in a war game played out in the bowels of a 
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metallic computer overlord and enacted under the watchful gaze of a police-
controlled surveillance network that put eyes underneath and over the roads. We 
return again to ideas of grids, with a parallel experiment in Glasgow—which has a 
grid-plan city centre—allowing us to dig into the concept, concluding that London 
was peculiarly badly suited to 1960s computer traffic modelling. The chapter then 
considers what happens when existing technological networks such as 
computerized traffic lights take on new meaning amid changing socio-political 
contexts. In this case, political demonstrations over the Vietnam War helped 
convert a local system for traffic control into a comprehensive CCTV surveillance 
network deployed in a public-order discourse. Again, this is an older story than 
might be assumed, starting in the early 1960s, and it is more complex than a 
simple tale of appropriation by the state for sinister purposes. 
Chapter 8 takes some of the lessons learned from the main case studies and shifts 
attention back to planning. It explores the role of traffic and planning policy in the 
interplay between capital and property. Three projects from the 1950s and 1960s 
are singled out for study. The first is the relatively well-known case of Centre 
Point at the bottom of Tottenham Court Road, in which property developer Harry 
Hyams used the London County Council’s desire for a congestion-busting 
gyratory roundabout to extract a favourable planning consent to build a skyscraper 
against local zoning policies. The clear conclusion is that the traffic problem 
could be leveraged by speculators to assist in the accumulation of capital. The 
second case is that of London Wall, a short stretch of long-proposed ring road to 
the north of the City of London that embodied a new approach by the local 
council to financing and property development in order to extract a planning 
aim—a segregated pedestrian walkway network. This seems to offer a 
counterpoint to Centre Point, showing that planning ends could benefit from 
capital as well as vice versa. The third case is more complex. The Pimlico 
Precinct was the first of Colin Buchanan’s ‘environmental areas’, namely a small 
traffic-calming project in a quiet residential neighbourhood near London’s 
Victoria station. It just involved a few one-way streets, some banned turns, a bit of 
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paving and the planting of a few trees. It was led by Westminster City Council 
and seemed highly successful and hardly controversial—residents loved it and 
motorists were barely inconvenienced. But, as the chapter will show, it was also 
implicitly part of a gentrification scheme which saw lifetime working-class 
tenants allegedly harassed and evicted to enable the houses in the precinct to be 
done up and sold off to affluent incomers—a scandal at the time, long-since 
forgotten. How do streets and buildings relate, and how does capital accumulate in 
the reconfiguration of each? The chapter offers evidence that the marketization 
and capitalization of London’s roads is older and more widespread than the story 
of Thatcherism and the 1980s Enterprise Zones. The chapter offers worked 
examples of how plans have been enacted, who has paid and who has benefited. 
Chapter 9 offers some conclusions. Firstly, it summarizes what has been learned 
about common themes such as London governance structures, grids, verticality 
and segregation. It claims that the case studies show we can only understand 
traffic if we consider it as a socio-technical network (with a sensitivity towards 
material as well as intellectual evidence), with the traffic problem a set of 
constructions motivated by political, social and economic goals. Next, the chapter 
concludes that the lineages of the neoliberal city go back further than the standard 
accounts would suggest, not just in the road-pricing project discussed in Chapter 6 
but in more general terms of the marketization and capitalization of road space. In 
this conclusion, it is suggested that the network might be flat, but the ontology is 
not; capital is a more powerful actor than others in the network, and there is a 
privileged relationship between capital accumulation, traffic and roads. However, 
it is also concluded that capital is not the only social formation to affect the 
construction of the traffic problem. Then, the chapter concludes that some aspects 
of the London story are unique to its physicality and history whereas thinking 
about power allows us to connect its unique aspects with other places, suggesting 
that this London story could act as a model for thinking about complex urban 
problems elsewhere. Finally, the thesis ends with a short survey of the traffic 
problem today and tomorrow—as seen by a diverse range of professional groups. 
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Chapter 2. Approaching the Traffic Problem 
 
Kingston, 30 May 1963. A transport statistician is in an aircraft photographing the 
streets below. Four years later, Reuben Smeed gestures to the image during his 
inaugural lecture as Professor of Traffic Studies at University College London. 
‘When travelling by air over a congested urban area’, he comments, ‘one may be 
surprised by the apparent emptiness of the roads’. He continues, ‘even when the 
average speed of traffic is as low as 5 miles per hour, only between 8 and 16 per 
cent of carriageway is covered by vehicles at any moment’.26 
 
 
Figure 4: Traffic in Kingston, London, Thursday 30 May 1963, 3.15pm (Reuben Smeed).27
                                                 
26 Reuben Smeed, ‘Traffic Studies and Urban Congestion’, Journal of Transport Economics and 
Policy 2, no. 1 (January 1968): 43. 
27 Ibid., 44. 
2. APPROACHING THE TRAFFIC PROBLEM  35 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at the ways congestion and the traffic problem have been 
approached in professional and scholarly discourses before describing a 
methodological approach to sources. In Chapter 1 it was observed that traffic in 
London today goes no faster than it did more than a century ago in the horse-and-
cart era. At least, that is what we tell ourselves as we talk about congestion and 
the problem—or crisis—of traffic in the capital. It sounds as if it should be easy to 
measure but, of course, if the traffic problem is a construction, then metrics used 
to measure it are themselves problematic. The first section of this chapter 
therefore examines the history of traffic metrics in London. This raises problems, 
which are outlined in the second section, which concludes that a different 
approach is needed that looks beyond statistics. This approach is to treat traffic as 
a socio-technical network and thus to conceptualize, rather than try to measure, 
movement in the city. The chapter then examines the sophisticated ways traffic 
and infrastructure have been considered in scholarly disciplines such as science 
and technology studies and human geography, particularly the turns towards 
infrastructures and mobilities, and looks at the politics of London traffic—
political governance, the political economy and the wider politics embedded in 
mobilities. This scholarly context underpins the methodological approach taken in 
the empirical chapters of the thesis, and the final section of the chapter explores 
the thesis’s methodological approach to sources, taking a particular interest in 
what a sensitivity to material culture can offer. 
2.2 The traffic problem in statistics 
Numerous official bodies have recorded traffic statistics of one form or another, at 
one time or another. These have included the Board of Trade, London and Home 
Counties Traffic Advisory Committee, Royal Commissions, Select Committees, 
London County Council (LCC) and Greater London Council (GLC). Today, both 
the Department for Transport (DfT) and Transport for London (TfL) publish 
detailed traffic statistics, but even DfT observes that ‘Traffic congestion is an 
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inherently difficult concept to define as it has both physical and relative 
dimensions ... congestion can mean very different things to different people’.28 It 
is hard, therefore, to decide what to survey when seeking to measure traffic and 
congestion: journey time or average speed, quantity of traffic or number of 
accidents. The statistics presented reflected the picture that authors wished to 
paint. Henry Watson, for instance, who wrote Street Traffic Flow in 1933, 
provided the following figures: 
Census of London Traffic. Thousands of Vehicles Passing 39 Selected Points 
 1912 1920 1923 1926 % Increase over 1912 
Motors 253 364 456 587 132 
Buses 129 129 166 194 50 
Trams 26.9 27.3 30.4 31.8 18 
Horse Vehicles 307 182 133 105 -66 
Cycles 65.8 91.6 131 188 185 
Barrows etc 44.7 24.5 25.3 22.0 -51 
Total 825 818 943 1129 37 
Table 1: Census of London traffic in busy areas, 1912–26.29 
However, he chose not to present the vehicle classes in order of magnitude or 
percentage change. Instead, it served his case to show that buses increased more 
than trams. As was shown in the previous chapter, Watson spoke for the tram 
lobby at a time of febrile argument over municipal socialism in Britain’s cities. 
 Watson drew his data in part from annual statistics published by the LCC 
and GLC, which ran from the LCC’s formation in 1889 to the end of the GLC in 
the 1980s (with a gap from 1938 to 1945). These mostly favoured traffic counts 
(as Watson showed), which are hard to translate into experiences, but give a sense 
of the geography of the problem. In 1938, a comparative survey was published 
(shown in Table 2) showing the location of some of London’s busiest traffic 
locations and the rise in traffic density since 1904. It is clear that traffic levels had 
                                                 
28 Department for Transport, An Introduction to the Department for Transport’s Road Congestion 
Statistics (London: Department for Transport, 2013), italics in original. 
29 Transcribed from Watson, Street Traffic Flow, 4. 
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risen greatly since the start of the century, in many cases almost tripling and in 
some instances rising even faster, such as at Shepherd’s Bush Green where traffic 
in 1938 was almost five times that of 1904. 
 
Table 2: Traffic census data at specific locations, 1904–37 (London County Council).30  
                                                 
30 London County Council, London Statistics 1936–38 (London: London County Council, 1938), 
317. 
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Census data help reveal the locations of London’s traffic problems but do little to 
reveal the effects of congestion. For this, average speed has become the common 
characterization of the user experience as has been noted. TfL’s latest travel report 
included average traffic speeds for 2013 as follows: 
 Morning-peak speed (mph) 
Inter-peak speed 
(mph) 
Evening-peak speed 
(mph) 
Central area 9.38 8.45 8.57 
Inner London 12.4 13.2 11.2 
Outer London 19.5 21.8 18.1 
Table 3: Average traffic speeds on working weekdays, 2013.31 
This may be compared with figures from 1906, when the LCC published a table 
listing average speeds of different vehicles in London’s central area, as follows: 
Class of vehicle 
Speed during ‘crush-hours’ 
(8–10am and 5–7pm) 
Miles per hour 
Speed during slack hours 
Miles per hour 
Traction engines 2 2 
Heavy vans 2½  3 
Light vans 4 to 6 6 to 8 
Omnibuses—horse 3½ to 6 5¼ to 8 
Omnibuses—motor 6½ to 8¼ 8¼ to 11½ 
Cabs—horse 3½ to 6 6 to 8½  
Cabs—motor 8 12 
Tramways—horse 2 to 5 5½ to 8 
Tramways—electric 5½ to 7  8½ to 11½  
Table 4: Speed of vehicles in the central area of London, c.1906.32 
Private motor cars were still not common on London’s streets in 1906, but we can 
take the figures for motor cabs as reasonably representative of motor cars in 
general (although cabs spent time crawling for fares, which will have brought the 
average down slightly). These figures are useful in that they were captured at a 
                                                 
31 Extracted from Transport for London, Travel in London: Report 7 (London: Transport for 
London, 2014), 145, and converted from kph to mph. 
32 Transcribed from London County Council, London Statistics 1905–6 (London: London County 
Council, 1906), 334. The ‘central area’ was defined as ‘the cities of London and Westminster, the 
boroughs of St Marylebone, St Pancras (south of Euston-road), Holborn, Finsbury, Shoreditch, 
Bethnal-green, Stepney, Southwark, Bermondsey, and Lambeth (north of Kennington-lane), an 
area of 12,268 acres (about 19 square miles)’ (24). 
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time when motorized traffic was still in the minority, and give some evidential 
weight to claims that average traffic speeds in the capital have not increased since 
the horse-drawn era.  
 That was the situation at the start and end of the period being considered. 
Statistics exist for much of the interim too. We recall from the previous chapter 
that the average speed recorded in 1936 in the central area was 12.5 mph, and the 
rest of the situation between 1906 and 2013 can be glimpsed by examining firstly 
a series of average speed statistics collected by the Road Research Laboratory, the 
Ministry of Transport and the GLC over the period 1952 to 1968 (see Table 5), 
which did not differentiate for different vehicle types but instead, like the 1936 
experiment described in the previous chapter, showed the average speed of a 
survey car as follows: 
 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 
Off-peak speed (mph) 11.1 10.8 10.3 10.0 9.7 10.3 10.6 10.7 11.2 
Evening peak speed (mph) 10.9 9.9 9.1 8.3 8.6 9.5 8.7 9.5 11.1 
Table 5: Average traffic speed in Central London, 1952–68.33 
Secondly, in 1978, the GLC was able to paint a slightly rosier picture by adjusting 
the scope of the averaging. Here, the average speed in the central area remained 
about the same as that of the 1960s, but speeds on the GLC ‘primary roads’ trunk 
network and those on roads in outer areas were higher. By including them in the 
averaging, the council was able to claim that average speeds across all roads 
topped 20 mph (see Table 6): 
 
                                                 
33 Extracted from Greater London Council, Annual Abstract of Greater London Statistics 1968 
(London: Greater London Council, 1968), 61. 
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 Morning-peak (mph) Off-peak (mph) Evening-peak (mph) 
Primary roads 24.9 37.1 30.4 
Central area 12.3 12.6 11.9 
Inner area 13.3 16.0 12.9 
Central + inner 13.0 13.0 12.5 
Outer SE 16.9 24.1 18.7 
Outer SW 19.8 22.2 19.4 
Outer NW 18.5 23.9 18.2 
Outer N 17.5 22.9 19.8 
Outer NE 17.9 23.7 18.4 
All outer areas 18.3 23.3 18.8 
All areas 16.4 19.3 16.2 
All roads 17.4 21.1 17.6 
Table 6: Average traffic speeds in Greater London, various dates from 1975 to 1978.34 
Finally, in 1998, the Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
(DETR) published a historical data series filling in the period from 1968 to 1998, 
but only for the central and inner areas, as follows: 
 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1990 1994 1997 
Central area 
morning-peak speed 12.7 12.9 14.2 12.3 12.1 11.8 11.5 10.3 10.9 10.0 
Central area inter-
peak speed 12.1 12.6 12.9 12.6 11.6 11.9 11.0 10.6 10.9 10.0 
Central area 
evening-peak speed 11.8 12.7 13.2 11.9 12.2 11.5 11.0 10.3 10.8 10.2 
Inner area morning-
peak speed 15.1 14.5 15.9 13.9 14.2 13.5 11.8 13.3 13.4 12.0 
Inner area inter-peak 
speed 18.3 18.6 18.6 17.3 17.2 16.3 14.6 15.8 15.0 14.8 
Inner area evening-
peak speed 15.2 14.5 15.5 13.5 14.1 13.1 11.6 13.2 12.8 11.4 
Central + inner area 
morning-peak speed 14.4 14.1 15.4 13.5 13.6 13.0 11.7 12.3 12.6 11.4 
Central + inner area 
inter-peak speed 15.7 16.2 16.4 15.5 15.0 14.8 13.3 13.8 13.6 13.0 
Central + inner area 
evening-peak speed  14.0 13.9 14.7 13.0 13.5 12.7 11.4 12.2 12.2 11.1 
Table 7: Average traffic speeds (mph) in inner London, 1968–98.35 
                                                 
34 Extracted from Greater London Council, Annual Abstract of Greater London Statistics 1979 & 
1980 (London: Greater London Council, 1980), 88. The periods were defined as follows: 7.45 to 
9.15am (morning peak), 10am to 4pm (off-peak) and 4.45 to 6.15pm (evening peak). 
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 One of the problems with these statistics is that the area being surveyed, 
and the methodology of the survey, changed throughout the period, but at least 
they help us grasp the order of magnitude of the situation. Thus, assuming the 
‘central area’ was defined more or less the same over the century; that the hours 
representing the peaks and inter-peak period are also comparable; and taking the 
values for 1906 from the top average speed of motor cabs, then we can derive the 
following historical pattern: 
 
Chart 1: Average traffic speed during weekday daytimes for motor traffic in Central London, 1906 
to 2013, constructed using sources described above (David Rooney). 
It seems that London traffic today really does go no faster than it did in the horse-
drawn era. But what has this analysis of the statistics really told us?  
2.3 The problem with the traffic problem 
In 1954, journalist Darrell Huff published How To Lie With Statistics, a popular 
work recently described by a statistician (presumably with a straight face) as ‘the 
                                                                                                                                     
35 Extracted from ‘Traffic Speeds in Inner London: 1998’, DETR Statistics Bulletin 98, quoted in 
document at www.camden.gov.uk/ccm/cms-service/stream/asset/?asset_id=570372. 
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most widely read statistics book in the history of the world’.36 In it, Huff trained 
his readers to watch out for devices such as ‘the well-chosen average’ and ‘the 
gee-whiz graph’, just two of several techniques employed by people seeking to 
manipulate statistics to present a particular message (and which might look 
familiar from the foregoing account of traffic statistics). Huff was not a 
statistician, and some on the inside of the profession were uncomfortable with the 
points he made, but most accepted his premise. As one said recently, ‘People do 
lie with statistics every day, and it is to Huff’s credit that he takes the media (and 
others) to task for having stretched, torn or mutilated the truth’.37 It is now quite 
clear that repeatedly changing the sample and the methodology will render any 
meaningful statistical analysis impossible. While there is no suggestion the GLC, 
DETR, the Road Research Laboratory or Henry Watson intended to deceive, the 
fact that they were operating in politically inflected environments, and that they 
all wanted to convey particular messages with their statistics, means we should at 
least consume their fare with doses of salt. The problem is that the traffic problem 
starts to break down under close scrutiny into numerous other problems—human 
problems, requiring approaches from the humanities as much as the sciences to 
make sense of them. 
 Statistics will not tell us the wider story. For this, it is crucial to look at 
how movement and motion in cities has been conceptualized. The traffic 
‘problem’ is often defined in terms of congestion, but it is really a set of 
conceptual problems about mobilities, which have geographical, political and 
technological aspects. We physically configure the places and spaces of traffic 
according to values and beliefs. In talking about the traffic problem we are 
passing judgement over other people. Ideas underpinning the approach in this 
                                                 
36 Darrell Huff, How To Lie With Statistics (London: Victor Gollancz, 1954); J. Michael Steele, 
‘Darrell Huff and Fifty Years of How to Lie with Statistics’, Statistical Science 20, no. 3 (2005): 
205. 
37 Steele, ‘Darrell Huff and Fifty Years of How to Lie with Statistics’, 207. 
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thesis to these three aspects—geographies, politics and technologies—will now be 
considered. 
2.4 Technologies, politics and geographies 
Scholars in the humanities have been turning increasingly towards infrastructure 
over recent years. In the history of technology, Thomas Hughes established a 
research programme in 1983 which has since been developed by countless writers 
seeking a sophisticated understanding of networked technologies. In urban studies 
and related fields, authors such as Stephen Graham, Maria Kaika, Simon Marvin, 
Karen Ruhleder, Susan Leigh Star, Erik Swyngedouw and Nigel Thrift have 
offered particularly notable contributions. Together, this work has helped situate 
studies of urban planning, mobility, society and nature within technological 
systems, and it is impossible to imagine studies of infrastructure which do not 
engage critically with material culture. A recent focus on maintenance and repair, 
as well as infrastructures in their failed states, whether acute or chronic, shows 
there is analytical value in considering the fragility of infrastructure. It helps us 
see that which is normally invisible.38 Thus traffic congestion helps us see 
mobility. From this latter point it would be easy to characterize congestion as the 
failed state of mobility. Yet the infrastructure turn helps problematize that 
position. In their study of maintenance, Stephen Graham and Nigel Thrift 
comment that ‘it can be argued that the accidents that stem from so many 
breakdowns are not aberrant but are a part of the thing itself. To invent the train is 
                                                 
38 Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880–1930 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); Susan Leigh Star and Karen Ruhleder, ‘Steps 
Toward an Ecology of Infrastructure: Design and Access for Large Information Spaces’, 
Information Systems Research 7, no. 1 (March 1996): 111–34; Susan Leigh Star, ‘The 
Ethnography of Infrastructure’, American Behavioural Scientist 43, no. 3 (December 1999): 377–
91; Maria Kaika and Erik Swyngedouw, ‘Fetishizing the Modern City: The Phantasmagoria of 
Urban Technological Networks’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24, no. 1 
(March 2000): 120–38; Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin, Splintering Urbanism: Networked 
Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2001); Stephen Graham and Nigel Thrift, ‘Out of Order: Understanding Repair and 
Maintenance’, Theory, Culture & Society 24, no. 3 (2007): 1–25; Stephen Graham, ed., Disrupted 
Cities: When Infrastructure Fails (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010). 
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to invent the train crash, to invent the plane is to invent the plane crash, and so 
on’.39 In this sense, congestion is not a failed state: it is an ineluctable part of 
mobility, and this reinforces the view that the term ‘traffic problem’ is itself 
problematic and deserves to be subjected to critical scrutiny. 
 This thesis, then, assesses a material culture of traffic, but defined 
carefully. Graham and Thrift argue that: 
Cultures of normalized and taken-for-granted infrastructure use sustain 
widespread assumptions that urban ‘infrastructure’ is somehow a material and 
utterly fixed assemblage of hard technologies embedded stably in place, which is 
characterized by perfect order, completeness, immanence and internal 
homogeneity rather than leaky, partial and heterogeneous entities.40  
They also argue that those infrastructure cultures have histories. Giving the 
example of how societies deal with car accidents, they comment that ‘this crash 
ecology has not come into existence overnight. It has been built up over a long 
period of time’.41 The idea of an ‘ecology’ points towards networks including 
things such as skills and knowledge as well as hard artefacts. In our example, 
traffic congestion is clearly a juxtaposition of materiality (artefacts, technologies) 
and people (with skills, knowledges and beliefs). And it is these ideas about 
assemblages—actor-networks which comprise and are performed by both human 
and non-human elements—which can guide us towards a more sophisticated 
approach to a socio-technical culture of traffic.  
 Antoine Bousquet has recently summarized the socio-technical nature of 
assemblages, commenting that: 
the deployment of any technology within the social field must necessarily be 
grasped in terms of the wider ensemble within which it is inserted, since the 
                                                 
39 Graham and Thrift, ‘Out of Order: Understanding Repair and Maintenance’, 4. 
40 Ibid., 10. 
41 Ibid., 17. 
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multiple relations that compose this ensemble determine to a large extent the 
usages and meanings given to the said technology.42  
But what does this general comment mean for a study of traffic and congestion? 
Bousquet’s conclusions give useful summaries of assemblage theory that can 
directly transfer to ‘the traffic problem’. One can note his following comment: 
technology is simultaneously both less and more than what it is typically taken to 
be: less because it’s not an external material agency that unilaterally transforms a 
passive social body, and more because it actually permeates every aspect of the 
social. The question of technology thus directs us towards the ubiquitous 
materiality of social relations, the very glue that holds human collectives 
together.43 
If we substitute the word ‘congestion’ for ‘technology’ in the quote, it points 
towards the need to avoid an approach that is pure technological determinism or 
pure social construction. Instead we need to consider action and influence in both 
directions. Work in this field looking specifically at automobility includes that of 
Peter Merriman, who guides us towards looking at multiple actors and viewpoints. 
He notes that we need to look at (among other groups) road safety experts, 
government scientists, police, judiciary, traffic engineers and commercial 
organizations as well as planners, engineers, landscape architects and 
preservationists when considering the planning of traffic.44 He discusses 
electronic monitoring networks as well as codes of conduct and the practice of 
conventions. And he has commented explicitly on the significance of technologies 
in this network:  
roads and motorways are not simply products of political decision-making, 
planning or engineering, for a large number of actors are required to bring about 
such socio-technical achievements: from human actors such as planners, 
                                                 
42 Antoine Bousquet, ‘Welcome to the Machine: Rethinking Technology and Society through 
Assemblage Theory’, in Reassembling International Theory: Assemblage Thinking and 
International Relations, ed. Michele Acuto and Simon Curtis (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014), 93. 
43 Ibid., 96–7. 
44 Peter Merriman, ‘Automobility and the Geographies of the Car’, Geography Compass 3, no. 2 
(2009): 590. 
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politicians, engineers, lobbyists, labourers and landscape architects, to distinctive 
arrangements of concrete, tarmac and steel.45 
Ideas of traffic and congestion as socio-technical assemblages will therefore run 
implicitly throughout this thesis. 
 So, too, will issues surrounding the peculiarities of political decision-
making in the capital. ‘Technically there is no London’, wrote public affairs 
scholar Hank Savitch in 1988. He was describing the capital’s political 
governance, divided between Greater London, the City of London and the London 
boroughs, and he observed that the system had led to ‘the vice of a confused 
identity’. The result was an ‘intractable metropolis’.46 Michael Hebbert has 
expanded this analysis, observing that the tension between the London County 
Council on the one hand and the City Corporation and boroughs on the other hand 
(‘the parochialism of the vestries’) was actively created at the turn of the twentieth 
century by Tory politicians seeking to limit the influence of the Liberal and 
socialist LCC. This conservative Corporation and borough opposition to the 
metropolitan LCC formed, in Hebbert’s words, ‘an effective and durable political 
axis’ and ‘a system of permanent ambiguity in the issue of who should speak and 
act for London’.47 As Jerry White has noted, ‘rivalry and conflict and controversy 
were bred in the bones of London governance from the very start of the 
[twentieth] century’.48 
 The story of London’s government has been well and carefully told, and 
remains a live subject, with the formation of the Greater London Authority in 
2000 the latest in a century and a half of attempts to govern ‘an ungovernable 
                                                 
45 Peter Merriman, ‘Roads’, in The Routledge Handbook of Mobilities, ed. Peter Adey et al. 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 201. 
46 Hank Savitch, Post-Industrial Cities: Politics and Planning in New York, Paris, and London 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 170–1. 
47 Michael Hebbert, London: More by Fortune than Design (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 
1998), 50–2; see also Michael Hebbert, ‘Governing the Capital’, in The Crisis of London, ed. 
Andy Thornley (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 134–48. 
48 White, London in the Twentieth Century, 357. 
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city’, in the words of Tony Travers.49 Of particular interest in the context of this 
thesis is to consider the key driver for unification of London government from the 
1850s onwards: infrastructure. Right from the start, Hebbert has argued, ‘The 
great unifier was transport’.50 The formation of the first capital-wide governance 
body, the Metropolitan Board of Works in 1855, emerged from problems with 
sewerage and sanitation, but included improvements to the capital’s arterial road 
network in its founding scope, as John Davis has noted.51 The MBW was, as 
Travers has described, ‘a temporary technical solution to the problems of 
equipping the world’s largest metropolis with basic infrastructure’.52 Its 
supersession by the LCC in 1889 continued this work, in part to enact transport 
improvements so that overcrowding could be eased by an active dispersal policy, 
as Andrew Saint has argued.53 Then, as the LCC gave way to the Greater London 
Council in 1965, ‘Arterial roads—or rather the lack of them—were a dominant 
consideration’ for the government, in Hebbert’s words. ‘The council was created 
expressly to get the primary road network built’, he has noted.54 Thus transport—
particularly road transport—has remained an enduring factor in the ongoing 
political tension between metropolitan and local government in the capital and 
will be a recurring theme throughout the case studies, which will look at how this 
tension played out, in detail, in the streets themselves.  
                                                 
49 Tony Travers, The Politics of London: Governing an Ungovernable City (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004); see also Tony Travers, London’s Boroughs at 50 (London: Biteback 
Publishing, 2015). 
50 Hebbert, London: More by Fortune than Design, 39. 
51 John Davis, Reforming London: The London Government Problem 1855–1900 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 41; see also Gloria Clifton, Professionalism, Patronage and Public 
Service in Victorian London: The Staff of the Metropolitan Board of Works 1856–1889 (London: 
The Athlone Press, 1992). 
52 Travers, The Politics of London, 25. 
53 Andrew Saint, ‘“Spread the People”: The LCC’s Dispersal Policy, 1889–1965’, in Politics and 
the People of London: The London County Council 1889–1965, ed. Andrew Saint (London: The 
Hambledon Press, 1989), 215–36. 
54 Hebbert, London: More by Fortune than Design, 76. 
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 But of course the politics inherent in congestion and the traffic problem is 
wider and deeper than overt governance structures, important though they have 
been in the shaping of responses to traffic. A wider consideration of the politics of 
traffic is invited following the work of writers such as David Harvey, Doreen 
Massey, Patrick Joyce, Gareth Stedman Jones and Tim Cresswell, who reveal the 
ways cities and their infrastructures are comprised of, and constitute, political 
acts—political in the widest sense of the word, including body politics.55 These 
issues, too, will repeatedly emerge in the stories that follow.  
 Recent writing on mobilities draws together and provides theoretical 
rigour to these attempts to break down a seemingly fixed, singular, technical 
‘problem’ and decode its politics. This revolves around ideas of flow and fixity, a 
pairing of concepts which could be tailor-made for treating the subject of traffic 
congestion. Introducing the concept, Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift encourage a 
focus on flow rather than stasis, commenting that ‘Modern cities are extraordinary 
agglomerations of flows’.56 They observe that in their work ‘there is a strong 
emphasis on understanding cities as spatially open and cross-cut by many 
different kinds of mobilities, from flows of people to commodities and 
information’.57 They consider the city as a ‘machinic assemblage, which is both 
composed by, and institutionalizes, flow’.58 This approach points up a negative 
value judgment placed on congestion. If Tim Cresswell says movement is 
                                                 
55 See for instance David Harvey, Social Justice and the City (London: Edward Arnold, 1973); 
David Harvey, Paris, Capital of Modernity (London and New York: Routledge, 2003); Doreen 
Massey, Space, Place, and Gender (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Doreen 
Massey, For Space (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2005); Patrick Joyce, The Rule of Freedom: 
Liberalism and the Modern City (London and New York: Verso, 2003); Patrick Joyce, The State of 
Freedom: A Social History of the British State Since 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013); Gareth Stedman Jones, Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship Between 
Classes in Victorian Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); Tim Cresswell, On the 
Move (New York and London: Routledge, 2006); Tim Cresswell, Place: An Introduction 
(Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2015). 
56 Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift, Cities: Reimagining the Urban (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 42. 
57 Ibid., 3. 
58 Ibid., 5. 
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mobility without meaning, as Peter Adey has concluded, then we need to 
scrutinise the meaning of congestion, which means seeing it as a form of mobility 
itself (mobility can incorporate immobility) rather than a meaning-free and 
uncritical ‘lack of movement’.59 Adey says: ‘To abstract mobility to movement 
(mobility without meaning) often has distinctly political consequences’.60 So, the 
abstraction of a wide range of experiences of traffic to the monolithic traffic 
problem is the result of a set of political acts.  
 Melissa Butcher has specifically examined a political materiality of 
congestion. She notes that: ‘Physical zones of exclusion such as gated 
communities and gentrification projects are designed to remove uncivil spaces of 
congestion that cause discomfort’, and that ‘Local markets ... are gentrified ... by 
clean shopping malls that enable the easy flow of traffic within and without. 
Space becomes privatised, regulated and surveilled to contain or exclude 
congestion’.61 However, a risk in this approach is that there appears to be little 
human agency: spaces ‘become’ surveilled; gentrification projects ‘are designed’; 
and it is malls which gentrify street markets. A more active view sees people 
constituting gentrification projects and surveillance systems, and examples of both 
will be considered in this thesis. Adey reinforces this point: ‘Mobility is not 
essentially good or bad ... Rather mobility is given or inscribed with meaning,’ 
depending on context and people doing the inscribing.62 He has also observed 
that: 
The politics of mobility is rarely a new thing, but often builds on the back of 
much longer historical trends and of ideologies sedimented into plans and 
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processes, concretized into large-scale building projects and infrastructure. Here 
these included a general privileging of private automobility as the norm.63  
 Two lessons deserve to be drawn from Adey’s comments here. The first is 
about biography and history. Mobilities have histories and they are constituted by 
human agency, a point made too by Miles Ogborn in his approach to telling global 
history when he comments that: 
it is easier to see the effects of human action, and the effects on human action, 
once that global scale is understood as the on-going organisation of different and 
partial relationships, networks and webs. These modes of connection may stretch 
across vast areas, but they always do so via particular forms of action.  
The aim of his approach, he observes, ‘is to present the world as seen from many 
points of view’. He notes that his work ‘gives due weight to the actions of all sorts 
of people in exploring these global histories and geographies’ and is thus a call for 
multiple historical biography in the telling of historical geography. As he 
concludes, ‘People can and do make a difference for themselves and others’.64 
This point can be seen in the context of another ‘turn’ in the humanities—the 
biographical turn—which seeks to critically examine the ways in which 
biographical research and life-writing affect the ways we interrogate and interpret 
histories. Barbara Caine has commented that the biographical turn ‘involves a new 
preoccupation with individual lives and stories as a way of understanding both 
contemporary societies and the whole process of social and historical change’ and 
that a biographical approach gives historians ‘a way of accessing subjective 
understanding and experience’.65 This thesis will follow that logic, aiming to use 
individual biographical and historical cases to understand better the subjective 
experiences of traffic that are occluded by seemingly objective statistical or 
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economic accounts, as well as to gain insights into wider processes of change. In 
doing so, it attempts to reinforce the value of studying the ‘longer historical 
trends’ described by Adey above. 
 The second point to be made in response to Adey’s comments is about 
scale and geography. By focusing on the large scale of the traffic problem, one is 
likely to see large-scale infrastructures and large-scale trends, such as the 
privileging of private automobility, as Adey notes. The significance of both of 
these in the story that will be told in this thesis cannot be denied. However, there 
is value in balancing large-scale historical study with the parallel study of smaller-
scale episodes—which might in turn illuminate different large-scale trends. By 
looking at the fine grain of seemingly localized projects and infrastructures, and 
demonstrating how the configurations of mobilities have been enacted in specific 
places at specific times, we can take into account a further point made by Miles 
Ogborn, with Frank Mort, who together noted the following:  
What is uncovered at close range is much more about the ways in which 
conceptions of urban society and culture and the geographical ordering of the city 
are interrelated in the history of specific streets and thoroughfares, monuments, 
buildings, and even distinctive interiors ... the turn to the detailed particularities 
of place and setting, and to the multiple social actors who inhabit these 
environments, produces a particular effect. London’s geographies now become 
active sites for examining the competing uses, social meanings, and power 
relations that have structured the development of the city.66  
This thesis will follow this logic, too, exploring a range of specific London 
projects in order to interrogate the use of traffic and the streets as sites for the 
performance of power relations. 
2.5 Sources 
The theoretical framework outlined in this chapter invites a different reading of 
sources, a reading which seeks out and interprets alternative voices or visions of 
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mobility which have been marginalized. This approach is strongly consistent with 
a commitment to a distributed sense of the traffic problem—of traffic as a socio-
technical network or assemblage. From the outset this has meant setting aside the 
metrics as sources of evidence. As has already been said, this is not to say that 
they are not interesting. Rather, it is to recognize that what they really offer is 
evidence of the black-boxing of experiences of mobility into a monolithic, 
measurable traffic problem. Having thus invited a deeper reading of the 
problem—the opening of the black box—the statistics can be set aside for more 
challenging fare. Presently, this section will critically examine the conventional 
range of sources used in the thesis. Those sources are documents, pictorial 
material and films. But approaches borrowed from material culture studies and 
professional museum curatorship have led to a distinct sensitivity to the 
affordances of material as well as archival evidence—to physical artefacts beyond 
paper and celluloid. 
Artefacts 
In the present project, which explores London’s traffic as a complex socio-
technical network, it would not be possible to understand the full, diverse form of 
the network without approaching the streets of London themselves as a heuristic 
material archive—a landscape of artefacts. Exploring the real streets as a distinct 
research activity animates the close reading of written sources. This has acted to 
reinforce the aforementioned new reading of the literatures to seek out 
marginalized voices and accounts. The role of artefacts as mediators of 
marginalized or concealed histories, and their value in guiding research into wider 
social conditions, has been widely considered in a variety of cultural contexts.67 
These have tended to consider portable artefacts circulating in social networks, 
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rather than those which are also themselves physical networks (such as 
infrastructures), but the act of interrogating objects to reveal stories concealed 
from official accounts is an approach that can be applied to the present case. It is 
possible to take ideas of revelation further by considering the processes of 
curating artefacts in museums. These processes, as Donald Preziosi has observed, 
transform the artefacts by removing them from place, context or condition, giving 
them a complex relationship both with themselves before they entered the 
museum, and with other, similar, things.68 This disruptive process, which opens 
artefacts to close scrutiny and deconstruction, need not, however, involve physical 
transportation. Objects can be curated in situ and transformed through acts of 
visual, sensory and intellectual interrogation in the search for concealed or 
marginalized meanings. 
 How this happens on the ground is hard to describe, being a largely tacit 
activity. Let us take two examples. The first is a 1960s project to construct a 
network of interconnected traffic lights in an area of west London (which will 
form the basis of Chapter 7). It is difficult to grasp from the published literature (a 
few newspaper reports, a line or two in histories of traffic control) the scale of 
civil engineering needed to construct such a network. Without grasping that, it 
would be easy to dismiss such a project as trivial—as marginal. On the ground, 
though, every set of signals atop their steel poles invites a close inspection of the 
physical landscape nearby. This reveals a patchwork of saw-cuts in the road in 
which vehicle sensors have been laid before being covered over with poured tar 
(exploring when the sun is low on the horizon helps as the light reflects off the 
glossy tar more than the surrounding tarmac). Following these lines to the side of 
the road leads the researcher to cast-iron plates covering junction boxes flush-
mounted at or near the kerb, which can be seen to be connected under the 
pavements to surface-mounted boxes containing electronic equipment. Some are 
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marked, others unmarked, but one soon works out what is what, and what was 
when (inspection hatch covers contain many clues). One then spots lampposts 
nearby, and clear evidence of digging-up and infilling, revealing that the traffic 
signals and equipment-boxes take their power from the public lighting circuits. 
One also spies General Post Office duct covers which can be followed to chart the 
path of interconnections between the signal control-boxes and the public 
telephone network. These lead to exchange buildings, and so on, as the network 
widens. Walking between each set of lights and the next is time-consuming and 
tiring. Traffic is heavy (that was the point) and it is clear that installation of this 
network would have been highly disruptive. The area looks small on a map but in 
reality covers a lot of ground. This is not, it turns out, a trivial piece of civil 
engineering. 
 A second example might be concrete flyovers in London (the subject of 
Chapter 4). Modern elevated roads loom large in the planning literature but it 
would be easy to assume that they were a post-war phenomenon designed for 
segregated fast motor-car traffic. We often read of the Chiswick and 
Hammersmith flyovers (1959 and 1961) and the Westway (1970) and have in our 
minds affluent car-owning commuters living west of the city. It would thus be 
easy to miss the 1934 Silvertown Viaduct in Canning Town. A visit establishes 
the story. For a start, this is not a segregated highway. Generous pavement widths 
on each side enable pedestrians to use this flyover with ease. The ramp gradients 
are shallow—horses and heavy vehicles would easily cope—and there are stair 
cases in the middle portion of the flyover, offering short-cuts. Traffic does not 
travel particularly fast, and can be seen easily from a distance, so crossing the 
road is no more dangerous than on the streets below. A double-decker bus on the 
474 route passes by. There are several stops along the viaduct, located next to the 
stair cases—designed for the convenience of people working nearby commuting 
in by public transport. Then there is the view. The parapets are low and the view 
is far-reaching. The docks below stretch impressively into the distance. A short 
hop on the bus gives an even finer view from its top deck. One can sense the scale 
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of the dock structures that is missed at ground level, but this is not a privileged 
vantage point—it is accessible to all. But it is not all about the long view. The 
curious pedestrian can look down onto the tangle of streets over which the viaduct 
passes. From above, old railway lines can be clearly discerned, still embedded in 
the road surface, leading off into industrial premises. The routes of telephone and 
telegraph lines, electric supply networks, and water and gas mains can be 
followed and plotted. A hidden infrastructural history of the dock area is revealed. 
The view of the viaduct itself, from the streets below, is equally instructive. It sits 
not on monolithic piers as in Chiswick or Hammersmith, but on a dense network 
of slim piles. The land-take is therefore prodigious and one can easily imagine the 
difficulty of using this technology in parts of London with higher land values. One 
also immediately realizes this is no ‘non-place’, if one ever thought of concrete 
flyovers as such constructions. Small businesses—scrap-metal dealers, 
hairdressing suppliers—occupy units let into the sides of the higher portions of the 
viaduct. People spend their working lives within this structure underneath those 
using it to get to other places of work nearby. There is a thriving local community 
of the viaduct as well as around it (and it is a community that has gathered here 
from around the world). Even in 2016 after the decline of the docks the 
Silvertown Viaduct is alive with commercial activity.  
 Walking the Silvertown Viaduct provides a unique reading both of itself 
and of the physical context in which it sits. It problematizes ideas that London’s 
flyovers are segregated structures for affluent car-drivers to speed between the 
city and the suburbs. In doing so it reveals how working Londoners in the margins 
of the 1930s east end could gain democratic access to a view of the docks from 
above—a vision of the heart of the British Empire. This is not a metaphorical 
vision. With the low parapets, wide pavements and frequent double-deck buses 
(or trolley buses, then), the view was real, impressive and long. Yet the physical 
scale of the viaduct is revealed to be entirely human. It is a comfortable place to 
explore. And it allows the close examination of the entire infrastructural landscape 
in a way that would not be possible purely from maps or descriptions. It embeds 
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what might be seen as a singular artefact—a flyover—into its streets, 
surroundings and landscape. It shows its network.  
 Alternatively, the visual interrogation of the west-London traffic light 
network acts to de-embed it—uprooting it from the streets in which it is 
physically embedded and subjecting its network status to view. In doing so, its 
socio-technical scale is revealed, in that each part of the network must have 
involved physical and social acts to install and maintain—planning, surveying, 
hiring plant, gaining permissions, designing cable routes, installing junction 
boxes, writing contracts to work with other infrastructure providers for access to 
trenches, developing technical standards and so on. All these clues are there to be 
seen in material form, but are almost entirely elided from all but the most 
technical written accounts—accounts which will only be recovered from the 
margins once the significance of the project has been grasped, and its place in a 
network established.  
 By their very definition it can be hard to find accounts that have been 
marginalized. Often, the clues are there in the literature (assuming one casts the 
net widely enough) but they are missed because one is not sensitive to spotting 
their traces. Field trips, however, train the senses. By living, breathing and feeling 
the subject under one’s feet, fingers and eyes over a long period of time—walking 
hundreds of miles of London streets, exploring tunnels and flyovers, peering 
inside roadside equipment cabinets, tracking the traces of cables buried in 
roadways, triangulating surveillance cameras, observing vehicle behaviour, 
feeling gradients and cambers, crossing roads, timing traffic light phases, spotting 
different types of manhole cover, listening to traffic noise, talking to maintenance 
workers, examining road works, decoding symbols spray-painted onto pavements, 
and throughout this activity attempting to put a date on different artefacts in the 
road landscape—tacit instincts are developed. Those instincts then enable a 
potentially interesting object to be spotted a mile off through the subtle clues and 
cues it exhibits. Then, once potential candidates have been spotted, their traces 
will relatively easily reveal themselves in the written literature. Practical 
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familiarity with the material artefact in question has a second methodological 
effect which then comes into play, in that written descriptions of technical 
projects are almost inevitably incomplete or equivocal. In such cases, knowledge 
of the artefact can help fill in gaps or interpret ambiguous statements. Revisiting 
the scene of a particular traffic project after reading about it in the archive can 
transform comprehension of how it worked and, therefore, what it meant. It 
enables exploration of the streetscape of the object as well as the object itself. 
This is the value of hands-on exploration in helping reveal marginalized accounts, 
and this iterative exploration of archival and situated sources has taken place 
throughout the present project. 
 This is not to say that a curatorial training is required to develop the 
obsession with infrastructure that leads to such extensive practical and hands-on 
exploration. Very many people share this obsession, including, clearly, the authors 
of numerous works cited in this thesis. It is hard to study cities and how they work 
without wanting to spend time exploring them. The point is made simply to 
register a distinct methodological technique and a significant category of sources 
often overlooked in scholarly accounts. This methodological approach has fed 
through to the structure of the thesis. Alongside biographical stories of human 
agency are biographies of objects. The technologies examined in this thesis 
include the following. The first is a study of concrete flyovers, focusing on the 
Silvertown Viaduct in Canning Town. The second examines an installation of 
metal guard-rails along the East India Dock Road. The third case study follows 
proposals for road-pricing meters, vouchers, licences and other technologies of 
charging. The fourth studies the building of a computer-controlled traffic light 
system connected to a network of traffic sensors and CCTV cameras. The final 
case study examines the deployment of technologies as diverse as tower blocks 
and trees. These case studies will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 as they 
emerge from a close reading of the planning literature as well as the physical 
exploration of London. These are stories of things in, on, over and under the 
streets of London, their material qualities, the connections between them and the 
2. APPROACHING THE TRAFFIC PROBLEM  58 
 
 
 
ways they speak to things elsewhere, as well as the people who have invented, 
made, used, modified, commissioned, appropriated, experienced and performed 
them. Of course, any field trip relies on documents as well as shoe-leather. A 
variety of historical maps of London, together with Pevsner’s Buildings of 
England, the Survey of London’s detailed tomes, street directories such as the 
Post Office and Kelly’s, and gazetteers such as the works by Harold Clunn, Henry 
Tomlinson and Albert Linney, have been invaluable in reconciling past with 
present in the aforementioned exploration of the three-dimensional archive. This 
is a historical network. 
 Once we understand the individual case studies we can expand out to 
wider histories and geographies, as James Secord has observed in the context of 
science history, commenting that ‘All evidence from the past is in the form of 
material things’, including articles, books and images, and that ‘It is in tracing the 
patterns of circulation of these “things-in-motion”, as the anthropologist Arjun 
Appadurai has called them, that we can create a history that goes beyond 
particular instances’.69 Frank Mort has taken an approach similar to this in his 
examination of a series of canonical plans for London in the 1940s.70 He examines 
the intertextuality of the plans, reading them on numerous layers as unstable 
performances of cultural world views. Their selection of images, for instance, was 
critical in the construction of a vision for London, and those images circulated; 
along with words, maps, diagrams and quotations they were things in motion, 
which accreted as official reports, popular paperback books, exhibitions, 
educational packs, models, lectures, press releases and so on. The Abercrombie 
plan, for instance, can therefore be artefactualized, problematized, deconstructed 
and interrogated. Thus, a sensitivity to the socio-technical network creates a new 
set of historical sources—objects—as well as a new approach to apparently non-
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artefactual sources—books, papers, manuscripts, films, images, archival material. 
With this in mind, we now turn to those sources themselves. 
Documents 
Documents are not passive artefacts. They are themselves actors in networks of 
ideas, approaches, practices and technologies of traffic. Throughout this thesis, 
official publications, including reports and plans, have formed the basis for 
studying responses to the traffic problem but, as has already been discussed, 
seeing such publications as fixed and singular is problematic and the structure and 
methodology of the thesis has been designed to open up and read across such 
documents. For instance, two 1960s reports commissioned by the Ministry of 
Transport, Traffic in Towns and the lesser-known Road Pricing, are considered at 
length, the latter forming the basis for Chapter 6 which examines in detail the 
process by which the report came about and was constructed, as well as the ways 
in which it was mobilized as a political device. Similarly, Chapter 3 will examine 
a canon of official and semi-official plans for London with the intention of 
identifying what they marginalized as well as what they promoted.  
 This commitment to ideas of assemblages, with published documents 
occupying positions within them, invites a wider examination of the construction 
of the canonical plans. This can mean, for instance, seeing each plan as a short 
moment in a long process, a process which can be opened to view by exploring 
the detailed correspondence files that manifest it. For the present study, these files 
are mostly held at The National Archives (which holds central government files 
and those of government institutions such as the Road Research Laboratory and 
Metropolitan Police), the London Metropolitan Archives (which holds the records 
of London government, from the London County Council and Greater London 
Council to the City Corporation) and local borough council archives (holding 
correspondence of London’s numerous town halls). The files held in these 
repositories give minutiae, opinion, disagreement and works-in-progress, whereas 
official published reports freeze that work into public statements, still contingent 
and problematic but designed for public view. Both are needed. In some cases, 
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official publications have come out of government select committees, royal 
commissions and parliamentary bills, so the reports of minutes of proceedings, 
evidence tabled and Hansard debates provide important evidence situating the 
final reports into longer and wider networks of debate and rhetoric. Throughout 
the public archives, record survival is uneven and selective, and a reliance on a 
small number of repositories accentuates bias and distorted views. However, the 
bias inherent in uneven archival survival can be a positive benefit as it helps 
suggest what was considered important and what was thought less so, although a 
careful touch is needed to take advantage of this. 
 Traffic is often characterized as a technical subject, and therefore an 
extensive technical literature joins the official publications circulating in the 
network of traffic. These technical publications and debates explore all aspects of 
the subject described in this thesis, from traffic-light design to traffic control 
techniques, and from computer modelling methods to concrete highway 
construction design. These take the form of standalone books written for 
professional institutions and practitioners’ personal libraries, the papers and 
discussions published in countless technical journals, and a wide body of what is 
often called ‘grey literature’, documents which are not-quite-published (often for 
non-public audiences such as companies or government bodies) and thus often 
easy to miss in reviews of literature. Following the threads of the network of 
sources brings them into view. Professional boosterism, the cult of novelty, 
commercial conflicts and the perils of technological triumphalism are particular 
hazards to watch out for in such accounts but the main problem is simply 
incomprehension, unless one is oneself a technical specialist. In this project, the 
hands-on exploration of London’s street infrastructures discussed previously has 
helped aid comprehension, but it is fair to assume that most of the advanced 
technical and mathematical detail has been skipped lightly over. This would be a 
problem if we were seeking a full technical understanding of a technology, but we 
are looking more broadly than that. The main value from such publications in this 
context is an understanding of how practitioners talked about their subject—how 
2. APPROACHING THE TRAFFIC PROBLEM  61 
 
 
 
they thought these projects worked, what they thought they meant, and how they 
shared their world views with others. Even the most technical publication 
expresses a world view, whether overtly or through assumptions or omissions. It 
is this world view—often expressed through telling phrases or comments about 
alternative or competing approaches—which brings great insight to projects such 
as this one. They are also often a crucial source of photographs, diagrams and 
other illustrative representations which are vital evidential sources in their own 
right (as discussed below) but which rarely make it out of their grey-literature 
prison. 
 Personal recollections by both official and professional actors have 
occasionally been used as sources in this thesis. Examples include the 1928 
autobiography of Labour MP Jack Jones, the 1949 memoir of roads campaigner 
and administrator Rees Jeffreys, the 1989 recollections of neoliberal economist 
Alan Walters, and several accounts written by planner–historian Peter Hall from 
the 1990s onwards. Such sources provide opinion and insight into past events and 
can often be the only evidential glimpse into what really happened in committee 
rooms and council chambers. But it need hardly be said that memoirs are highly 
staged narratives. They are also usually written many years after the event, when 
memories can have become clouded, selective or distorted. However, so long as 
they do not form the only source for particular arguments, they can be a delight. 
Obituaries share the same problems and benefits, with obvious additional bias. 
Biographical essays, such as the incomparable Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, are often much more balanced, with critical distance between author 
and subject, and have been highly useful here. However, of course one must still 
investigate the authorship of each essay. Several institutional biographies have 
been used, too—of councils, boroughs, police departments and research 
laboratories for instance—and the political posturing of such accounts must be 
taken into account. What all these biographical sources offer, besides (biased) 
accounts of events, is information about the wider network of human actors that 
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was involved at the time, enabling research to progress in directions otherwise 
hard to identify from accounts written in the heat of events.  
 Having considered official and technical documentary sources, a third 
category brings a wider public into the network—a public introduced to an extent 
by the aforementioned personal accounts. Public voices can include special 
interest, amenity and campaigning groups and societies, which often provide 
countervailing statements to those expressed in governmental and professional 
publications. Naturally these are highly politically inflected but often at the 
opposite end of the spectrum from the official view, giving at least a sense of the 
spectrum’s form and length. But using special interest group publications and 
archives can often be surprisingly unrewarding as it quickly becomes apparent 
that the group’s sanctioned, official position masks a multiplicity of divergent and 
often contradictory views in the membership. Sometimes this can be recovered 
from correspondence files where these survive but much of this debate was verbal 
and took place at meetings—the minutes of which do not record the nuance of the 
debate. For instance, the Pedestrians’ Association (now Living Streets) has been 
an important presence in this story since its inception in 1929, but its official 
reports and magazine occlude what was clearly a wide range of viewpoints and 
much disagreement. None the less, the publications and archives of such groups 
have substantial value. Also existing at the public nodes of the network are 
newspaper reports, which are important sources of information and opinion, or 
rather actors. Of course they are highly selective and biased, and hardly represent 
a singular public voice. They can be read as official and professional statements as 
much as public opinion. But by seeing them as a part of the network, they help 
illuminate the marginal as well as the dominant framings of traffic in an aspect of 
the literature that is firmly located in public view. Further bias comes from 
digitization: The Times, The Guardian, The Observer, the Illustrated London 
News and The Economist can easily be searched online whereas the tabloids and 
myriad local newspapers—including the London Evening Standard—cannot. 
Much time has been spent in local studies archives as well as the British Library’s 
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Newsroom trawling through newspapers and clippings files in an attempt to 
balance this, but there is a limit and the bias and selectivity must be kept in mind.  
Pictorial material 
The use of pictorial material in this thesis is occasionally merely illustrative, but 
in most cases such material is included as evidential sources in their own right. 
This material can be divided into six broad categories, although clearly the 
boundaries between categories is porous and the categorization is itself 
problematic. The first is maps and diagrams of proposed road layouts, often 
included in urban plans. Chapter 3 is based on such documents and the maps and 
diagrams form a crucial aspect of the evidence. A second and closely related 
category is conjectural or artistic representations—artificial visions of traffic 
landscapes, also often part of official plans. These too provide crucial evidence of 
what Frank Mort has described as ‘the business of image making and forms of 
representation’.71 The third category can be described as photographs showing 
traffic conditions on the ground. In some cases this is reportage photography 
taken by officials as part of their research into particular traffic projects, and 
included in correspondence files or internal documents. In other cases such 
images are given a public audience, reproduced in reports, plans and the press. 
Such images are included here in order to understand how particular traffic 
problems were rhetorically presented as well as to recover and comprehend the 
conditions on London’s roads at the time. In each case the context in which the 
images were made or reproduced is made clear in the accompanying narrative. 
Fourthly, images showing new installations—publicity shots—have been 
included, again as evidence for how such projects were presented in public and 
how professions presented their work, but also to get a sense of scale and period. 
A fifth category may be termed illustrations of traffic technology. Often (but not 
always) shown in situ, such images show particular artefacts such as traffic lights, 
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junction installations, equipment racks, control rooms and so on, or depict in 
diagrammatic form a particular network. They were often promotional material, 
either in trade literature or sent by manufacturers to official bodies investigating 
new traffic projects. Their inclusion here can be seen as illustrative, giving visual 
awareness of the artefacts being discussed, but is also in many cases evidence in 
their own right. Category six is maps other than those reproduced in reports. They 
are included to situate the present reader when particular routes or locations are 
being discussed and an understanding of the topography will be helpful. A 
separate category is stills from films, which cut across several of the previous 
categories and are discussed in the next section.  
Film and television 
Films have formed a limited but important set of sources in this thesis. Newsreel 
films offer the same benefits and suffer the same problems as newspaper 
articles—British Pathé films are searchable whereas many newsreels remain 
undiscovered. Several Pathé films have been used as research sources here. 
Documentary films only cover part of the century—their heyday was 1930–1950, 
as Timothy Boon has described—but in that period they helped frame the public 
discourse with technology, as television documentaries went on to do in the 
subsequent couple of decades.72 Documentaries made by the GPO Film Unit, the 
Greater London Council, the Corporation of London and the BBC have informed 
this account, underpinned by an appreciation of the socio-political context of their 
production. But these films can act as more than straightforward historical 
accounts. Each of them, in its own way, offers evidence of the performance of a 
technological assemblage—traffic—in a way that cannot easily be recovered from 
textual sources. Their value lies in depicting live human interactions with 
technologies which transcend their textual meaning—they are more than 
                                                 
72 Timothy Boon, Films of Fact: A History of Science in Documentary Films and Television 
(London: Wallflower Press, 2008). 
2. APPROACHING THE TRAFFIC PROBLEM  65 
 
 
 
representational.73 In a 1933 Pathé film showing a new vehicle-actuated traffic-
light system, for instance, the clicking of electrical relays in the control box can be 
heard as vehicles approach different arms of the controlled junction, revealing the 
dense network of sensors fitted into the streets. Pedestrians crowd the junction, 
interweaving with vehicles, in ways which to modern eyes seem unruly, 
undisciplined and unsafe. Yet this was normal behaviour and helps inform a 
reading of pedestrianism in this period. A sense of a complex performance, 
different from today’s, has been offered. In a 1939 GPO film, Charles Bressey 
describes his plans for a new road network by placing transparent sheets over a 
map of London, each sheet marked with a proposed new ring road or flyover. The 
engineer’s world view is revealed—new roads can be built over existing networks 
rather than wiping out the old streets entirely. Bressey then gestures towards a 
series of pictures of aerial concrete road networks—visions of a future London—
framed on the walls of his office as if revered artworks. A sense of a disciplinary 
cosmology of verticality and efficiency has been demonstrated by hand-gestures 
and the choice of visual aids. In Reyner Banham’s 1964 BBC film on London, he 
describes the difficulties experienced by pedestrians in the City’s choked traffic 
streets, but the scene unfolding behind him is of pedestrians apparently having 
little trouble, negotiating traffic with long-embodied skill. Perhaps the streets were 
just quiet that day—as a source of evidence the film is ambivalent but suggestive. 
In 1967 Pathé films of a new traffic control centre at Scotland Yard, the 
controllers sit in near darkness. It might be dramatic lighting set up especially for 
the newsreel camera operators, but it is more than likely the lighting was always 
low so that the relatively inefficient cathode ray tube screens showing CCTV 
camera outputs could be viewed more easily. Nevertheless, viewers get a sense of 
the panopticon, the secret central surveillance chamber kept dark so that prisoners 
cannot see inside, and the sense that this was the framing that the police wanted to 
show. Traffic is a physical, embodied performance as well as a rhetorical one, and 
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films enable these gestures to be glimpsed. Finally, The Italian Job from 1969 has 
been used twice as a source of evidence in this thesis. A Ministry of Transport 
computerized traffic-light experiment led to one of the most popular heist capers 
of the twentieth century, so surely there is sociological significance in the traffic 
problem that cannot be overlooked, although using Benny Hill as an evidential 
source brings a particular set of challenges. 
Summary 
The approach to sources in this thesis thus involves seeing them as active, rather 
than passive—as actors in the socio-technical assemblage rather than fixed, 
unproblematic statements. This means following leads, connecting together 
different sources, writers, representations, characterizations, disciplines and 
periods to recover a wider network than initially presents itself for inspection. It 
means remembering that people have many things going on in their lives; reading 
across those views and experiences sets them all into wider contexts. And it 
means understanding that traffic lives in the real streets of London as well as in 
the minds of people trying to shape it, so the physical archive as well as the 
documentary, pictorial and film archive has much to offer a committed historian 
of urban infrastructure networks.  
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Chapter 3. The Traffic Problem in Urban Planning 
 
Conduit Street, Mayfair, October 1910. The Royal Institute of British Architects 
is packed with architects, surveyors and engineers listening to presentations on the 
new discipline of town planning. Next up is George Pepler, an emerging talent in 
the garden city movement, who claims that ‘the traffic problem grows more 
serious every day’, and proposes a ‘great girdle round London’ to ‘relieve central 
congestion’. He gestures to a map showing his ring road, stating ‘it is clear that 
there is ample scope for present London to spread itself a little, and for its 
population to regain health and vigour among fresh woods and pastures new’.74 
 
 
Figure 5: George Pepler’s map showing proposed London ring road scheme, October 1910 
(George Pepler).75  
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3.1 Introduction 
The introduction and rise of the motor vehicle and of professional urban planning 
share a common chronology. The Locomotives on Highways Act of 1896 
unlocked the potential of motor vehicles as a form of mass transport; two years 
later Ebenezer Howard published his ideas for garden cities and by the mid-1900s 
town planning had been established as a discipline. It makes sense, then, that the 
eyes of historians and geographers have most commonly turned towards the 
planning discipline to find characterizations of, and understand responses towards, 
traffic congestion in the motor age. This chapter thus examines the traffic problem 
as seen in the professional urban planning discipline. It surveys a series of 
canonical London plans from the 1910s to the 1970s, considering how each 
successive plan and its planners characterized traffic and proposed to deal with it. 
This is done in order to appreciate the dominant framing of traffic as a problem 
with a particular and canonical set of solutions. But by treating traffic as an 
assemblage or socio-technical network, this reading will also help identify figures, 
forces, projects and world views that existed in the margins of mainstream urban 
planning, either actively marginalized owing to their incompatibility with urban 
planning approaches, or acting as influences on urban planning from outside the 
formal discipline. One such actor, for instance, is capital, which has had a 
particularly complex relationship with traffic and planning. Some of these 
marginal approaches, having been identified in this chapter’s conclusion, will be 
brought into central view in later chapters, offering as a whole a wider and more 
complex account of traffic congestion in twentieth-century London. 
 The literature on the history of urban planning is, of course, extensive. 
London, as capital city, has very often been the focus for attention, and the years 
before and after the Second World War have commonly been seen as catalysts for 
the planned solution of the traffic problem, particularly given the scale of 
destruction of London from bombing. Hermione Hobhouse, for instance, put 
‘traffic flow or rather its congestion’ first in a list of ‘historic problems’ that 
wartime planning sought to solve, noting it as ‘One of the most all-pervading 
3. THE TRAFFIC PROBLEM IN URBAN PLANNING 69 
 
 
 
concerns’ throughout the history of London planning.76 Gordon Cherry observed a 
growing interest in tackling transport congestion through planning in the 1930s, 
after decades of piecemeal localized road improvements, although it was not until 
the Second World War that the interest intensified, and the 1960s that demand 
really took off.77 Donald Foley had situated this concern in decentralization 
proposals, which he showed were seen as means to reduce the amount of daily 
commuting.78 Helen Meller described ‘the revolution in transport’ in the early 
1960s ‘which seemed to have had most implications for the physical environment 
of cities’.79 For Douglas Hart, voicing early 1960s concerns, traffic congestion 
was causing planners to ‘lose control of the capital’.80  
 Given this general acceptance of the crucial significance of traffic 
congestion to the development of the twentieth-century planning of London, it 
seems that a good starting point in studying London congestion per se is to 
examine plans for London and chart their characterizations of the problem. 
However, this raises interesting issues. The dominant historiography of London 
planning focuses on a limited set of what might be termed canonical plans and 
their (named) authors. But the question of what constitutes a plan, who is a 
planner, what authorship of a plan means in practice, and how one might build a 
hierarchical relationship as well as a chronological or genealogical one between 
them all, is by no means trivial. These issues have been considered at length by 
Peter Larkham and David Adams, whose work has particularly informed this 
section. They note the general focus in histories of urban reconstruction on: 
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‘great plans’ and ‘great planners’ to the virtual exclusion of all other forms of 
reconstruction planning: one might think that Abercrombie alone was responsible 
for post-war reconstruction planning!81  
They also note the porous disciplinary boundaries defining the term ‘planner’ and 
observe that architects, engineers and surveyors often carried out planning work. 
They both invite and offer a wider view, and the plans chosen for the following 
survey, at least those from the particularly intensive period of 1940–47, draw 
largely on Larkham and Adams’s own selection. 
 By looking for the politics, technologies and geographies embedded in the 
authors’ visualizations of congestion and its solution, one sees that circulation and 
traffic has been at the heart of professional town planning throughout the 
twentieth century, and a set of common themes and actors are encountered. These 
themes include geographies of governance and the relationship between London-
wide bodies and local authorities; technological visions of grids, networks, 
verticality and progress; social geographies of segregation and control; and the 
politics and financing of roads and mobility. Common actors include the big 
names of Unwin, Abercrombie, Holford and Buchanan but also (responding to 
Larkham and Adams’s invitation) figures such as the police traffic commissioner 
Alker Tripp and the engineer Charles Bressey, who are less commonly associated 
with London’s mid-century planning landscape. 
3.2 The birth of town planning, 1898–1910 
London’s traffic problem was not a modern one. Its streets were teeming long 
before the motor car, as James Winter has demonstrated.82 What is of interest here 
is the modernization of the response to the city and its problems. At the turn of the 
twentieth century, several interlinked factors—decentralization, motorization and 
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the growth of government intervention in social welfare and the physical 
environment—came together to create a new set of responses which focused on 
planning for a better future, as Helen Meller has described.83 This pioneering 
movement fused technological intervention (in the widest sense) with social and 
environmental reform and found early expression in Ebenezer Howard’s 
pioneering Tomorrow, published in 1898.84 Tomorrow set out the now-familiar 
blueprint of decentralization via fast transport links to ‘Garden Cities’, themselves 
models of techno-utopias designed in concentric ring formation for circulation of 
traffic. In 1899 Howard founded the Garden City Association which eventually 
became the Town and Country Planning Association. In 1909, government 
legislation put town planning on a formal basis and a university course in the 
subject was offered. In 1910 the first town planning inspector—Thomas Adams—
started work, and a journal, the Town Planning Review, was launched. Four years 
later, the Town Planning Institute—a professional body for the new profession of 
town planner—was formed.85 
 Town planning was an international movement, although with distinctive 
contributions from practitioners in different countries. As Howard was promoting 
Garden Cities back home, in Chicago Daniel Burnham was urging the ‘City 
Beautiful’, a movement for the creation of monumental grandeur and beauty in 
American cities such as Chicago and Washington DC to instil moral civic virtues 
on citizens.86 This was a neo-baroque grandeur of wide boulevards leading to 
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monumental civic centres which, as Jane Jacobs described, performed a ‘sorting 
out’ of cultural functions, ‘decontaminating their relationship with the workaday 
city’ in a way that harmonized well with Howard’s Garden Cities.87 Both Garden 
Cities and Beautiful Cities were thus segregated cities, and a third modern city 
vision soon emerged: Le Corbusier’s Ville Radieuse or ‘Radiant City’, devised in 
the 1920s.88 This was a city of high-rise tower blocks separated by expanses of 
parkland; or rather, the city was a park, horizontally, from which the vertical city 
emerged. Again, fast transport links provided connection and segregation. 
 Jane Jacobs has situated Le Corbusier’s Radiant City as a direct product of 
the Garden City, with traffic at the heart of both visions, as follows: 
He attempted to make planning for the automobile an integral part of his scheme, 
and this was, in the 1920s and 1930s, a new, exciting idea. He included great 
arterial roads for express one-way traffic. He cut the number of streets because 
‘crossroads are an enemy to traffic’. He proposed underground streets for heavy 
vehicles and deliveries, and of course like the Garden City planners he kept 
pedestrians off the streets and in the parks. His city was like a wonderful 
mechanical toy.89 
The notion of the city as a giant park had seen earlier expression in the parkways 
movement of the landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted, who had conceived 
of scenic urban roads for pleasure in the horse-drawn era. After motorization, the 
movement developed into the construction of limited-access motor roads in scenic 
or landscaped settings, and found ultimate expression on the New-York parkways 
of Robert Moses in the 1920s and beyond.90 Carmen Hass-Klau has considered 
the history of pedestrianism in depth, and concurs with this idea of an 
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international movement advocating pedestrian separation from vehicles, achieved 
through town planning, to reduce traffic congestion as well as improve safety.91 
Thus, this rapid survey of early town planning clearly shows the importance of 
roads and of traffic circulation, flow and segregation within modern visions of 
urban existence, and there are clear connections between the approaches of 
different actors in different places and times. Back in London, the modernizing 
city was projecting its future as the town planning discipline moved on from its 
pioneering phase. 
3.3 The London Society plans, 1918–21 
The London Society was founded in 1912 as a civic amenity society lobbying for 
a beautiful, ordered city, with a strong focus on traffic and circulation. As Helena 
Beaufoy has argued, it became an important body in the development of modern 
urban planning in the interwar period, playing a major role in developing holistic 
plans for an arterial road network for the capital which directly influenced a young 
Patrick Abercrombie.92 Lucy Hewitt has further tracked the idea of the society’s 
involvement in promoting an arterial and ring roads network, originating in a 
1910 proposal by architect David Barclay Niven.93 She describes the seminal 
Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) conference on town planning held in 
London later that year, at which Niven’s ring road was proposed by garden-city 
doyen George Pepler, and notes that ‘It was ... the challenge of providing for 
London’s increasing traffic flow that raised the most pressing concern at the 
conference’.94 Out of the meeting emerged the idea of a membership society—
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which became the London Society—which could lobby for London-wide action. 
Niven was a founding member, and in 1914 the society joined with RIBA in 
pressing for the establishment of a single body to design a main road network for 
the capital.95 The outcome of this and other government lobbying was the 
establishment of an arterial roads conference programme held from 1915 
onwards.96 
 The London Society’s role was substantial, in no small part owing to its 
publicity activities, and it acted, in David Gilbert’s words, as ‘a kind of early 
twentieth-century urban think tank’.97 Throughout the First World War, the 
society developed its first London-wide plan, entitled A Development Plan for 
Greater London, a large-scale map depicting the proposed arterial road network 
and the society’s own ideas for parks, parkways and other open spaces.98 The map 
was first revealed by the society’s founding chairman, architect Aston Webb, in 
1918 before being published by Stanford, exhibited at King’s College in April 
1919, and later going on permanent public display in the London Museum at 
Lancaster House, St James’s.99 Figure 6 shows its key map. Traffic congestion 
was the problem front and centre in the society’s minds as they created it. In his 
presentation, Webb stated that ‘the main roads round the Metropolis, with their 
rapid, heavy traffic, are proving totally inadequate’. By 1914, he noted, the capital 
was still ‘without an authorized comprehensive scheme for road improvement’. 
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He ended by offering the map as the first plan ‘showing a complete scheme for 
the improvement and development of Greater London’.100  
 
Figure 6: Key map to the London Society’s Development Plan For Greater London, 1918, 
showing proposed network of new main roads in red (Courtesy of the London Society).101 
 As Hewitt observed, the Development Plan demonstrated the society’s key 
argument: that London’s traffic infrastructure was critical, and that it needed 
treatment as a whole. For Gilbert, it appeared at first disappointingly conservative, 
omitting the central area completely and acting more as a map of record than 
proposing a new plan for the city, as Patrick Abercrombie’s 1940s plans were 
later to do. But Gilbert draws attention to the map’s role in reconfiguring London 
in the public and professional debate ‘as a metropolitan region, rather than as a 
compact city’, being influential in discussions about decentralization and the high-
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speed motor roads that would make it possible.102 It was influential, too, in 
debates about London’s government: in 1922, a Royal Commission looking into 
the subject drew directly from its proposals.103 The arterial roads programme 
which the society had so strongly supported began to be built in 1919 as an 
unemployment-relief project, with some 300 miles constructed by the mid-
1930s.104 The society’s mapping work continued through the 1920s with a series 
of plans of central London showing existing land use, although this did not result 
in a map or model showing proposed future land usage or road layouts, work 
which was taken over by the London County Council from 1925.105  
 Yet the society was not just a group of data-gatherers; it had an 
imaginative, speculative side too. In 1921, the society published its second major 
planning statement, London of the Future, a collection of essays edited by Aston 
Webb.106 Described by Gilbert as ‘not so much a coherent master plan as an 
exercise in the contemporary urban imagination’ and ‘an attempt to rethink 
London as a city of the twentieth century’, the report nevertheless demonstrated 
the society’s overriding concern about traffic and circulation.107 Five of its 
eighteen essays were overtly concerned with London’s transport infrastructure, 
and all the others focused on it to a greater or lesser extent, characterizing traffic 
congestion as a threat to ideals of beauty and dignity. This was, too, a 
technological characterization of congestion. As Gilbert has noted, the book 
expressed both ‘technological enthusiasms’ such as those in chapters on aviation 
and the Channel Tunnel, as well as ‘planning itself as a progressive technology 
                                                 
102 Gilbert, ‘London of the Future’, 101; on decentralization see for instance Rooney, 
‘Visualization, Decentralization and Metropolitan Improvement’. 
103 Hewitt, ‘The London Society and the Development Plan for Greater London’, 121–3. 
104 Bressey and Lutyens, Ministry of Transport Highway Development Survey, 24. 
105 Hewitt, ‘The London Society and the Development Plan for Greater London’, 125–6. 
106 The London Society, London of the Future. 
107 Gilbert, ‘London of the Future’, 92. 
3. THE TRAFFIC PROBLEM IN URBAN PLANNING 77 
 
 
 
with the power to transform urban existence’ in the work of Raymond Unwin and 
Stanley Adshead.108 
 The London Society showed a rising generation of professional planners 
the value in both detailed statistical and graphic presentation and in imaginative 
visions of future Londons. For Patrick Abercrombie in 1920, then a professor at 
Liverpool University, the success of the Development Plan showed what city-
wide amenity bodies could achieve, and he never lost touch with the work of the 
society throughout the 1920s and 30s, as Hewitt has observed. By the time he was 
approached in 1941 to work on what became the County of London Plan (1943) 
and Greater London Plan (1944) he was explicit in his debt to the society’s 
activities and methodological approach.109 
3.4 Greater London Regional Planning Committee, 1929–33 
One critical figure in the London Society’s planning activity was the architect and 
planner Raymond Unwin, who had made his name in the garden cities and 
suburbs movement. He organized the 1910 RIBA town planning conference 
which had led to the society’s establishment, and both part-financed and co-
directed (with Aston Webb) the Development Plan for Greater London project.110 
His essay in the 1921 collection was, as David Gilbert notes, a means to introduce 
professional planning practice—heavily influenced by work in the United 
States—to a lay British audience, and promoted a vision of a planned, expanded 
London based on fast motor roads connecting the decentralized population to 
employment at the centre.111 During the 1920s he worked on housing policy with 
health ministers including Neville Chamberlain. Then, after Chamberlain founded 
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the Greater London Regional Planning Committee (GLRPC) in 1927, Unwin 
became its technical adviser in 1929 and wrote its landmark Reports, the first 
published the same year and the second report four years later.112 
 At the GLRPC, Unwin’s approach to traffic congestion continued to be 
framed in the London Society’s discourse of beauty through order and a holistic 
approach to planning, with an assumption that decentralization of residence—
made possible by new transport technologies—would decongest the central area 
in time. But his focus had by this time turned from the creation of main and 
arterial roads—now mostly built—to the buildings alongside them. The rapid 
development of dwellings, shops and industrial facilities along the new roads—
ribbon development—was causing both congestion and a loss of amenity. 
Congestion, he argued, was caused by obstructions such as frequent junctions and 
parking outside shopping parades, as much as by road width, and evidence from 
the USA, which was further along the road in this field, was that main roads could 
either be traffic highways or built-up areas—not both. This was the year after 
Clough Williams-Ellis had laid into the British approach to ribbon development 
and eulogized the parkways of the USA.113 
 For Unwin, there were three consequences arising from ribbon 
development. Firstly, it caused economic inefficiency, as the individual freedoms 
of frontagers carried a general cost in congestion. This economic argument will be 
explored in a later chapter. Unwin’s second argument was the danger to life and 
limb owing to accidents arising from fast cars, numerous junctions, and ‘the 
crossings by thoughtless children [and] short-sighted or hesitating folk’. The 
solution was a form of segregation (although Unwin did not use that word) of fast 
motor traffic from ‘the obstructions and the dangers incidental to frontage 
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development’, and these ideas too will be examined in a later chapter. The third 
consequence of ribbon development—and the one perhaps most distressing to 
Unwin and the other London Society aesthetes, was that it ‘injures the Amenities’, 
bringing town aesthetics into the countryside.114 
 By the time of the second report in 1933, Britain was in the grip of the 
Great Depression, which was just beginning as the first report was published. 
Hardest hit were the heavy industrial areas of the Midlands and the North, 
whereas the new light industries clustering in London and the South-East had 
already helped to catalyse the development of the main road network. Whilst the 
depression briefly slowed the rise of car ownership in the early 1930s, a steady 
rise in the fortunes of the motor industry both drew from and fed a marked 
expansion of motor traffic in the capital as the decade progressed. Combined with 
other factors such as migration and large-scale electrification, London’s 
population was booming and the ribbon development along the main roads 
showed no signs of abating. Unwin lamented that many of the new main roads 
were ‘now unsuitable for the demands already made on them’ with some ‘rapidly 
becoming as congested as some of the areas the road was constructed to by-
pass’.115 Congestion was an indicator of bad or piecemeal planning control, and 
the solutions almost inevitably came in the form of physical segregation of motor 
vehicles from pedestrians combined with standardized traffic control and 
engineering conventions, and new technological forms of traffic junction offering 
one-way gyratory flow or grade separation, all borrowed from US experience.116  
 Unwin then put forward a list of 71 road improvements needed in Greater 
London, some already on the planners’ radar, others newly proposed, all designed 
either to create connections between congested areas (many industrial, including 
the docks) and the main arterial roads, or to bypass existing congestion black-
                                                 
114 Greater London Regional Planning Committee, First Report, 27–29. 
115 Greater London Regional Planning Committee, Second Report, 62. 
116 Ibid., 63–69. 
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spots or regional centres.117 But, as with the arterial roads programme itself, none 
of the proposed schemes entered the central, built-up area—and, unlike the arterial 
roads and their unemployment-relief financing, no government funds were 
forthcoming to build Unwin’s schemes. The roads campaigner Rees Jeffreys, an 
insider in the debates of the time, explained why. ‘The national financial crisis 
was assigned by the Government as a reason for deferring any approved works ... 
Once again the Government, in default of action, fell back upon an Inquiry’.118 It 
was an engineer, not a planner, who was given the task of preparing a plan for 
London’s roads. 
3.5 Highway Development Survey, 1937 
In December 1934, the Minister of Transport, Leslie Hore-Belisha, instructed 
Charles Bressey, his Chief Engineer, to prepare a comprehensive survey of the 
highway developments needed in London over the subsequent thirty years. For the 
next three years, Bressey worked alongside the architect Edwin Lutyens in a 
systematic analysis of London’s traffic problem.119 Lutyens had been one of the 
founder members of the London Society back in 1912 but Bressey was not a 
planner in any disciplinary sense. Yet this was the first systematic study of 
London’s traffic problem since the dawn of the motor age and the Royal 
Commission on London Traffic’s reports of 1903–5.120 In fact, at least for the 
County of London, Bressey observed a total disconnection between official town 
planning and traffic, stating that: 
as far as the London County Council area is concerned, town planning operations 
may exercise little direct influence on highway development seeing that the 
                                                 
117 Ibid., 70–73. 
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119 Bressey and Lutyens, Ministry of Transport Highway Development Survey, 5; Charles Bressey, 
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County Council have so far pursued the policy of excluding from their plan all 
new roads and road improvements.121  
 Bressey’s plan was the first to examine systematically what he termed 
‘centres of congestion’ in the inner London area, namely the 13 worst junctions 
for causing congestion across the city, acknowledging that new roads were only 
part of the answer to London’s traffic problem.122 It offered exhaustive analysis of 
junctions with new main and arterial roads—proposing vertical separation at 
some—and it examined the growing problem of parked cars. It incorporated large-
scale maps pinpointing some 66 proposed road schemes in both Greater London 
and Inner London—a complex tangle of red lines showing the comprehensiveness 
of Bressey’s planning (the Greater London plan is shown in Figure 7). He even 
included plans for the London end of a new national motorway network which 
was often proposed by those who had experienced the Italian Autostrade and the 
German Reichsautobahnen.123 And, in another first for traffic planning, the Survey 
was based on the results of real surveys, as was noted in Chapter 1: observations 
throughout summer 1936 of traffic delays on key routes, which showed that 
average speeds in the capital varied from 5.85 mph in the inner zone to 18 mph in 
the outskirts.124  
                                                 
121 Bressey and Lutyens, Ministry of Transport Highway Development Survey, 5. 
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Figure 7: Proposed road schemes in Greater London, Highway Development Survey, 1937 
(Ministry of Transport).125 
 Throughout, the report presented the world view of a civil engineer. 
Congestion would be solved and efficient flow restored by building, bridging, 
smoothing, connecting and widening. Town-planning principles were left to the 
local authorities to deal with.126 Lutyens’s role seems likely to have been confined 
to the architectural treatment of the new flyovers and roundabouts.127 But, in its 
further desire to solve congestion by controlling, segregating and directing the 
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traffic, it also represented a Metropolitan Police world view, for Bressey 
acknowledged its extensive assistance in his work. He did not name his source 
there, but it was certainly Alker Tripp, who had been promoted to Assistant 
Commissioner with responsibility for traffic in 1932, and who, between then and 
his retirement in 1947, studied and wrote widely on the relationship between road 
traffic and town planning.  
 Tripp’s role as a transport planner has long been observed.128 But he was 
more than an isolated figure at the margins of the discipline: some scholars have 
noted the influence of his ideas on urban planning more widely. He promoted 
numerous ideas on the reduction of traffic congestion that were realised in post-
war plans for London. These included urban motorways as well as the segregation 
of pedestrians from motor traffic, either vertically through raised concrete 
walkways, as shown in Figure 8, or horizontally, through his notion of the 
‘precinct’. These ideas were encapsulated in his 1942 book Town Planning and 
Road Traffic, for which the foreword was written by Patrick Abercrombie, who 
said he had ‘benefitted enormously’ from Tripp’s work, a fact noted later by Peter 
Hall and Stephen Ward among others.129 This joined Tripp’s 1938 work Road 
Traffic and Its Control in influencing both European and US planning circles.130 
Several authors have also noted the debt owed to Tripp by Colin Buchanan in his 
1963 work Traffic in Towns, which will be examined presently.131 So, whilst 
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neither Bressey’s Highway Development Survey nor Tripp’s Town Planning and 
Road Traffic emerged from within the formal town planning discipline, both 
underpinned the post-war plans of Abercrombie and Buchanan. 
 
Figure 8: ‘Place-segregation of vehicular and pedestrian traffic’, 1942 (Alker Tripp).132 
3.6 MARS Group, RIBA and the Royal Academy, 1942–44 
The outbreak of the Second World War intervened in Bressey’s plans for a 
comprehensive road-building programme for London, but did not prevent 
planning work from continuing. As is well known, after the Blitz attacks on the 
capital in 1940 and 1941, many planners, ministers and other interested parties 
saw opportunities for comprehensive reconstruction along modern planned lines. 
Before considering the plans of Abercrombie, however, it will be instructive to 
consider congestion as characterized in a series of ‘independent’ wartime schemes 
for London. Emmanuel Marmaras and Anthony Sutcliffe have located the period 
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from 1941 to 1947 as crucial for the development of urban planning policy, the 
latter date being the introduction of statutory town planning under the 1947 
Act.133 They explore three plans published by independent bodies in 1942 and 
1943 which, they suggest, have been overshadowed by the official County of 
London and Greater London plans of 1943 and 1944. These plans were published 
by the Modern Architectural Research (MARS) Group, the Royal Academy (RA) 
and the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA). 
 The MARS Group was founded in 1933 to promote modern architecture in 
Britain. It began working on a London urban plan in 1938, rekindling its interest 
in 1941 as the Government requested reconstruction plans following the Blitz 
bombings. Its work was led by architect and planner, Arthur Korn, whose early 
influences included Raymond Unwin, and the structural engineer Felix Samuely, 
who took a particular interest in transport and economics.134 Their proposals were 
presented at an exhibition in 1942, followed by a written account in which they 
insisted that ‘London must be considered in its entirety, as a working 
organism’.135 The MARS plan was, in Marmaras and Sutcliffe’s words, ‘clearly 
not practical, [but] presented an ideal vision of London as it might be if a 
completely fresh start could be made using all the potential of the “Machine 
Age”’. And it was a London which Korn and Samuely saw ‘almost entirely in 
terms of movement and distribution’ with high-speed transport arteries 
dominating a total linear rebuilding of the city’s boroughs onto a grid, as shown in 
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Figure 9, in order to reduce distribution costs.136 (In this gridded linearity, 
Marmaras and Sutcliffe note Korn and Samuely’s debt to Le Corbusier’s Ville 
Radieuse which will figure in a later chapter.137) Korn and Samuely recognized 
that ‘the idea of such a superimposed grid may appear somewhat Utopian’, but 
felt radical action was needed as ‘any purely local planning is doomed to 
failure’.138 In fact, as John Gold has observed, the authors felt that ‘the legacy of 
the past left London with a congested, outmoded and inefficient transport system’, 
which led to them foregrounding plans for circulation and transport.139 
 
Figure 9: MARS plan for Greater London showing grid of districts contained within a circulating 
ring of transport corridors (MARS Group).140 
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 The transport network in their new London was a model of high-tech 
segregation: industrial areas segregated from residential and administrative; 
goods-in-transit kept out of built-up areas; parcel deliveries located underground; 
ribbon development along traffic arteries eradicated. All this segregation was 
required for the following reasons: 
the present-day street system, which is not more advanced than that of old 
Babylon, cannot cope with twentieth century traffic. This street system causes 
those obstacles which prevent steady flow, eg level crossings and forks, and the 
presence on the same road of vehicles of all speeds, the slowest of which, 
naturally, sets the pace.  
Traffic lights were out of favour, as ‘they have slowed up the traffic even further’; 
vertical separation at junctions was a better solution.141 Two-level streets 
separating goods and passenger traffic on shopping streets were an option. 
Escalators carried pedestrians between levels. Viaducts and one-way systems 
eradicated conflict. London became very much a machine for circulation (see 
Figure 10). Idealistic though it certainly was (and was intended to be), this 
provocative vision of a Modern London, based on an efficient transport grid, was 
influential in setting a strong modern direction for much wartime and post-war 
planning of London, although Gold has warned us against considering it as a 
single plan with only two authors, rather seeing it as expressing the ‘experimental 
and pluralistic nature’ of modernist planning thought in this period, which evolved 
over several years with a multiplicity of voices and approaches.142 
   
Figure 10: Vertically and horizontally segregated traffic streets in the MARS plan, showing a main 
artery (left) and a shopping street (right) with discrete lanes for through goods, loading goods, 
road, rail, local traffic and pedestrians (MARS Group).143 
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 The second of Marmaras and Sutcliffe’s independent plans was a pair of 
reports from the Royal Academy’s planning committee.144 Yet they cast the 
notion of independence into relief, for whilst the RA was clearly not a statutory 
body, the membership of its committee showed it to be intimately connected to 
official planning debates. The RA plans emerged directly from Bressey and 
Lutyens’s Highway Development Survey for the Ministry of Transport. As 
Marmaras and Sutcliffe suggest, the Survey had little in it of Lutyens’s influence, 
and in 1940 the RA sought to redress the balance by inviting Lutyens to chair a 
committee to develop the architectural side of the Survey.145 But it was not merely 
a committee of architects or Academicians. It included Charles Bressey, Patrick 
Abercrombie and Alker Tripp and, as such, needs to be examined more closely 
than as ‘a period piece of academic nostalgia incorporating every cliché in the 
Beaux Arts repertoire’, as Lionel Esher described it, or having value ‘more in 
publicizing an alternative to the MARS Plan than in the significance of its 
recommendations’, as Marmaras and Sutcliffe put it.146  
 In fact, underneath the overt aesthetic nostalgia can be found some 
powerfully modern statements on transport and circulation that echo some MARS 
ideas and show the clear controlling hand of Tripp. The second report began by 
stating that ‘The road problem has never been tackled seriously in this country ... 
That a radical operation is necessary to save the patient from paralysis and 
strangulation is obvious to all who have given any thought to the subject’.147 Key 
to the RA’s proposals for traffic were the following: firstly, a high-speed ring road 
around Inner London dedicated to motor traffic, sunk in a wide cutting clear of 
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existing roads and junctions and connected to the street network by ramps (see 
Figure 11); secondly a system of vertically segregated arterial roads through the 
centre and into the suburbs (see Figure 12); thirdly vertically segregated 
roundabouts incorporating shopping and business centres, carrying arterial roads 
underground and separating pedestrians from vehicles; fourthly, a network of 
parking spaces and underground garages; and fifthly, a City ring road. 
 
Figure 11: Proposed segregated ring road around Inner London in the second Royal Academy 
plan, 1944 (Philip D. Hepworth).148 
 
Figure 12: Arterial traffic route in the first Royal Academy plan showing segregated levels for 
through traffic, local traffic and shops, 1942 (Philip D. Hepworth).149 
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 By comparing these traffic proposals with the ring-and-artery network and 
systematic vertical segregation of the MARS scheme, it is clear that the RA’s 
vision for solving the traffic problem—driven by Tripp and his acolytes, Bressey 
and Abercrombie—was a transportation machine just as modern as that of Korn 
and Samuely. The report claimed that ‘The adoption of different levels for our 
roads is long overdue; this is the only way in which the great traffic problem can 
be solved’, but in a nod to the aesthetic sensibilities of its patron, observed that 
‘beauty must be an inseparable companion of convenience: no longer is the 
merely structural or engineering solution to be accepted as sufficient’.150 A poke 
in the eye for Bressey, there. But in any case the public reaction to the RA plans 
was muted at best, and critical at worst, focusing on the architecture and aesthetics 
rather than the functioning of London—‘style more than substance’, as Larkham 
and Adams put it.151 It lacked the wider focuses of planning beyond circulation. 
But it hardly mattered. In between the publication of the two reports, the London 
County Council had released what was to be Patrick Abercrombie’s most 
significant contribution to London planning, the County of London Plan, and all 
eyes appeared to focus on that. 
 The same fate befell the third of Marmaras and Sutcliffe’s independent 
plans, a 1943 publication by RIBA reporting planning activity begun in 1941.152 
As with MARS and the RA plans, transport and circulation dominated RIBA’s 
characterization of London’s problems—probably owing to the availability of 
information set out in Bressey’s Highway Development Survey, in Marmaras and 
Sutcliffe’s view.153 Alker Tripp popped up once more in the acknowledgements 
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and Raymond Unwin’s work on the GLRPC attracted special praise.154 The RIBA 
plan incorporated all the elements now familiar: ring roads around the centre, 
arterial trunk roads across the capital, full segregation between different types of 
traffic, the creation of zoned precincts bounded by the trunk routes, and flyover 
roundabouts at all main road junctions.155 And it called for a single planning body 
for the region in place of decision-making by over 100 local authorities. But it had 
come at the wrong time. While Patrick Abercrombie was a key adviser to the 
RIBA committee, he was also at that time completing his County of London Plan, 
leading RIBA to pull back from their own work and back Abercrombie’s official 
publication. 
3.7 County of London Plan and Greater London Plan, 1943–44 
In the County of London Plan, authors Patrick Abercrombie and the LCC’s 
architect, John Forshaw, were careful to widen the scope of the London planning 
debate beyond traffic. They presented four ‘defects of present-day London’, of 
which traffic congestion was only one (the others being housing, open spaces and 
industrial zoning), and noted that ‘The Highway Development Survey, 1937, was 
clearly a piece of planning on the strategic scale but was it sufficiently 
comprehensive in character, in dealing with planning as a road matter alone?’ Yet, 
even within this widened scope, of the four defects traffic congestion was ‘the 
most obvious and ubiquitous’, leading to ‘waste of time, injury and loss of life’.156 
Congestion was depicted in the Plan as a line of traffic on Tottenham Court Road, 
an image reproduced with the caption ‘the traffic problem’ in a Penguin 
paperback version of the Plan and shown in Figure 13 (attention will return to this 
photograph in the conclusion of the thesis). 
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Figure 13: ‘The Traffic Problem’, County of London Plan, 1943–45 (London County Council).157 
 For Forshaw and Abercrombie, London was ‘a Machine’, but the 
machinery of movement was becoming severely overloaded.158 The main fault lay 
in the mixing of through traffic with local stopping traffic and pedestrians.159 
Their solution, as has already been alluded to, was based on Alker Tripp’s ideas of 
segregation and a hierarchy of local community areas of decreasing size, from the 
urban precinct to the small neighbourhood. These precincts and neighbourhoods 
needed to be saved from ‘invasion’ by through traffic, and thus the whole ethos of 
the Plan relied on the creation of a new roads network to carry the hostile invader 
away from the precincts and enact the geographical segregation. Peter Hall has 
observed that, for Abercrombie: 
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the roads were not merely built to reduce traffic congestion and prevent 
accidents; they were also to provide a new structure for London, by running in the 
gaps between the village and town communities.160  
Thus, Abercrombie and Forshaw’s traffic proposals followed the Bressey report 
‘except where its traffic routes cut through communities’, in their words, and 
proposed a scheme to turn the whole of central London into a precinct by routing 
all through traffic onto a new inner ‘fast motor ring-road’, connected to the centre 
by a network of new radial and cross roads. But, unlike many earlier plans, which 
encouraged vertical separation through elevation, Forshaw and Abercrombie 
proposed to sink the new radial and cross roads in tunnels. This, they said, 
‘follows the lead of the tubes’, and they observed that ‘the motor-driver must 
become tunnel-minded’.161 A further ring road, connecting the railway termini and 
termed a ‘sub-arterial station ring’, completed the plan (see Figure 14).162 Frank 
Mort, considering visual representations expressed in the Plan, has noted the 
abstract, ‘grandiose’ modernity of this vision, describing its ‘futuristic road 
diagrams’ and its views from above of ‘a city dominated by an abstract idea of 
communication’.163 Tanis Hinchcliffe has explored its use of aerial 
photography.164 This was a plan rooted in ideas of technological progress and the 
bringing to order of a disordered, pre-modern system. 
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Figure 14: Proposed inner ring road, new inner arterial and cross routes, and a sub-arterial railway 
termini ring road, in the County of London Plan, 1943 (Alec Bellamy and Eveline Felce).165 
 It was as a master plan that the Plan was novel, guiding short-term 
decision-making so as not to prejudice longer-term opportunities. The authors 
expressed the customary frustration about the inability of the patchwork of 
authorities to plan London properly. But for the first time they were hopeful that 
the situation would soon be resolved by government legislation based on recent 
Royal Commission proposals, ‘which promises to remove many of the difficulties 
under which planning authorities have been labouring in the past’.166 However, 
they recognized that redevelopment on the scale they proposed would involve a 
wide consortium of both public and private enterprise.167 There will be more on 
this in Chapter 8. 
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 While working for the LCC on the County of London Plan, Abercrombie 
was also developing a plan for the Greater London region for the Ministry of 
Town and Country Planning. In the Greater London Plan, too, Abercrombie drew 
heavily on the ‘help and inspiration’ of Alker Tripp for the section on roads. Here, 
Abercrombie was scathing of the patchwork planning landscape, noting that 
amongst the 143 local authorities involved in planning in the Greater London 
area, ‘there has been a lamentable failure to realise a need for co-ordination in 
planning all round London’.168 To the four defects of London treated in the 
County of London Plan he added a fifth: urban sprawl and ribbon development, 
which he felt had a toxic effect on transport and congestion. The arterial roads 
programme of the interwar period had helped, Abercrombie observed, but 
government investment was woefully low, and the absence of control over the 
building-up of the new routes remained a huge problem. With their narrowness 
and the blockages caused by local traffic and pedestrians, he said, ‘fast movement 
is thus impossible; congestion results, and accidents abound’.169 It was the same 
old problem, and the Greater London Plan proposed the same old solution: a 
network of limited-access express motor roads and bypasses, with grade-separated 
intersections, and frontage development forbidden.170 Figure 15 shows proposed 
junction types. 
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Figure 15: ‘Three types of arterial road junctions’, in Greater London Plan 1944 (Ministry of 
Town and Country Planning).171 
3.8 City of London, 1944–47 
Abercrombie and Forshaw’s work on the County of London Plan contained a 
highly significant lacuna, namely the City of London, which, as always, wished to 
plough its own furrow.172 On 14 November 1940, after two months of intensive 
bombing by the German Luftwaffe, the Common Council of the City of London 
ordered its Committee for Improvements and Town Planning to begin work on a 
scheme for post-war planning and reconstruction of the Square Mile.173 In May 
1944 its preliminary report—written largely by Francis Forty, the City Engineer—
was complete, being published in July. It shared with the County and Greater 
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London plans a view that traffic congestion was caused not so much by quantity 
of traffic but by ‘the varying attractions and social habits’ of the area which 
caused conflict and led to ‘abnormal concentration at certain points’. It also shared 
the opinion that traffic intersections caused most of the problems, observing that 
‘Control lights and one-way streets are but palliatives to the proper solution—a 
well-considered street system’.174 And, as with Abercrombie’s proposals, the City 
plan differentiated between through and local traffic. For the former, a ring road 
skirting the City (shown in Figure 16) would take traffic away from the cramped 
intersection at the Bank of England.  
 
Figure 16: Map showing proposed City of London ring road (in red), 1944 (Corporation of 
London).175 
 Pedestrian subways would be provided at the ring road’s roundabout 
connections. This had been proposed in Bressey and Lutyens’s 1937 Survey, 
although the line proposed by the City Corporation differed. For local traffic, a 
scheme of stopping-up minor streets to reduce the number of intersections was 
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proposed, with the added advantage of aiding pedestrian movement. Finally, road 
layout improvements would take place at the north sides of Blackfriars, 
Southwark and London Bridges. But in general, the 1944 City proposals were 
modest in their ambition: no overt segregation, to streets in the sky, no large-scale 
reconfiguration of the street plan.176 It was, instead, a plan with ‘respect for urban 
morphology’, as Michael Hebbert has explained, in which the City Corporation 
‘explicitly distanced itself from the fashionable preference for clean-sweep 
planning’, either in the form of Lutyens or Abercrombie.177 And that was the 
problem. 
 Forty’s report went down badly with both the government and critical 
reviewers, who felt it went nowhere near far enough.178 Their criticism focused on 
Forty’s status as an engineer rather than a planner, and observed that his proposals 
sought simply to get the City back to the situation it was in before the War, but 
with worse congestion owing to increased commercial floor space, as Gordon 
Cherry and Leith Penny have observed.179 One specialist noted that the report was 
simply a pre-war transport engineer’s improvement scheme for an undamaged 
city.180 Soon after the report’s publication in 1944, the Corporation (dictated by 
the government) instructed Charles Holden and William Holford to come up with 
something more aligned with the wider planning activity of London.  
 Their report was presented in 1947 (though not published until 1951) and 
was better received. The increased influence of Abercrombie and the LCC was 
clear, whether in its land-use zoning, development of local precincts, or proposals 
to limit the amount of accommodation in the City and therefore the working 
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population, paralleling Abercrombian ideas of decentralization and dispersal. 
Holden and Holford proposed a programme of stopping-up, one-way streets and 
improved intersections similar to Forty’s plan, but they were more ambitious in 
their proposals for new roads, including west–east and north–south cross routes 
(one following the line of the old London Wall) and as much junction grade 
separation as could be fitted in.181 Two of the new cross-routes—one to the north 
and one to the south—were to be double-level, with the lower street taking local 
turning traffic and the higher level flying over existing streets. Car parking would 
be provided on a shelf. Overall their proposals were for a substantial intervention 
in the City’s street landscape (see Figure 17 and Figure 18).  
 
Figure 17: Proposed street plan for the City of London, 1947, showing new streets, building lines 
and pavements in red (Corporation of London, courtesy of London Metropolitan Archives).182 
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Figure 18: Elevated ‘Northern Boundary Route’ skirting the City of London, with car parking 
shelf underneath, proposed by Charles Holden and William Holford, 1947 (Gordon 
Cullen/Corporation of London, courtesy of London Metropolitan Archives).183 
 One aspect of their report was particularly novel, namely its proposals for 
‘pedestrian ways’. Here, Holden and Holford recognized the significance of 
pedestrian passage in the City, whether for business, shopping or recreation. They 
presented an imaginary walk around the existing pedestrian ways of the City—in 
which ‘people become individuals’—before proposing a wholesale linking up of 
existing pedestrian routes with new connections into a circuit, ‘so that it will be 
possible to walk around a considerable area of the City on a different plane, so to 
speak, from that used by the services or traffic’.184 This was Trippian pedestrian 
segregation, but presented in terms of amenity, beauty and convenience rather 
than safety, congestion and fast vehicle traffic. Yet despite appearing to give 
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moral priority to the pedestrian over the motor vehicle, Holden and Holford’s 
pedestrian ways tended to be sunken: cars passed overhead with people beneath. 
Following Abercrombie, motordom was on the higher plane in a set of brutalist 
insertions. But this would change, as will be explored in Chapter 8. 
3.9 Administrative County of London Development Plan, 1951 
By the time Charles Holden and William Holford’s plan for the City of London 
had been presented, the legislative playing field for planning in Britain had 
changed, with the passing of the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, which 
founded a national planning system.185 This subjected almost all development to 
the need for planning permission, nationalized development rights and values, and 
levied a charge on developers equalling the rise in land value following 
development. It also obliged local authorities to publish development plans for 
their areas projecting forward a twenty-year set of proposals.186 For London, the 
planning authority was the London County Council, which also took on this duty 
for the City of London. In 1951, the LCC published its Administrative County of 
London Development Plan. As with the plans of Abercrombie, Forshaw, Holford 
and Holden during the war, the LCC plan sought to decentralize people and 
industry to new towns, and this was the context in which better transport links 
were framed. Frustrated by six years of financial pressure leaving it unable to start 
Abercrombie’s roads programme, the LCC launched a modest manifesto of eleven 
miles of new main roads, seven miles of road widening, two miles of new tunnels, 
the rebuilding of two river bridges and a river wall, and 43 new or improved 
traffic intersections using roundabouts or flyovers. This excluded City of London 
projects, the primary of which remained a new through route.187 The priority 
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projects for the twenty-year Development Plan were mapped onto the LCC’s 
‘Ultimate Road Plan’ (see Figure 19). The ring and main roads of the 
Abercrombie era can be clearly seen. 
 
Figure 19: Priority road projects for the twenty-year Administrative County of London 
Development Plan (1951) shown in red mapped onto the LCC's ‘ultimate road plan’ (London 
County Council, courtesy of London Metropolitan Archives).188 
 What was new in the Development Plan was hindsight of the changing 
levels of traffic in the capital in times of peace and war through the collection of 
traffic survey data. London had experienced a steady rise in road traffic in the 
interwar period, except for a plateau during the Depression of the early 1930s. 
This general rise had started to tail off as war approached, and of course the war 
dislocated normal traffic patterns. By 1949, traffic levels were down ten per cent 
on 1937 levels, although that headline figure masked a substantial drop in private 
cars, heavy lorries and public service vehicles and a big rise in vans and taxis. Car 
use was expected to pick up as supply of vehicles increased and petrol rationing 
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had ended, but the cautious projection offered in the Plan was that traffic levels 
would only rise by 50 per cent over 1951 levels by about 1980.189  
 But Abercrombie’s vision of roads in London seemed to be slowly dying, 
as Michael Hebbert has described.190 In the immediate post-war period, housing 
had taken priority over road-building. Then, following publication of the LCC’s 
1951 plan, the government refused to provide financial support. And by the mid-
1950s, a programme of national inter-city motorways was underway. But things 
moved quickly in that decade and, just five years after the Development Plan was 
published, a little-known planning officer in the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government issued a polemical challenge to the urban planning discipline on 
Britain’s traffic problem, followed two years later by a popular book.191 The stage 
was set for Colin Buchanan—and the crisis of the car in the capital. 
3.10 Traffic in Towns, 1963 
In a 1956 article, Colin Buchanan claimed that urban traffic congestion, whilst not 
new, seemed ‘to have acquired a new urgency in the last ten years’ and that it was 
widely held that ‘unless something is done fairly soon it will be impossible for 
traffic to move at all’.192 This encapsulated the view that has survived to the 
present: that the post-war period saw a rapid rise in urban traffic congestion that 
was reaching crisis levels by the turn of the 1960s.193 Buchanan offered a new 
characterization of congestion, stating that ‘there is far more at stake than the 
curing of traffic jams’, preferring a definition of the word ‘congestion’ to mean 
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‘all the uncivilising consequences of motor traffic in addition to obvious 
difficulties of movement’.194 It was rare for a planner to define the term; rarer still 
for one to criticize the planning orthodoxy which focused on enabling traffic to 
bypass towns. Buchanan did, describing ‘a good deal of wishful thinking about 
the value of the by-passes’.195  
 More than any planner before him, Buchanan acknowledged the influence 
of Alker Tripp on the planning orthodoxy, observing that ‘many of our present 
ideas first found coherent expression’ in Tripp’s 1942 book, such as traffic-limited 
precincts and pedestrian segregation. But Tripp’s conception of precincts and the 
arterial roads running between them was wrong, said Buchanan. ‘One begins to 
wonder what this traffic can possibly be that will flow so amenably along the 
radials, round the ring and out the other side’, he asked, concluding that ‘all the 
evidence seems to point to a far more complicated journey-pattern than this, with 
far more penetration into the precincts and the central area’.196 For Buchanan, 
urban congestion was mostly caused by traffic that wanted to be in the town, with 
through traffic—the target of the ring roads—being a minor problem, at least in 
large towns and cities such as London. He claimed: 
surely what motor vehicles are mainly doing is to worm their way into alleys and 
courts, to shops, offices, warehouses and workshops all over the centre, and then 
to return more or less in their tracks.197  
He was calling for a micro study of traffic movement, with solutions of a fine 
enough grain to match, as well as a new viewpoint onto the problem in which 
solutions involved more than merely getting the traffic moving. 
 Yet on the other Tripp-influenced solution—pedestrian segregation—he 
was strongly in favour. The reason the idea had not seen much expression, he felt, 
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was that the idea of a double-level urban street system ‘postulates urban 
reconstruction on a frightening scale’. Instead, he proposed a network of elevated 
pedestrian walkways, cantilevered out from existing buildings along, say, Oxford 
Street, and connected by lightweight bridges ‘thrown across at frequent intervals’. 
The pavements at road level would be turned over to traffic.198 Look again at 
Figure 8 to be reminded of early expressions of that idea. 
 Buchanan’s iconoclastic viewpoint and focus on the micro-scale of 
congestion was given state sanction with the publication in 1963 of Traffic in 
Towns, written for the Ministry of Transport at the request in 1960 of Ernest 
Marples. Marples had become transport minister the previous year and had been 
impressed by Mixed Blessing, the popular book written by Buchanan to flesh out 
his 1956 ideas and bring them to a wider audience.199 In Traffic in Towns, 
Buchanan described his own more sophisticated development of Tripp’s precincts, 
which he termed ‘environmental areas’.200 Buchanan chose to explore a single 
‘metropolitan block’ of Central London—Fitzrovia—in the hope that 
understanding a succession of such blocks would permit an understanding of the 
capital’s problem as a whole—a synthetic approach diametrically at odds with the 
analytical approach of his predecessors.201 But this was not to mean that a focus 
on the local unit meant supporting the existing system of local government in 
urban planning; as with those which went before it, Traffic in Towns advocated 
government reform and new urban regional planning, as Simon Gunn has pointed 
out.202 Gunn has also examined the ambivalence of Buchanan’s prescription, in 
which a concern for the local environment—his environmental areas integrated 
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pedestrians and slowed-down vehicles—clashed with modernist proposals for 
fully segregated urban motorways, noting that the report was ‘novel less in the 
ideas it contained than in their synthesis’ and that whilst it did represent the end of 
the existing paradigm in government planning of the ring road and the circulation 
of traffic, nevertheless it contained a ‘Corbusierian inflection’ in its ‘vision of 
multi-deck cities’ among other proposals.203 Figure 20 shows an artist’s 
impression of the London proposals in Traffic in Towns, making clear the 
influence of Corbusier and of brutalist vertical segregation. 
 
Figure 20: Artist’s impression of multi-level reconstruction in Central London, from Traffic in 
Towns, 1963 (Kenneth Browne/Ministry of Transport).204 
 Yet, despite the ambivalence (or perhaps because of it), the response to 
Traffic in Towns was overwhelmingly positive. Most people, it seemed, were able 
to buy into a vision of technological reconstruction. This was the year of Harold 
Wilson’s ‘white heat’ speech on a technological revolution, and Britain’s future 
seemed to rest on modernisation. Buchanan offered that but also, cleverly, 
tempered it with conservationism and a focus on the small lives of the individuals. 
But, as both Gunn and Peter Hall have pointed out, there was one group which 
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refused to buy his vision—the transport economists, who held that markets, not 
the state, should solve the problems Buchanan raised.205 This brings up a further 
point raised by Buchanan back in his 1956 paper, which again had been rather 
heretical for an urban planner in an age of intervention, and that was the 
possibility of what he termed ‘medicinal’ as well as ‘surgical’ cures for traffic 
congestion in cities, or in other words the control of traffic through police 
direction, waiting restrictions, one-way routing, or, most significantly, the 
restriction of vehicle entry into central areas, as well as the reconstruction of the 
fabric of the city.  
 Although Buchanan’s own view on such restriction was that it might be ‘a 
useful bottle of medicine in the cupboard should the worst come to the worst’, he 
nevertheless prophesized that it was ‘in the wind’ and ‘may eventually play a 
larger part than we perhaps care to imagine at the moment’.206 Buchanan, then, 
was clear that restriction rather than reconstruction could only be a palliative, and, 
as Gunn has shown, so were almost all contemporary responses to Buchanan’s 
proposals except the economists. Both these alternative viewpoints to Buchanan’s 
planning vision—traffic control and traffic restriction—will be discussed in later 
chapters. But for now our review of plans will be concluded with one that came 
out at a turning point in attitudes towards the car in the city, and can be seen as the 
final great planning statement for the holistic state-led reconstruction of London. 
3.11 Greater London Development Plan, 1969–73, and beyond 
On 28 October 1965, matters relating to congestion in London came to a head. 
Following several days of serious traffic jams in the evening rush hour, a three-
hour emergency debate on London traffic congestion was held in the House of 
Commons, swiftly followed by critical leader articles in the Evening Standard and 
                                                 
205 Gunn, ‘The Buchanan Report, Environment and the Problem of Traffic in 1960s Britain’, 531–
3; Peter Hall, ‘The Buchanan Report: 40 Years On’, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil 
Engineers: Transport 157, no. 1 (February 2004): 7–14. 
206 Buchanan, ‘The Road Traffic Problem in Britain’, 236–7. 
3. THE TRAFFIC PROBLEM IN URBAN PLANNING 108 
 
 
 
Evening News.207 By that time, Greater London’s traffic planning had been taken 
over by the Greater London Council (GLC), which had come into being in April 
that year, specifically—as Michael Hebbert has observed—to get a London road-
building programme built.208 Douglas Hart, too, has shown that the founding of 
the GLC enabled the traffic-planning orthodoxy of segregated limited-access 
motor roads, by then over fifty years old, to be enacted through its new powers 
combined with political will for construction.209  
 Road-building was in the ascendant on London’s policy agenda. One of 
the GLC’s first announcements—made just twelve hours after it had come into 
existence—had been the construction of an inner-London ring road or ‘Motorway 
Box’, and that was just the start. A year later, in 1966, the Council announced 
plans for its ‘Primary Road Network’, a further two motorway-standard ring roads 
around the capital (known, with a re-titled Motorway Box, as ‘Ringways’) as well 
as a network of twelve new radial motorway routes. Then, in 1969 (two years later 
than expected), the GLC published its Greater London Development Plan 
(GLDP) which formalized the scheme (see Figure 21; a fourth Ringway, outside 
the GLC’s area, was planned by the Ministry of Transport).210 
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Figure 21: Diagram of primary road network, including three ‘Ringways’, in 1969 Greater London 
Development Plan (Greater London Council, courtesy of London Metropolitan Archives).211 
 In its popular version of the GLDP, the GLC was bullish: 
If London comes to a standstill, or even slows down to a permanent crawl, 
planning has failed ... Congestion means more noise, fumes, vibration ... 
Congestion stultifies and limits life ... Congestion is grey—grey skies, grey faces, 
grey fish and grey cauliflowers, grey facades and grey grass.212  
The solution, held the GLC, was the urban motorway network; but as it turned 
out, the plan was doomed. The story of the rapid decline and fall of the Ringways 
scheme and the Primary Road Network following a lengthy and acrimonious 
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public enquiry has been well examined.213 Construction of the brutal elevated 
Westway by the Ministry of Transport in the late 1960s showed the public the 
reality of urban motorways—grey, noisy, fume-laden, life-limiting. Westway 
opened, unfortunately, on the eve of the GLDP enquiry in 1970 and became 
emblematic of the environmental cost of the Ringway scheme.214 In short, by 
1973, the plans for the two inner Ringways, and their associated radial routes, had 
become politically toxic following huge public opposition, and were pretty much 
taken off the table. A new paradigm of public engagement and environmental 
concern was becoming established, albeit fitfully—what Peter Hall has termed the 
‘revolt against the freeways’.215 
 And that, it seemed, was that. In 1974, J. G. Ballard wrote his fictional 
account of the Westway, Concrete Island, and the dream had officially become a 
nightmare.216 The demise of the Ringways signalled the end of a planning model 
that had lasted three-quarters of a century, in which London’s plan was conceived 
as a top-down skein of roads and precincts laid onto the capital. It is true that a 
few bits and pieces of the canonical schemes were built in the ensuing years. Parts 
of the East Cross Route of Ringway 1 were built as the Blackwall Tunnel 
Southern Approach and the Rochester Way Relief Road in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and a radial road connecting Ringway 1 to Ringway 2 opened after huge protests 
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as the A12/M11 link road in 1999.217 But there were no more grand plans for the 
total reconstruction of London in the twentieth century. Yet it was not, clearly, the 
end of planning for roads in London. Formal planning remained after 1973, but 
what changed was the envisioning of roads and a moral shift in characterizations 
of their purpose. Public transport, cycling and walking emerged (or re-emerged) 
in moral terms. Transport plans became sets of strategies. The car was still there, 
but reduced in status, at least temporarily. The late 1980s and 1990s saw a new 
popular literature emerge on the failure of government and planning in the capital, 
catalyzed, perhaps, by the winding-up of the GLC.218 Changed, too, was the 
political landscape, both at a national and a London level, as the capital 
transitioned from having no overall local government to the establishment of the 
Greater London Authority.219 One crucial new approach, expressed most clearly at 
the London docks from about 1970 onwards, was akin to ‘non-planning’, an 
approach which appeared to herald a market free-for-all, the large-scale 
consequences on traffic policy of which are still playing out.220 The concluding 
chapter of this thesis will glance at London’s traffic planning landscape in the 
present day. 
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3.12 Conclusions and a view into the margins 
In April 1943, the Minister of War Transport appointed a committee to look at the 
design and layout of roads in towns. In its 1946 report, the committee made a bold 
statement. ‘Segregation, which may be defined as separation of traffic in the 
interests of safety and free flow, should be the key-note of modern road design’, it 
stated. The solutions it put forward to achieve this urban segregation included 
behavioural control, civil engineering and electrical technology as well as town 
planning, with ring roads, bypasses, motorways, cycle tracks, footways, one-ways 
streets, flyovers, underpasses and traffic light systems all advanced as 
possibilities.221  
 This chapter has charted more than half a century of urban planning and its 
characterizations of traffic congestion, and has seen the themes of segregation, 
technology, verticality and control emerge time after time. The peculiar 
patchwork of London local government has continually frustrated the attempts of 
planners and specialists to treat London’s traffic problem holistically. There has 
also been a tense dialogue over who is—or should be—a planner. The sheer 
industry of Patrick Abercrombie is evident but, as Larkham and Adams have 
considered, he was very stretched.222 As they state, ‘named (and famous) plan 
authors were not sole authors’.223 Forty at the City of London came in for 
criticism for being an engineer, not a planner in the disciplinary sense. But 
planners themselves were often architects or surveyors, at least in the earlier 
decades. Clearly, a wider view is needed. Here are Larkham and Adams again: 
‘detailed consideration should be given to the interplay, dialogue, relationships 
that existed between the Ministry [of Town and Country Planning], the plan 
authors, City officials, inhabitants and so forth, involved in shaping London’s 
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post-war future’.224 Douglas Hart raised a similar point from a different angle, 
noting that:  
‘The problem’ of traffic congestion was in fact several problems which varied in 
scope according to the values and interests of the labelling organisations. The 
London County Council, road-building interests, public transport authorities and 
various professional bodies all saw ‘the problem’ in different ways.225  
Larkham and Adams’s invitation to take a wider view of plans, planners and 
planning is an important one.  
 Through numerous political statements, expressed through 
characterizations of London’s traffic, we have a heroic narrative—that traffic is a 
big problem requiring a big plan (and big planners) to solve it. That there was an 
alternative to this was realized long before the consumer frenzy and road-building 
visions of the 1950s and 1960s, with motorways in the sky and a car for every 
citizen. The chronicler of London modernity, Harold Clunn, observed the 
following in 1927 as he surveyed twenty years of reconstruction: 
Wild schemes are proposed from time to time for the relief of traffic congestion 
in London, by the construction of overhead roads, which would cost millions of 
pounds ... there is little doubt that the elimination of some half a dozen of the 
worst ‘bottlenecks’ in London ... at about one-quarter the cost of the overhead 
road would do more to solve the traffic question than such visionary schemes as 
are so often suggested; but whereas these visionary projects will always receive 
quite an interested and respectful hearing from the Press and the general public, 
anything in the nature of a much less ambitious programme ... will invariably be 
dismissed ... as being totally inadequate to meet the requirements of the case.226 
For Clunn, and others who came to question the need for grand interventions in 
London’s street scene, congestion was being used by politicians to grandstand in 
front of voters, mediated by the press. For these politicians to be seen to solve big 
problems, those problems needed to be made visible—or perhaps created in the 
first place, since Clunn claimed that congestion in London had actually decreased 
                                                 
224 Ibid., 36. 
225 Hart, Strategic Planning in London, 26–7. 
226 Harold Clunn, London Rebuilt 1897–1927 (London: John Murray, 1927), 6–7. 
3. THE TRAFFIC PROBLEM IN URBAN PLANNING 114 
 
 
 
over the previous twenty-five years. Thus the talking-up of traffic congestion by 
politicians eager for tangible infrastructure to open and name—fed by specialists 
keen to try new technologies and planning ideas—has been a feature of London 
for a century. 
 And it is a hard narrative to look beyond. Individuals such as Abercrombie 
and Buchanan, and artefacts such as their plans, capture our attention easily. We 
have thus absorbed, over many decades, such planners’ conceptualizations of 
traffic as a means of circulation, and this has led to a common language of traffic: 
through-routes, flow, expressways, ring roads, arterials. We have also been 
repeatedly exposed to big themes, including segregation and verticality, and 
assured that big interventions, such as the Westway, were the solution to the big 
problem. But there was small-scale, fine-grain planning, too. Here, congestion 
was seen as local and affected individual journeys and intersections, as well as 
being seen in terms of aggregate flows. This pre-dated the 1973 revolt against the 
freeways. Simon Gunn’s recent work has explored this in Buchanan’s plan where 
it was most overt. Buchanan’s own practice later explained that: 
‘Environmental Areas’ emerged as the important complement to the Ringway 
proposals: traffic and environmental management was to be used to adapt the 
existing local street network in such a way as to force traffic on to a purpose 
designed primary and secondary road network.227 
 So by expanding this sense of planning and responding to traffic, by 
seeing it as more of a problem than one of circulation and flow, by examining 
responses to the fine grain of London traffic congestion, we can chart an 
alternative post-war planning history. We can ask about the histories of ideas in 
the canonical plans. How, for instance, did Tripp’s ideas of pedestrian segregation 
and Buchanan’s flyover decks get worked out on the ground? Look again at 
Figure 20. Where and when did that form of flyover originate? This was not just 
planning of the imagination via the pen onto the drawing board. The ideas in 
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Traffic in Towns had history, in some cases tangible; they had been worked out, in 
part, in steel and concrete, by people in disciplines outside town planning, and in 
decades past, and perhaps in places far from the UK. We can ask questions about 
alternative discourses, or reactions to the hard interventions, such as asking who 
reacted against concrete reconstruction. There were people with world views who 
saw the hard plans as anathema, or who simply did not buy into the vision. They 
were urban planners, too, though not in the disciplinary sense. What did they 
propose? We can also ask how much of the canonical plans was put into practice 
before the 1973 revolt. How much trace of the road-building visions of 
Abercrombie, Forshaw and Buchanan can we see on the streets of London today? 
Selection of case studies 
The foregoing account sets up the rationale for examining case studies across a 
range of professional groups and actors at the margins of professional planning. 
The selection of case studies, however, is a challenging one. The themes do not 
dictate a distinct set of cases; there are many candidates of people and projects to 
consider that differ from the orthodoxy. Nevertheless, some assessment criteria 
can be proposed in order to lead towards a rich and nuanced view as well as to 
attempt to offset biases or prejudices over what constitutes the traffic problem—
biases and prejudices which are the very concern of the thesis. The criteria against 
which candidate case studies were assessed are as follows. 
 The first is a level hierarchy of actors. This has meant looking for middle-
ranking officials as well as the Abercrombies and Buchanans, and this is designed 
to offset the singular heroic trope. The second criterion is geographical location 
(seeking a range from west to east, central to outer) and land-use type (residential, 
industrial, public, retail). This throws up a range of traffic types, from freight 
haulage to commuting, and from leisure travel to local circulation. Together, this 
spread of locations and traffic types is meant to hedge broadly against biases of 
socio-economic status, as well as to a certain extent gender and age. The third 
criterion is chronological, looking for coverage across the period of the twentieth 
century. A fourth consideration is the scale of each project under review to ensure 
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small-scale interventions are examined as well as those covering the whole city. 
At its least this means looking for mundane technologies as well as exceptional 
ones, and hedges against an obsession with size and form. A fifth concern 
underpins the other four, and relates to the discussion in Chapter 2 about practical 
exploration of London’s streets today. This is about acting on responses 
developed by hands-on engagement with the subject. The intention is to take a 
heuristic, instinctive approach to spotting good candidate case studies lurking in 
the literature. With these problems, themes, questions and guidelines in mind, the 
rationale for the selection of case studies, and the ways they allow us to study the 
margins of the network, is as follows.  
Chapter 4, which considers congestion as an engineering problem, explores the 
construction of the 1934 Silvertown Viaduct in east London. By doing so, we can 
place ideas expressed a short time later by Charles Bressey in the Highway 
Development Survey into a context wider than town planning. These include an 
engineering world view of efficiency, in part driven by the affordances of the new 
materials and techniques of steel-reinforced concrete, as well as a political vision 
strongly inflected by class politics of labour and trade over a crucial period in 
British socio-political history. As a project at the geographical and social margins 
of east London, designed primarily for freight vehicles and use by working-class 
people, it provides an alternative narrative on inter-war road-building modernities 
in the capital which have tended to focus on arterial roads, automobility and the 
affluent middle classes. 
Chapter 5, which looks at congestion as a problem of control, examines the 
concept of segregation, an idea embedded in professional plans for London’s 
traffic network. Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner Alker Tripp sits in 
the margins of the planning literature as an influence on this concept, yet, apart 
from noting that his police work gave him a deep insight into the problems of 
traffic and the dangers caused by traffic collisions, little has been said to unpack 
the relationship between his work as a cop and his approach as a planner. He is 
therefore at once a canonical figure and a marginal voice. 
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Chapter 6, which examines a technological alternative to the planners’ paradigm, 
namely road pricing, emerged from a close reading of recent literature around 
Colin Buchanan’s Traffic in Towns, which has observed that it was only certain 
economists who had any real problem with Buchanan’s proposals, proposing 
instead a market mechanism for allocation of space mediated through pricing. We 
have a discipline—economics—which was actively marginalized from the 
planning discourse by planning professionals. 
Chapter 7 looks at a 1960s west-London experiment in computer-controlled 
traffic lights. Traffic lights and roadway vehicle sensors exist in the margins of 
our vision. Few of us ever notice the rectangular patterns of poured tar near stop-
lines, or cast-iron boxes by the side of the road. It has been easy, therefore, to 
ignore the traffic light network growing since the 1960s in favour of studying the 
Ringways and similar traffic infrastructures. But by examining the electronic 
network, one starts to get the sense of the physical as well as the socio-political 
scale and significance of this infrastructure. And yet we ignore it. Chapter 7 will 
offer suggestions as to why we should not. 
Chapter 8 looks at three cases offering glimpses into traffic and the mobilities of 
capital. The first and second—Centre Point at St Giles’ Circus and the London 
Wall highway development—have already received close attention, and are 
discussed here to explore the ways planners and developers attempted to exploit 
each other to gain beneficial outcomes. However, the third study—the modest 
traffic calming of the Pimlico Precinct—has received little attention. Yet, as the 
activist and local press observed at the time, the relationship between this traffic 
project and wider issues of property capitalism is significant, and helps reveal the 
long history of traffic projects saturated with market decisions and the 
accumulation of capital. 
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Chapter 4. Engineers, Flyovers and Empires 
 
Silvertown Way, West Ham, 13 September 1934. Transport Minister Leslie Hore-
Belisha is standing on a newly-built concrete flyover, ready to cut a ribbon across 
the road. Once the ceremony is complete the party moves to nearby Stratford 
Town Hall for speeches. Remarking on Benito Mussolini’s recent opening of 
Rome’s Via dell’ Impero, which ‘only a dictatorship could make true’, Hore-
Belisha claims that ‘Silvertown Way is the conception and the achievement of 
democracy ... surely as bold an undertaking as the Imperial Road of Rome’.228 
 
 
Figure 22: Silvertown Way viaduct from the south-east, 1934 (Rendel, Palmer and Tritton).229 
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4.1 Introduction 
In September 1934, a new road opened in Canning Town, east London, leading to 
the Royal Victoria Dock. Named ‘Silvertown Way’, this was no ordinary road. It 
was a reinforced-concrete elevated highway described as ‘a remarkable 
engineering feat’, which rose over the existing network of roads, railways and 
waterways in an area formerly ‘half-strangled in a maze of narrow approaches’.230 
This was Britain’s first modern urban flyover, a lofty structure sitting on 6,000 
concrete piles sunk deep into the ground, carrying goods and workers to and from 
the heart of London’s docks. It was an engineers’ solution to traffic congestion in 
which new roads passed over old ones, a grade-separated city which abolished 
conflict and fostered healthy circulation, and was the brainchild of two of 
Britain’s most influential highway engineers, namely Henry Maybury and his 
protégé, Charles Bressey, at the Ministry of Transport. These two engineers 
profoundly shaped London’s roadscape, partly during their own careers, in 
projects such as Silvertown Way and London’s arterial road programme, and 
partly in the influence they exerted on a generation of urban planners who were 
waiting in the wings ready to act during and after the Second World War. 
 This chapter explores one of the tropes of twentieth-century urban 
planning which envisioned an efficient, vertically separated network of mobility 
across the capital, as was seen in the previous chapter. But it does so from the 
civil engineer’s point of view, rather than that of the urban planner, and situates it 
in some 30 years of concrete culture. This culture can be considered as a network 
of ideas, beliefs and practitioners of civil engineering. It can also be characterized 
as a belief in the affordances of concrete to retrofit a new, efficient transport 
network into old urban environments. In considering this engineering culture of 
networks, this chapter offers a longer view of the ideas expressed repeatedly 
throughout the planning literature. It also provides evidence of the effects of 
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London’s distinctive political governance network on the realization of large and 
complex infrastructure projects, and the frustrations experienced when relying on 
public funding for traffic infrastructure. Finally, it examines the socio-political 
networks of modernity and democracy mediated by such structures, on both a 
global imperial scale and a local class-inflected scale. 
4.2 Congestion at the Royal Victoria Dock, 1855–1915 
In 1925, reporting to the Ministry of Transport on congestion in London’s streets, 
its chief engineer Henry Maybury made the following stark assessment: 
The deplorable state of the roads-access to the Dock Area has long been a matter 
of great concern to the various authorities interested, and it is now generally 
recognised that nowhere in the whole of the London Area is traffic so congested 
or subject to such vexatious delays ... The worst congestion occurs on the way to 
Victoria Docks and there is nothing comparable to it in the whole of London.231 
 The vast Royal Group of Docks complex in Silvertown, London (mapped 
in Figure 23) was constructed between the 1840s and the 1920s on previously 
deserted, low-lying marshland.232 The North Woolwich Land Company, run by 
the engineer and property speculator George Bidder, purchased the area before 
building roads on the western and southern edges, along with the North Woolwich 
Railway (later part of the Great Eastern Railway), in 1847. Along the riverfront 
numerous factories sprang up housing noxious trades ousted from London proper 
by the 1844 Metropolitan Building Act. Charles Dickens described the area in 
1857 as ‘a place of refuge for offensive trade establishments turned out of town—
those of oil-boilers, gut-spinners, varnish-makers, printer’s ink-makers and the 
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like’.233 Henry Tomlinson, 1930s chronicler of the docklands, described 
Silvertown as: 
a perplexity of railway sidings, roads that wander and lose themselves, creeks 
intruding among backyards, cemeteries, gasometers, the funnels of steamers 
mixed with factory chimneys, warehouses built of the refuse of Tartarus, and a 
formless spread of the grey homes of those who, somehow, must supply the 
reason for its existence.234  
Firms included the Thames Iron Works, Brunner Mond, Silver rubber works 
(hence Silvertown) and Henry Tate, as well as railway and telegraph works and a 
huge gasworks in nearby Beckton.  
 
Figure 23: Royal Docks in 1912 (Bacon’s Large Scale Atlas of London and Suburbs, courtesy of 
Roger Cline/London Topographical Society/Harry Margary).235 
 Bidder went on to promote the Victoria Dock, the first large enough for 
steamships, which opened in 1855. In 1864 it was sold to the London and St 
Katharine Dock Company (which owned dock complexes further upstream), 
which opened the Royal Albert Dock in 1880, at which time its predecessor was 
renamed the Royal Victoria Dock. In 1909 the newly formed Port of London 
Authority (PLA) took over all London’s enclosed docks and built the King 
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George V Dock, which opened in 1921. Throughout this development period, the 
rail network at the complex was expanded, with a huge marshalling yard 
eventually provided to the north-west of the site. The Royals were far bigger than 
London’s existing facilities, enabling larger and more numerous ships to load and 
unload their wares and, with excellent rail links and storage space, they soon 
specialized in goods-in-transit, primarily food. However, by the early twentieth 
century, whilst the complex was well-served by rail, its road network had not been 
expanded to meet the demand brought by increased trade and the rise of 
motorized goods vehicles, and it had become one of the worst places in London 
for road traffic congestion. By the 1930s, the total volume of goods handled at the 
three docks exceeded one million tons per year, much of it transported by road, 
and was supplemented by rapidly growing traffic from the riverside factories.236 
 The Royal Docks lay in the County Borough of West Ham, just outside the 
London County Council boundary, and the earliest coordinated demand for 
improvements to the access roads came in 1902, when a group of factory owners 
petitioned West Ham Corporation to look into the matter.237 The formation of the 
PLA in 1909, and the rapid development of its plans to build the King George V 
dock, focused the merchants’ attention on the problem. At a hearing of the 
committee which set up the PLA, the West Ham Corporation witness complained 
that ‘we have been struggling about those level crossings for the last 20 years 
down there’ and, in 1912, a group of some 25 firms led by the sugar giant Henry 
Tate and Sons (whose refinery was on Silvertown’s riverfront) lobbied the Local 
Government Board, the Board of Trade and the PLA to deal with the matter. Later 
that year, the West Ham Municipal Alliance submitted petitions containing the 
signatures of 1870 local residents complaining of the delays, and a lively public 
meeting in the City of London brought many of the parties together to work out 
practical proposals. Over the ensuing months, the West Ham Borough Engineer 
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and the PLA Chief Engineer worked together on an outline scheme to solve the 
problem with a new elevated road, which was put before the Road Board by a 
deputation on 15 July 1913, but was rejected owing to the Board’s existing 
commitments to building arterial roads.238  
 Interest in the scheme was growing but West Ham was having trouble 
stumping up its share of the cost. At a conference in November 1913 convened by 
the Local Government Board to look at London’s road network, delegates heard 
about the proposal as an example of good ideas running aground in heavily taxed 
boroughs such as West Ham for lack of funds.239 In 1914, the pressure group 
offered a class-inflected spin on the situation, remarking in a press release that 
‘Public feeling in the district affected particularly resents the attitude of the Road 
Board’, which was ‘favouring West London at the expense of East London’ by 
funding arterial roads, ‘which will be chiefly used for the purposes of pleasure’ 
rather than urban main roads such as those in Silvertown, ‘which are of far greater 
intrinsic value to the country’.240 At a subsequent Local Government Board spin-
off conference looking at the specific needs of north-east London, the chairman 
remarked as follows: 
it was the river that made London. London cannot exist without the river. The 
docks are an essential feature of both the river and London, and the growing 
population and the enormous accretion of trade and industry in the East and 
North-East of London call you who represent local authorities ... to take a big 
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view of your duties and responsibilities with regard to the future roads and town-
planning of this important area.241  
The conference described the proposed Victoria Dock road improvement scheme 
as: 
in any case ... a great blessing to the docks and to the factories at Silvertown, but 
in view of the additional dock accommodation to be provided, it now becomes of 
paramount importance, and should on no account be allowed to fall through.242  
On 22 July 1914 a further deputation was made to the Road Board which this time 
resulted in an offer from the Board to contribute £100,000 towards the £300,000 
cost.243 The Board suggested that the remaining sum should be contributed by a 
consortium of the PLA, the West Ham Corporation, the Great Eastern Railway 
and the manufacturers of Silvertown.244 
 Detailed discussions by a conference committee in 1915 crystallised into 
two distinct schemes, namely a relatively simple PLA-led proposal and a more 
ambitious West Ham Corporation plan, each involving new elevated roads to 
bypass the congestion black spots.245 The committee concluded that the simpler 
PLA scheme should be started immediately, with the West Ham proposals 
perhaps being added at a later date, although the Royal Institute of British 
Architects proposed a combination of both schemes that appears to have been 
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ignored by the committee.246 The PLA had stated that ‘Victoria Dock Road is an 
evil of long-standing and one which requires drastic and immediate treatment’.247 
By this time, though, the First World War had intervened and costs for labour and 
materials began to shoot up, leaving the £300,000 scheme costs woefully short. 
4.3 Developing a concrete proposal, 1919–29 
After the war ended, fresh attention was paid to the congestion in Silvertown. The 
old problems had not gone away, and with the PLA’s King George V dock 
nearing completion, traffic began greatly to increase in the area. The 1919 report 
of the Road Board revived the 1915 arterial road conference proposals, and the 
establishment that year of a new Ministry of Transport galvanised action 
further.248 The new Ministry’s Director-General of Roads was Sir Henry 
Maybury, who had been chief engineer at the Road Board in 1913 when proposals 
for the Victoria Dock district had first been presented by the PLA, and he was 
instructed to prepare a detailed and costed scheme for improvements in the area, 
which he described in 1920 as containing ‘congested roads carrying probably the 
heaviest traffic in the world’.249 He also raised the scheme in his evidence to the 
Royal Commission on London Government, which reported in 1923, as one 
which demanded funding from across London as well as the Home Counties.250 
Later that year, as the London Chamber of Commerce was mobilizing the 
business community to carry out a major public lobbying campaign in support of 
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road improvements at the docks, Maybury received full details of a workable 
scheme from his technical staff.251  
 
Figure 24: Ministry of Transport proposals for road improvement scheme in Silvertown, including 
bridge replacements, widenings and an elevated flyover (Ministry of Transport).252 
 Having first described the congestion in the area, their report went on to 
outline the proposed solution (shown in Figure 24). Taking the problems in turn, 
the first proposal was to widen the eastern end of the East India Dock Road and 
construct a wide new bridge over the River Lea with easier gradients and 
straighter approaches than the existing bridge, known as the ‘Iron Bridge’. Outline 
costings assumed this bridge would be made of steel, as was conventional at that 
time, but the report pressed for an alternative that was taking the engineering 
world by storm: reinforced concrete. Concrete was described in glowing terms, 
readers being informed that it ‘would cost approximately two-thirds of the cost of 
a steel bridge. It would require less constructional depth allowing of better road 
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grades while its upkeep would be nil and its life indefinite’. The next blockage, a 
narrow bridge over the Canning Town railway station, would be resolved by 
building a second new bridge with new station buildings set further back, enabling 
a wider roadway. The Barking Road east of Canning Town railway station would 
be widened, with one consequence being that an easier turn south into Victoria 
Dock Road could be constructed. But by far the most significant proposal was the 
construction of a wide elevated viaduct road along the line of the existing Victoria 
Dock Road, rising from ground level south of Barking Road, which would carry 
traffic over a critical level crossing known as the ‘White Gates’ as well as the 
entrance lock to the Victoria Dock (with its railway lines) before returning to 
ground level on the southern edge of the dock. It was to be an urban flyover. 
Spaces under the viaduct could be let to local industrial firms for parking their 
goods vehicles, while the existing streets at ground level could continue to be used 
by local traffic. 
 Maybury’s scheme was well received, and was published in the annual 
report of the Road Fund, which by this time was administered by the Ministry of 
Transport.253 The strategic nature of these traffic pinch-points was highlighted: 
The Iron Bridge ... is the funnel through which are poured all the streams of 
traffic bound for riverside and dock destinations from Poplar to Tilbury—sixteen 
miles as the crow flies, and including about 20 miles of river frontage.  
At the White Gates level crossing, it was noted that ‘the entire rail traffic to and 
from this dock area passes between these gates’. At this and other level crossings 
in the area, ‘the confusion and congestion are almost indescribable’. All in all, the 
effects of these blockages became cumulative, as ‘all these obstructions are so 
close together that when one is removed the flood of dammed-up traffic is 
immediately added to the block already forming against the next barrier’. And it 
was not just the delays to vehicles that was hampering trade in the area, but also 
delays to pedestrians, which was leading to bad timekeeping by factory 
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employees. In summary, the Ministry argued, ‘it can be said without exaggeration 
that delays here produce a retardation of movement through the entire 
metropolitan area’. But the cost had risen tenfold compared with the PLA’s 1914 
plan: the Ministry’s 1923 scheme was estimated at two to three million pounds.254  
 However, by this time, the Ministry had another person in post with the 
influence to press for the scheme besides Maybury, namely Harry Gosling, who 
was the Minister of Transport, Whitechapel Labour MP, a former Thames 
lighterman, member of the PLA and a prominent trade unionist who campaigned 
for better conditions for dock workers.255 Now, having a detailed analysis of the 
traffic problem in the docks area, Maybury and Gosling together felt ready for 
action. Two events occurred in 1924 that gave traction to the proposals. Firstly, 
Maybury presented a paper on the subject to the Royal Society of Arts, at a 
session chaired by Gosling, in which Maybury described the unchecked growth of 
the Silvertown area and the scant resources of the West Ham Corporation to 
provide for it, exclaiming that: 
The result at Silvertown provides town-planners with conspicuous examples of 
what to avoid. For our ancestors’ want of foresight the penalty has long been 
accumulating, and payment is now overdue.256  
He described the ‘disabilities the district now labours under, and what means of 
relief might be applied if London as a whole would put its shoulder to the wheel’, 
before describing his scheme, which he believed to be ‘one of the most urgent 
improvements conceivable’.257  
 In addressing the RSA, Maybury and Gosling had a specific goal in mind. 
They were presenting the scheme in order to seek financial contributions from 
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across the capital to fund a road improvement that would be of benefit to all, not 
just the local area, with Maybury concluding that he was ‘satisfied that the vital 
interests of the Imperial Capital demand the immediate inception of this 
scheme’.258 He explained that his appeal was ‘to London as a whole, London in its 
widest sense’, with its ‘incalculable resources’. It could not wholly be funded by 
West Ham, nor wholly by national government, but was ‘first and foremost an 
All-London task, the cost of which should be distributed over a wider region than 
the Metropolitan Police Area’. In closing, he said that: 
So great a campaign demands united forces led by a spirit of vision and venture. 
The Home Counties which derive so much of their wealth and rateable value 
from their vicinity to London, should not stand aloof.259  
After a warm response from the audience, he finished with the comment that: 
The country could not afford to have millions of money invested in those great 
Docks, and have the whole traffic from those docks throttled by the present 
wretched communications.260 
 The second event in 1924 of significance to the problem was the passing, 
by Harry Gosling, of the London Traffic Act. This legislation established a 
London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee (LHCTAC), bringing 
together government departments, London councils, the police and a variety of 
local councils in nearby areas to offer a coordinated voice advising the Minister of 
Transport on traffic matters.261 It had its origins in the 1923 Royal Commission on 
London Government, to which Henry Maybury had proposed the Victoria Dock 
Road scheme as an example of the need for a London-wide traffic body, and on its 
establishment, he was appointed its first chairman. The LHCTAC was empowered 
by the Act to come up with proposals for sharing costs of road schemes among the 
various bodies and councils affected, and finally, here was an official (if only 
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advisory) body with a mandate to seek London-wide funding, and one in which all 
interested parties could come together to coordinate their views. Within months of 
its constitution, the LHCTAC formally recommended the Victoria Dock Road 
scheme as a top priority.262  
 In 1926, the Royal Commission on Cross-River Traffic in London lent its 
weight to the pressure being exerted on government and local councils to fund the 
Silvertown improvement scheme, observing that ‘The existing condition of affairs 
[in the Royal Docks area] has indeed become a public scandal’.263 In 1927 a 
committee of MPs and parliamentary candidates for constituencies affected by the 
congestion pressed the government for action in response to the Royal 
Commission.264 In 1928, with funding starting to come in from the various 
contributors, the government asked the London County Council and the West 
Ham Corporation jointly to place a bill for the scheme before Parliament, which 
received royal assent in May 1929. A House of Commons select committee 
remarked that ‘through the genius of the Minister of Transport, they had all the 
diverse authorities brought together and a practically agreed scheme of 
improvement’.265 The £2.5 million cost was met by a grant from the government 
covering 75 per cent, with the remaining 25 per cent coming from the London 
County Council, City of London Corporation, and nine nearby county boroughs 
and councils, including West Ham.266  
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 The building of new roads, whether arterial or elevated, was inextricably 
bound up in this period with labour and unemployment policy.267 Much of the 
road building programme of the 1920s and 30s was paid for under unemployment 
relief policies, with the result that new roads did not necessarily map onto 
locations of congestion; or rather, political geographies of highway engineering 
did not always match congestion geographies. The former Road Fund secretary 
and roads campaigner Rees Jeffreys put it as follows in 1927: 
It must not be forgotten in reviewing the arterial road programme that it is a 
compromise between conflicting ideas and interests ... the Government, being 
concerned mainly with the relief of unemployment, were impelled towards 
projects affecting undeveloped lands free from those dilatory and costly obstacles 
which haunt all clearance schemes ... the undertakings which were ultimately 
selected were not always those holding first place on the traffic priority 
schedule.268 
In later years, Jeffreys explained that this was why the Victoria Dock road scheme 
took so long to realize. Unlike the arterial roads, which were built largely on 
virgin land, the dock road involved widespread clearance.269 Congestion relief 
was not always a quick win or politically advantageous, especially in the shabbier 
parts of town, with their cramped spaces, working-class populations, and goods 
vehicles, trams and buses jostling for space with motor cars. But the engineers 
kept the faith, and kept lobbying the politicians, even when circumstances 
changed. Henry Maybury retired from the Ministry of Transport in 1928, replaced 
as chief engineer by his protégé, Charles Bressey, but remained as the Ministry’s 
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consulting engineer and adviser for several years, as well as continuing as 
chairman of the LHCTAC, so the baton handover was a long and successful one. 
After some two decades of promotion, Maybury was finally about to give 
Silvertown its flyover, with Bressey delivering the birth.  
4.4 Building the Silvertown Way, 1929–34 
The Victoria Dock road scheme delivered under Charles Bressey’s leadership was 
divided into a series of packages, each put out to tender and managed by the 
scheme’s consulting engineers, the firm of Rendel, Palmer and Tritton, to which 
the Borough Engineer of West Ham, Lionel Jenkins, was attached.270 First was the 
contract to build new housing for residents displaced by demolition. 599 new 
cottages and flats were constructed between 1929 and 1931 in the nearby Prince 
Regent Lane area on former allotment land largely donated by the Port of London 
Authority. The new estate was ‘done on town planning lines’, with tree-lined 
streets, a garden for each dwelling and a ban on through traffic giving it ‘the 
appearance of a garden village’.271 Next, the new bridge over the River Lea was 
constructed, capable of taking six lines of traffic, followed by a complex 
reconfiguration of the Canning Town railway station and its bridge. This work, 
begun in January 1930, was completed in September 1933. The biggest contract 
was the construction of the three-quarter-mile-long concrete flyover. Work on this 
began in November 1932 and was completed in 1934. Figure 25 and Figure 26 
depict construction. Works elsewhere in the area formed a final part of the 
scheme. A total of 18 contracts were let, ranging in scale from £6,158 for 
preliminary street works to the £330,352 package for building the viaduct. 
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Altogether 6,000 reinforced-concrete piles supported the scheme’s foundations 
and each new structure was designed to carry a 100-ton vehicle on four wheels.272 
 
Figure 25: Laying reinforced concrete viaduct slab on Silvertown Way, 1933–34 (Rendel, Palmer 
and Tritton).273 
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Figure 26: Partially completed section of Silvertown Way viaduct, 1933–34 (Rendel, Palmer and 
Tritton).274 
 Silvertown Way was novel in two ways. Firstly, it was an early British 
example of a grade-separated urban flyover, an elevated road passing over not just 
a single river, road, canal or railway (as in a bridge or simple viaduct) but over an 
entire ground-level transport network in a crowded city location. Secondly, it was 
realised largely in reinforced concrete, a technology which was reshaping civil 
engineering and architectural practice. The first reinforced concrete building in 
Britain, the 1897 Weaver’s Mill in Swansea, was followed by a wide variety of 
projects at such a pace that, by 1926, the industry’s journal was able to produce a 
vast conspectus of progress, covering buildings, bridges, viaducts, sports facilities, 
dock structures, industrial plant, highways, utilities structures and sculpture.275 
Concrete was a modern material and its industry, led by specialized architects, 
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engineers and contractors, worked with the energy and reforming zeal of pioneers. 
Its introduction and development also matched in date that of the motor vehicle, 
another symbol of dislocating modernity, and itself a technology that demanded 
new structural forms that reinforced concrete could create. Taken together, 
concrete and the motor vehicle created new urban architectures, with highway 
engineering emerging as a new discipline dedicated to reshaping the landscape of 
mobility.276  
 Silvertown Way was not the first urban concrete viaduct, but it was the 
most comprehensive and influential in Britain in the interwar period, being 
described by carscape historians Kathryn Morrison and John Minnis as ‘the most 
significant step towards the post-war flyover’ such as London’s Westway, which 
opened in 1970.277 Earlier examples included a viaduct in Dover, completed 1922 
and depicted in Figure 27; a system in Barking, completed 1927 and shown in 
Figure 28; and the Lea Valley Viaduct, also completed 1927 and pictured in 
Figure 29, all of which bear structural and aesthetic resemblances to the 
Silvertown structures (compare with Figure 26).278  
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Figure 27: Part of Dover Borough Council congestion-relief viaduct and bridge system, completed 
1922 (Concrete and Constructional Engineering).279 
 
Figure 28: Detail of Ministry of Transport Barking viaduct and bridge system, completed 1927 
(Concrete and Constructional Engineering).280 
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Figure 29: View of Ministry of Transport Lea Valley Viaduct, completed 1927 (Hobbs, Offen and 
Co./Public Works, Roads and Transport Congress).281 
In the United States, engineers had started building double-deck or viaducted 
urban streets such as Wacker Drive in Chicago, or streets with grade-separated 
interchanges such as the Bronx River Parkway in New York, in the 1920s 
(although the construction of concrete grade-separated freeways such as the 
Arroyo Seco in Los Angeles did not begin until the late 1930s).282 Yet none of 
these early schemes matched the scale or complexity of the Silvertown scheme, 
which claimed to clear the most congested streets in the world and showed 
planners and engineers how vertically separated concrete roads in urban traffic 
black spots could create a new network for traffic circulation.  
                                                 
281 Public Works, Roads and Transport Congress, British Bridges: An Illustrated Technical and 
Historical Record, 107. 
282 Miller McClintock, Street Traffic Control (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1925), 
55–57; Mark S. Foster, From Streetcar to Superhighway: American City Planners and Urban 
Transportation, 1900-1940 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981), chap. 5; Bruce E. 
Seely, Building the American Highway System: Engineers as Policy Makers (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1987), 150–156; Matthew Gandy, Concrete and Clay: Reworking Nature in New 
York City (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2002), chap. 3; Peter Norton, Fighting Traffic: 
The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2008), 
238–42; Zeller, ‘Staging the Driving Experience’; DiMento and Ellis, Changing Lanes: Visions 
and Histories of Urban Freeways, chaps 1–2. 
4. ENGINEERS, FLYOVERS AND EMPIRES  138 
 
 
 
 Civil engineering historian Mike Chrimes has explained the role of early 
exemplars in propagating an engineering culture of elevated concrete structures, 
stating that, ‘As articles appeared describing the early system bridges, and 
textbooks became available, it became easier for local authority and other 
engineers to draw up their own designs’, and indeed, by 1930, when the 
Silvertown Way was still under construction, some 2,000 reinforced concrete 
bridges had been built in Britain.283 The Ministry of Transport had spearheaded 
this development, with one industry commentator observing in 1927 that some of 
its new bridges were ‘of such importance that one can predict that reinforced 
concrete will be exclusively used in the future for bridges’.284  
 Silvertown Way provided a powerful boost to the engineering profession 
and its ambitions to reshape London, both in its use of reinforced concrete and its 
elevation. At a meeting of the Institution of Civil Engineers to discuss the scheme, 
one of Rendel, Palmer and Tritton’s engineers explained that concrete viaducts 
were chosen ‘as they were felt to be the most attractive’ in a scheme where 
‘continuity of design was of importance’ and the structures ‘were chosen to 
harmonize with their surroundings’. An important practical consideration in the 
Silvertown area, with its intensive industrial occupation, was that ‘the air was 
chemically laden, which made the maintenance of steelwork difficult and 
expensive’. Another engineer singled out the high-level viaduct as ‘an example 
which should be followed’ by the Ministry of Transport, urging that further 
projects be developed employing the new approach, in particular that ‘an attempt 
ought to be made to tackle one traffic-crossing right in the centre of London, no 
matter what the expense might be’. This, he hoped, would lead to widespread use 
of grade-separation.285 The concrete industry was actively promoting urban grade 
separation using concrete structures at that time, with one 1936 industry vision of 
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a vertically segregated city (shown in Figure 30) influencing Alker Tripp’s ideas 
on segregation introduced in Chapter 3 and depicted in Figure 8, and considered 
in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Figure 30: ‘“Upstairs footpaths” and shopping pavements, with cross-over bridges, visualised by 
the Concrete Association’, 1936, copied by Alker Tripp in his Town Planning and Road Traffic, 
1942 (Concrete Association).286 
 With concrete, engineers were trained to conceive new forms of highway 
structures that reshaped the urban environment aesthetically and formally, such 
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that, in the words of motorway historian Robert Baldwin, ‘By the 1930s a 
professional understanding of the ... utility of concrete had become part of the 
highway engineers’ professional discipline’.287 Adrian Forty has gone further, 
arguing that reinforced concrete from the 1930s onwards created a new form of 
‘urban nature’.288 Matthew Gandy has described 1920s American parkways as 
‘emblematic of a combination of engineering science with the aesthetic 
sophistication of landscape architecture’ and ‘a new spatial configuration of 
society, technology, and nature’.289 It became natural, then, for engineers to create 
concrete landscapes in cities, as well as to consider concrete structures as viewing-
points for scenic vistas, a point to which we will return presently. 
4.5 Highway Development Survey, 1934–39 
Following Bressey’s completion of the Silvertown Way scheme in 1934, Leslie 
Hore-Belisha instructed him to carry out a comprehensive survey of highway 
developments needed in London over the following 30 years, as was discussed in 
Chapter 3. The Highway Development Survey, written with the help of architect 
Edwin Lutyens, was completed in 1937.290 
 In Bressey’s plans, we can discern a light-bulb switching on in the minds 
of highway engineers: that a new motor road network such as the Silvertown Way 
scheme could be (literally) overlaid onto the existing London street pattern and, 
significantly, that this would be morally and aesthetically good. Bressey himself, 
discussing Silvertown Way with a group of traffic experts five years after it 
opened, said that: 
It affords a very instructive example of the advantages of a high-level road 
carried on a viaduct above the busy surface-streets teeming with local traffic. 
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Incidentally it is to the credit of this viaduct that from it travellers gain a 
fascinating view, never before vouchsafed to them, of docks and shipping which 
are invisible from the streets at ground-level. Viaducts are so often and so 
thoughtlessly denounced as destructive of beauty that we do well to remember the 
refreshing and hitherto unsuspected views they may reveal.291  
At the same time, demonstrating the 1930s engineer talking like a 1940s or 1950s 
planner, Bressey described proposed new roads leading north from the dock area 
as follows: 
Many of the areas that would be traversed by these new routes are so woefully 
dejected and so stricken with decrepitude that the wholesale demolitions and 
consequent re-planning which the building of a wide new thoroughfare would 
entail could only be regarded as a boon that is long overdue.292  
New roads cut through old London were, of course, nothing new; the novelty in 
the 1930s was the practical feasibility (demonstrated by the Silvertown Way) of 
new roads flying over the old, partly through the engineering affordances of 
concrete and partly through the handling characteristics of motor vehicles which 
could handle steeper gradients and tighter curves.293 In a GPO Film Unit film 
made to publicise his report, Bressey lamented the failure of Christopher Wren to 
rebuild London on a rational grid system, ‘a plan so enlightened, so far-seeing, 
that it would even have met the needs of modern traffic’.294 Instead, the streets 
had remained unaltered—an opportunity lost—and the result, Bressey intoned, 
was congestion. ‘Quick transport is essential to trade. Trade is London’s life. 
Congestion strangles it’, remarked the voiceover. ‘But there is a way to ease this 
congestion. Just as Wren made a plan for seventeenth-century Londoners, so Sir 
Charles Bressey has worked out a plan for us’. Bressey is then seen looking down 
from a lofty office window onto the congested streets below, before placing a 
series of transparent overlay sheets onto a map of London, each sheet showing 
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parts of his proposed new road network encircling and crossing the city, such as 
those shown in Figure 31.  
 
 
 
Figure 31: Charles Bressey overlaying his proposed new roads on acetate sheets onto a map of 
London, in The City, 1939 (Courtesy of BFI Stills).295 
 Then Bressey described how his roads would cross each other and 
intersect with the existing street pattern in Central London by using grade-
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separation, gesturing to a series of dramatic visual depictions of aerial cityscapes, 
such as those shown in Figure 32. He said: 
We must build elevated highways on viaducts ... we must drive tunnels under 
obstacles ... we must have roundabouts and flyovers of the most modern type ... 
we must adopt every device for facilitating the movement of traffic and giving it 
the clearest possible course.  
In his Highway Development Survey, and expressed vividly in the GPO film, 
Bressey was not so much proposing to replace the medieval street network of 
Central London with a Wrenian grid of streets. Instead, he was proposing—as a 
highway engineer might—literally to overlay a new grid of concrete roads just 
above the old tangled surface of the city. 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Visualizations of high-level roads and grade-separated junctions in Central London, in 
The City, 1939 (Courtesy of BFI Stills).296 
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 The moral, aesthetic and material verticality present in Bressey’s work had 
been generated too by a scientific gaze from above, in that he used aeroplanes to 
carry out aerial photographic surveys in an effort to prevent ‘the delay necessarily 
attendant upon the ordinary survey methods’.297 Vertical separation in London’s 
streets was in the air in the 1930s, as Kathryn Morrison and John Minnis have 
observed.298 It was an engineering solution, using concrete and steel, to the 
problem of London’s ancient, complex, local street network. And, as a pragmatic 
engineering solution rather than an idealistic plan, Bressey’s report urged the view 
that: 
Londoners would be better advised to embark immediately upon useful schemes, 
admittedly imperfect, rather than wait for the emergence of some faultless ideal 
which will have ceased to be attainable long before it has received approval.299  
The public, too, was thus being brought into a culture of concrete and the view 
from above. A concrete engineer reported in 1927 that: 
The general public is gradually being educated into the many uses of reinforced 
concrete, and everyone is now well acquainted with this material, which is 
considered as a symbol of strength and durability.300  
And this description—a symbol of strength and durability—could as equally 
apply to the British Empire, or rather the representation of it current in British 
culture at that time.  
4.6 Democracy and ‘a road to the Empire’ 
In 1935, the travel essayist Henry Tomlinson had narrated a fictional visit of a 
‘venturer’ by train to the Silvertown docks, observing that: 
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The miles of concrete quays, as he walks eastward to Gallions Station for a train 
back to town, will tell him more of Empire than all the exhibitions. For there are 
ports and ports. London is more than a seaport. It is a world market.301  
With the opening of Silvertown Way, and the development of other concrete 
structures at the Royal Docks at the same time, this imperial concrete appeared 
more real than the concrete exhibition halls on the other side of the city in 
Wembley. The docks were the real heart of the empire. In July 1927, during a 
House of Commons debate on road funding, the trade unionist, West Ham 
Corporation member and Labour MP for Silvertown, Jack Jones, had put on a 
piece of theatre for the amusement of his fellow members and the parliamentary 
reporters gathered in the Press Gallery: 
Mr Jack Jones made a speech in the mock big bow-wow style on behalf of the 
projected road to the London Victoria Dock. ‘Not a mere arterial road,’ he said, 
swelling his breast and raising high his head, ‘but an imperial road that Caesar 
would have gloried in.’ He was half-serious, but he could not resist the temptation 
to talk in the towering way of the real Imperialists, and when he had finished he 
joined heartily in the general laughter which his little piece of burlesque had 
provoked.302 
In the months leading up to the completion of the Victoria Dock road scheme, 
West Ham Corporation and the Ministry of Transport had bickered about what it 
should be called. Early suggestions included ‘King George V Avenue’, ‘Prince of 
Wales Avenue’, or simply ‘London Dock Road’.303 By 1 September 1934 the 
name had still not been decided on.304 On 7 September, the Ministry’s Deputy 
Chief Engineer, Frederick Cook, wrote to Leslie Hore-Belisha to say that he 
would be speaking to the West Ham Town Clerk the following morning to discuss 
the naming. He also told Hore-Belisha that ‘Enquiries have been made from all 
sources in London concerning the Via-Dell’-Impero at Rome and a note is 
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attached, giving the available information, together with a sketch illustrating the 
road’.305  
 
Figure 33: The Via dell’ Impero, Rome, opened 1932, showing views down onto ancient ruins 
(Journal of the Royal Institute of British Architects).306 
 The Via dell’ Impero, or ‘Imperial Way’, had been opened by Benito 
Mussolini in 1932 to reduce traffic congestion but more importantly as a 
ceremonial avenue designed to bring into view Rome’s ancient past (see Figure 
33). On 13 September 1934, Hore-Belisha proudly named his new road 
‘Silvertown Way’.307 In 1926, as the Victoria Dock road was debated in the House 
of Commons, Jack Jones had stated that ‘it is not a road for West Ham, it is not 
even a road for London, it is a road to the Empire’.308 The following year, as we 
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have seen, he described the new scheme as ‘not a mere arterial road, but an 
imperial road that Caesar would have gloried in’.309 Mussolini’s Imperial Way, 
under construction at the time, was a road which connected the past to the future 
by creating engineered public views onto the products of Rome’s ancient empire.  
 Upon its opening, Mussolini had stated that: 
we must create the monumental Rome of the twentieth century. Rome must be a 
city worthy of its own glory. And this glory must be renewed incessantly so as to 
hand it down to future generations as the heritage of the Fascist Age.310  
This creative destruction, a hallmark of urban modernity framed around modern 
problems such as congestion, was highlighted by the Italian archaeologist Guido 
Calza at the time, who noted that the Via dell’ Impero was not just an 
archaeological or aesthetic project, but: 
a street necessitated by the traffic requirements of the modern city ... a modern 
street which also endeavours to give value to the remains of the Imperial Forums 
and monuments, to give a panoramic view of them.311  
He concluded that, whilst it was a Roman road, it was ‘no less an Italian road, the 
road of a modern nation, which joins modern initiative to the cult of her past’.312 
 The connection made by Jack Jones to Rome, and to empires, was picked 
up by Hore-Belisha who, in his speech at Stratford Town Hall following the 
ribbon-cutting on the flyover, referred to Mussolini’s Imperial Way as follows: 
Silvertown Way is the conception and the achievement of Democracy. Silvertown 
Way is surely as bold an undertaking as the Imperial Road of Rome. It has 
overcome physical difficulties as challenging. It also has involved the rehousing 
of thousands of citizens. Not only is there about it an equally fine touch of 
imagination, but it has the advantage of serving an even more practical purpose. It 
exposes to view not the ruins of the past, but a vision of our present maritime 
greatness. Till now the London Docks have been hidden from sight. This road 
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gives a perspective of them, so that all who use it may see the masts of those 
ships which carry our commerce. This thing has been done by the people, by the 
so-called common men and women who had the idea, who have made the road a 
worthy outlet to the world.313 
Hore-Belisha pressed home his point about the public gaze: 
The London Docks are no exception to the general rule that docks and wharves 
are usually hidden behind high walls which shut them out of public view and are 
provided with fences ... The new road, with its bridges and its viaduct, will allow 
Londoners, and visitors to London, to gain a far-flung view of the waterways, 
docks and wharves which represent the real foundation of London’s wealth. This 
is the Aladdin’s Cave of London, and a thousand years of the romance of its 
commerce, wealth and industry are reflected in the scenes that are visible from 
these new viewpoints.314 
 It is hard to overstate the significance of this vision. As Felix Driver and 
David Gilbert have observed, ‘The ebb and flow of goods at the docks determined 
the fortunes of hundreds of thousands of working-class people; there was in this 
sense no more significant site in the landscape of empire’. Many visitors to the 
area were incoming sailors or immigrant workers, with Driver and Gilbert noting 
that ‘For many the first sight of London was of the vast and strange dockland 
landscape, on a ship sailing up the Thames estuary’.315 But that first sight was not 
always a good one. Albert Linney, chronicler of London’s river, described the old 
Victoria Dock Road as being ‘as wretched a street as could be found in London ... 
What an impression of the Capital of the British Empire must have been given to 
foreign seamen emerging from the Royal Victoria Dock into London!’ He went 
on, ‘Every time I walked down that road to the White Gates, I was appalled at the 
squalor of the scene’.316 Yet by this time, alongside dock workers and transient 
seamen, this Aladdin’s Cave was also a distinct tourist destination, with the PLA 
operating thrice-weekly summer steamboat excursions which included ‘a run 
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round the Royal Docks’, attracting a thousand passengers per day.317 But these 
visions had always been at ground or water level. What could a view from above 
offer? 
 Adolf Hitler, too, had spent the early 1930s engaged in the construction of 
imperialist congestion-busting highway infrastructure, namely his motor roads or 
Reichsautobahn programme initiated in September 1933. This project, as with 
Mussolini’s Imperial Way, was held up for comparison with the Silvertown Way 
by those close to London’s road building scene (although Hitler’s roads were 
limited-access inter-city highways rather than urban avenues). Rees Jeffreys, 
roads campaigner and secretary of the Road Board when Maybury was its Chief 
Engineer (and when the first proposals for the Victoria Dock scheme had been put 
forward), travelled widely in Europe and America examining their road 
infrastructure. Just hours after Silvertown Way was opened to the public, Jeffreys 
was on board the German airship Graf Zeppelin along with several officials from 
the Ministry of Transport as part of the 1934 International Road Congress, hosted 
by Hitler and his deputy, Rudolf Hess. The engineers were inspecting progress on 
Hitler’s road building scheme from above. Jeffreys was impressed by Hitler’s 
single-minded ability to press forward his highway plans, building road capacity 
before congestion brought traffic to a halt rather than after, as Jeffreys complained 
had been the case in Silvertown.318 
 Mussolini and Hitler, as with the other dictators of interwar Europe, 
wanted to reshape their countries. But, as Eric Hobsbawm has pointed out, ‘the 
antiquity of European civilization deprived them of the most obvious way of 
doing so: the building of entirely new capital cities’. So the solution, he said, 
came from engineers, not artists or architects: the building of new imperial 
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infrastructure, whether it was the Moscow Metro or the Dneprostroi dam.319 To 
Hobsbawm’s inventory we can add Hitler’s autobahnen and Mussolini’s Via dell’ 
Impero. Yet democrats wanted to create modern cities, too, and the Silvertown 
Way was an equally radical reshaping of old London; a modern engineering 
monument in concrete to the power of the British Empire. The fact that similar 
ideas about infrastructure could be manifest in markedly different contexts—
places, politics, cultures—was partly a result of the networks of people and ideas 
that spread across Europe and America as examined by Felix Driver and David 
Gilbert, who note the profound influence of classical Rome on theorists of empire. 
They conclude that whilst ‘There was no direct equivalent in London of, say, 
Mussolini’s extravagant archaeological campaigns’, influences from Rome could 
be found in London’s sculpture and buildings.320 Yet, to these artistic and 
architectural responses we can now add the engineering response manifest in the 
Silvertown Way, designed as a snub to il Duce’s extravagance, an imperial way 
peculiar to London that opened up vistas not to an ancient past but to Britain’s 
imperial present. 
 There was already, in fact, an Empire Way in London—part of the British 
Empire Exhibition of 1924–5 in Wembley, a complex expressed in reinforced 
concrete which offering visitors the chance to ‘inspect the Empire from end to 
end’.321 There was also, of course, The Mall, London’s ceremonial avenue 
remodelled in the years after 1901 to commemorate Queen Victoria.322 And one 
can readily see the London County Council’s Kingsway, opened in 1905, as an 
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imperial avenue.323 All these imperial roads were consciously modern. Yet it was 
the Silvertown Way that we should see as an expression of a new imperialism—of 
free trade and openness gained through the unfettered circulation of people and 
goods, and by the opening up of the empire to the public gaze.324 This was a clear 
expression of modern democracy versus modern dictatorship. Driver and Gilbert 
have noted an anxiety that London’s pre-eminence as the heart of empire might 
pass, like Rome’s, owing to decay and neglect—which is exactly how the problem 
of congestion in the heart of the docklands was portrayed.325 So it was Silvertown 
Way that was a riposte to Mussolini: a vast elevated reinforced concrete 
monument to a modern democratic empire, a new artery grafted onto the heart of 
empire to clear its congestion, new life in the face of decay, so as not to succumb 
to the ruination experienced in Rome.  
 And it was a Labour monument. On the matter of imperialism, Jones had 
set out the Labour view in his memoirs written in 1928. He characterized his 
party’s policy as one based on ideas of self-government, especially in India, 
against the Tory ‘govern and control’ approach. Labour wanted to encourage an 
India along the lines of Canada and Australia—‘a free, independent, completely 
self-governing part of the Commonwealth of Nations which we call the Empire’. 
‘We ruled them for their good’, he parroted of the Tory view. ‘It was the “White 
Man’s Burden”. Well, now, Labour says that if ever that was justified, it is so no 
longer, and that fashions in Imperialism, like girls’ dresses, have considerably 
changed—and the whole idea is as considerably cut down!’ Labour’s imperial 
policy, he stated, was ‘to trust the people on the spot, then; to develop self-
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government wherever possible; to repeal unfair treaties; to be truly democratic in 
foreign relationships’. Labour, he said, 
seeks earnestly to promote peace amongst all peoples and in co-operation to make 
the best of the resources of all lands. To do that she will abolish all artificial 
barriers, make intercourse free between peoples, in the firm belief that increase of 
knowledge of people and things is increase of understanding. She will endeavour 
to increase cheapness of transport and travel and abolish irritating restrictions.326  
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the construction of a concrete flyover in east London 
that now attracts little attention but in its day was held up as a powerful statement 
of democracy at a time of rising autocracy in mainland Europe. Far from the 
British Empire being in decline in 1920s and 30s it was in fact a stronger cultural 
construct than it had been in the Victorian period. But it sat in a reformist 
discourse—reform from within—in which imperialism was fused with progress 
and modernity, and emphasis was placed on the machine and efficiency. The 
home city of empire was London, both modern and imperial, but it had to work 
well. There was no room for inefficiency. This was a working-class empire of free 
trade, communication and technology; an empire of circulation for the 
improvement of all; this was an empire in which the goods circulating in Jack 
Jones’s constituency of Silvertown represented a political stance, one in which the 
construction of better roads in modern materials such as concrete would reduce 
‘irritating restrictions’ to world peace. And this was a circulatory empire peculiar 
to the 1920s and 30s but one whose legacy would be felt after the Second World 
War when the world had changed but ideas of urban circulation had become 
embedded. For this imperial world view of efficiency, modernity, progress and 
technology—a vision of free circulation—was also an engineer’s vision. In an 
editorial published on the day the Silvertown Way was opened, The Times made a 
bold claim about the world view of the highway engineer, writing as follows: 
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The Victoria Dock Road and the road from Cairo to the Cape are as much parts of 
the same highway as were the Via Flaminia and Watling Street in the days of the 
Roman Empire; and those who see to-day the magnificent sweep of the new road 
will agree that the modern engineer is no whit inferior to the classical in his 
conception of what the beginning of an Imperial highway ought to be.327 
 It is clear how the ideas of Maybury and Bressey, with their reinforced 
concrete and ideas of new networks overlaid onto inefficient old ones, would take 
root in the political ferment of the interwar period, and flourish in the aftermath of 
the Second World War. This was a time of great social change too. The lofty view 
from the Silvertown viaduct over the docks, as it ran ‘over the roofs and chimney-
pots of Canning Town’, enabled sailors to spot their ship at a glance, saving 
valuable time searching the vast dock complex, whilst lorry-drivers were able to 
make two more journeys per day between Silvertown and the City of London.328 
The Victoria Dock road scheme, with its elevated Silvertown Way, was unlike 
any other road building scheme in London in the interwar period. Unlike arterial 
roads, it was about freight rather than private transport; the working classes rather 
than the middle and upper (or rather, industry rather than leisure); a cramped, 
congested, complex urban streetscape rather than virgin agricultural lands; and 
messy local politics in a location (West Ham) that was not quite London but the 
heart of the empire. As Jack Jones exclaimed, it was ‘not a mere arterial road’. 
The docks were a part of London few people saw but which affected everyone, 
and Silvertown Way afforded a new, touristic, democratic view into the empire 
from above. And, as it soared over junctions and crossings, it was a distinctly 
engineered vision, a modern reinforced-concrete graft onto the empire’s 
congested old heart, a vision in which new technologies—concrete and the 
internal combustion engine—could enable the building of a new city of 
circulation. 
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Chapter 5. Cops, Guard-Rails and Segregation 
 
East India Dock Road, Poplar, 28 May 1936. Leslie Hore-Belisha, Minister of 
Transport, is back in the East End to open another traffic improvement scheme. 
This time it is no lofty flyover. Instead he manhandles a steel guard-rail into 
position, the last in a three-mile stretch newly installed along this east London 
thoroughfare. Crossings had recently been fitted along the street but pedestrians 
were ignoring them. ‘These guard rails will make pedestrians see them out of 
physical necessity’, claimed Hore-Belisha, ‘where hitherto they found some 
psychological difficulty in taking advantage of the facilities offered’.329 
 
 
Figure 34: Guard-rails along East India Dock Road, 1936 (William Whiffin, courtesy of Tower 
Hamlets Local History Library & Archives).330   
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5.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at pedestrian segregation, a central concept underpinning 
planning approaches to the traffic problem as was seen in Chapter 3. To do so it 
focuses on Alker Tripp, a Metropolitan Police official who is often cited in the 
urban planning literature as the inspiration for ideas such as neighbourhood 
precincts, limited-access motor roads and vertical separation. Tripp appears in that 
literature as a marginal figure in the network of people and ideas, not quite a 
planner but strongly influential as a traffic practitioner. But in a different 
literature, that of policing, Tripp occupies a more central position. Thus, in order 
to understand his approach, Tripp’s role as an actor in the culture of policing will 
be examined here, looking at the ways Tripp’s police experience influenced his 
views on the pedestrian’s place on London’s roads, both from a safety point of 
view and owing to more complex ideas developed through his experiences of 
American policing at a time of particular social and racial tension. This widening 
of the network, and the consequent centring of a marginal figure, draws a wider 
assemblage of concepts and beliefs into the story of London’s traffic, helping us 
interrogate concepts such as pedestrian segregation that can easily be taken for 
granted. 
 Tripp joined the Metropolitan Police as a Home Office civil servant in 
1902. In 1920 he became chairman of the police recruiting board and in 1932 was 
promoted to become assistant commissioner with responsibility for traffic, a post 
he held until his retirement in 1947 (he died in 1954). Soon after his appointment 
as traffic commissioner, Tripp began developing an ambitious scheme to save 
lives on London’s streets while keeping the traffic flowing.331 His plan was 
threefold. Firstly, he proposed building pedestrian crossings at fixed intervals of 
150 or 200 yards along every main road in London. Secondly, he would erect 
guard rails along the entire length of each road to prevent pedestrians from 
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leaving the pavement other than at crossings. Thirdly, he would protect each 
crossing with a set of traffic lights.  
 Tripp’s proposal drew together into a London-wide network elements 
which were being introduced individually by the Ministry of Transport under the 
energetic leadership of Leslie Hore-Belisha. Trials of pedestrian crossings had 
begun in 1926 with large numbers installed from 1934. Guard rails began to be 
erected at busy junctions in central London in early 1935.332 And Hore-Belisha’s 
department had been erecting hundreds of traffic lights in London since 1932, 
following an experiment on London’s Oxford Street in 1931 and a 1926 trial in 
Piccadilly in which the lights were provided to advise the police on point duty.333 
The novelty of Tripp’s scheme was in its scale and in the systematic nature of his 
ideas—nothing like as large an scheme had ever been enacted in Britain, and his 
plan required rails, crossings and lights to be interlinked and working together 
with pedestrians and vehicles as a single, techno-social system of segregation. But 
the problem was that the Metropolitan Police did not have direct control over 
traffic control installations. Responsibility lay with the patchwork of local 
authorities that covered London, and their design and specification lay with the 
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Ministry of Transport. This was another case where London’s governance 
frustrated attempts to take control—which was at the heart of Tripp’s world view. 
5.2 Traffic lights in the 1930s 
Traffic light systems in the 1930s could be of two main types: demand-based or 
time-based. The Ministry of Transport believed in demand-based traffic light 
systems. That is, it installed vehicle-actuated signals at busy junctions, with 
pedestrian crossings included in the junction layout and operated on demand by 
push-buttons. However, this technology was not without flaws. As the system 
responded to demand, rather than being on fixed time cycles, this meant that both 
drivers and those on foot faced unpredictable delays at light-controlled junctions 
and sometimes these waits could be lengthy. According to the police, this led to 
pedestrians taking risks by crossing against the traffic, and drivers choosing to use 
side-streets to avoid the hold-ups.334 And, being a system relying on vehicle 
sensors, push-buttons and interconnections between lights, the Ministry’s vehicle-
actuated technology was expensive. A Pathé newsreel film from 1933 depicts 
such an installation being ceremonially switched on, and the clicking of relay 
switches in the control box as vehicles drive over pneumatic sensors in the 
junction can be clearly heard.335 This was a complex infrastructure. Figure 35 
shows a 1932 installation being switched on in the City of London, and depicts its 
control box. Figure 36 shows pneumatic roadway sensors in a different (later) 
installation. 
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Figure 35: Lord Mayor of London switching on new vehicle-actuated automatic traffic light 
installation in City of London, 1932 (Automatic Telephone & Electric Co. Ltd).336 
 
Figure 36: Pneumatic vehicle sensors, with pavement box housing control equipment, no date but 
before 1957 (Automatic Telephone & Electric Co. Ltd).337 
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 Alker Tripp was outspoken in his criticism of the Ministry’s use of 
vehicle-actuated signals. In 1935 he wrote to the Home Office as follows: 
The Ministry of Transport have prepared a scheme which to me appears to be a 
mere hotch-potch. They simply scatter traffic lights all over the map at any likely 
looking crossing. I think this is quite useless, as numerous unrelated traffic lights 
impose so many jerky stoppages on the traffic that drivers go round the back 
streets in order to avoid the main routes and this create new dangers.338  
He had previously written to a Ministry of Transport official, as follows: 
the whole picture looks to me to be not a cohesive system, but a widely scattered 
sprinkling of independent installations, which might indeed ultimately prove 
mischievous rather than helpful. What we want to secure is regular passage for 
pedestrians; and pedestrians must not be left guessing as to the intervals between 
the successive stoppages of the traffic or the length of time that will be given to 
them for passage. From that point of view vehicle-actuated signals are far from 
ideal in inner areas.339 
 Tripp’s proposed scheme was different. As we have seen, it comprised a 
network of guard rails, pedestrian crossings and traffic lights set up at fixed 
intervals between busy junctions, with signals on the flexible progressive system, 
which was time-based rather than demand-based. This took the form of a network 
of traffic lights, each timed to synchronize with others on a route to create a green 
wave of light phases progressing along the road at a fixed speed—say, 17 miles 
per hour. A driver travelling at the system speed should therefore expect to find 
all lights at green as the journey progressed. In effect there would therefore be 
platoons of vehicles moving at a fairly constant speed, separated by regular gaps 
in the traffic coinciding with the red phases. The pedestrian phases at each 
crossing would be timed to occur during the gaps—reducing stoppages of 
traffic—and the gaps would also assist traffic turning into the main road from side 
streets. The result would be consistency of flow, predictability of waits for both 
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vehicles and pedestrians, and the minimum of hold-up.340 Tripp’s traffic lights 
were also cheaper than those of the Ministry, which he hoped would enable them 
to be installed systematically across London, rather than being ‘scattered’ where 
local conditions dictated. Tripp saw London’s traffic as a single system; he was a 
system-builder.341 But by late 1935 he was getting nowhere with the Ministry of 
Transport on his London-wide scheme so, to break the political logjam, he 
proposed a 1.5-mile experiment on a single busy trunk road in east London, the 
East India Dock Road. 
5.3 The East India Dock Road experiment, 1936 
 
Figure 37: East India Dock Road from Limehouse to Canning Town, mapped in 1912 (Bacon’s 
Large Scale Atlas of London and Suburbs, courtesy of Roger Cline/London Topographical 
Society/Harry Margary).342 
The East India Dock Road (see Figure 37) was chosen for the experiment as it had 
the worst pedestrian accident record in London.343 But the project was about more 
than road safety. It was a political struggle for control of London’s streets, in two 
ways. Firstly, it was a struggle between the Metropolitan Police and the Ministry 
of Transport. This was politics played out at the highest levels. But Tripp’s project 
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was also a political struggle played out on the streets of east London, in its local 
council committee rooms, shops, businesses, chambers of commerce and the 
pages of its local newspapers.  
 Tripp wanted to seize control of London’s streets from elected authorities, 
and he began his assault in Poplar. He had a fight on his hands, telling the 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner Hugh Trenchard, ‘if we are to have any real 
system for London, we cannot continue to be fettered by the whims and fancies of 
the numerous Local Authorities concerned’.344 But he did continue to be fettered. 
The Transport Minister, Leslie Hore-Belisha, had been receptive to Tripp’s ideas 
for the East India Dock Road, but felt that the experimental system was too big to 
ask the local authorities to swallow in one go—and that it was too expensive for 
the Ministry to fund itself from the Road Fund, which would have had far-
reaching political implications on spending outside the capital. The compromise 
was a split. The Ministry would pay a portion of the cost of erecting rails to 
represent the wider benefits to London, and the local authorities through which 
the road passed (Poplar and Stepney Borough Councils) would pay a share 
representing the local benefit to residents and businesses. Traffic lights, it was 
proposed, would be dealt with later once the rails were up. But Poplar and 
Stepney were not easily convinced, and various deals had to be offered and 
negotiated during autumn 1935 before the councils grudgingly accepted and work 
could begin.345  
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Figure 38: Hinged section of East India Dock Road railings, 1936, from promotional leaflet 
(Stewarts & Lloyds, courtesy of Tower Hamlets Local History Library & Archives).346 
 The barriers were constructed by the prominent Corby steel tube-makers 
Stewarts & Lloyds (see Figure 38). At just over three feet high and installed 
twelve inches from the edge of the kerb, the installation enabled vehicles to drive 
close to the edge of the carriageway without fear of striking pedestrians, thus, it 
was said, making better use of road space. Gaps were provided at bus and tram 
stops, side roads and garages, and businesses requiring goods loading were 
provided with hinged sections under their lock and key for use during 
deliveries.347 On Thursday 28 May 1936, Hore-Belisha fixed one of the final rails 
of the Poplar end of the scheme in position at a grand ceremony.348 By September, 
the rails had reached the Stepney end and the entire 1.5-mile stretch of road had 
been segregated (see Figure 39).349 
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Figure 39: Guard rails and pedestrian crossing on East India Dock Road, 1936 (William Whiffin, 
courtesy of Tower Hamlets Local History Library & Archives).350 
 The rails might have been up, but with opposition from local authorities 
over financial contributions, Tripp’s final hope in getting the experiment 
completed rested in convincing the Ministry of Transport to shoulder the whole 
cost of his rails-and-lights experiment. He remained in no doubt that this would be 
the right thing to do, explaining in frustration the following: 
Some millions of money are being spent from the Road Fund to provide new 
roads, new bridges, and fresh avenues of circulation for motor traffic thus 
increasing the length of the cutting edge of the tool that is inflicting such a heavy 
toll of life and limb, but money is denied for a scheme of public safety.351  
However, by the time the rails were up in the East India Dock Road, he was losing 
political support. Trenchard was replaced as Police Commissioner in late 1935 by 
the former Governor of New South Wales, Sir Philip Game, and Hore-Belisha 
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soon left the Transport Ministry, replaced in 1937 by the lacklustre Leslie Burgin. 
Neither Game nor Burgin appeared to have the appetite to continue the road safety 
work of their predecessors with as much vigour, leaving Tripp to fight alone. By 
1938, responding to a request for an update on the traffic lights, Tripp wrote a 
plaintive note to Game: ‘I am almost in despair about this matter’. He observed 
that Trenchard had compared London’s slow progress in installing lights with the 
speed of progress in New York as long ago as 1932, noting that New York had a 
‘definite co-ordinated plan’ whereas the ‘few in London are on no general plan at 
all’. For Tripp, the scheme was ‘aimed at pedestrian safety equally with (or even 
more than) vehicular circulation’ but, since the guard rails had been erected, ‘the 
effect has been to localise the casualties at the crossings. The protection of those 
crossings [with traffic lights] is obviously the next move’. He concluded that the 
Police were ‘powerless without the aid of the Ministry of Transport and the Local 
Authorities, and, if they show so little response, there is not much hope of really 
getting the casualties down’. The solution, Tripp had long argued, was for the 
police to take control of traffic across London away from local authorities, placing 
London ‘in the same position as the Police in other large cities, such as New 
York, Chicago, Berlin, Paris, etc’.352 But it was not to be. The outbreak of the 
Second World War put all plans on hold, with the experiment only half-built. 
5.4 Reactions to the rails, 1936–39 
Much of the press reaction to the East India Dock Road guard rails took Tripp’s 
line, which was that road traffic and foot traffic should be separated. This view 
assumed the road was a traffic artery. The Guardian, for instance, predicted that: 
We are probably approaching a time when no pedestrian will be allowed on the 
roadway at all (at least in towns) except at stated points under special protection. 
If motor transport continues to expand at its present rate the segregation of urban 
wheeled and foot traffic must some day be complete.353  
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Once the Poplar rails were up, the same newspaper suggested that ‘the principle of 
putting something more solid than common sense between the motorist and the 
pedestrian is bound to grow in strength’. It went on to state that ‘Whether one will 
consider it a division of the sheep from the goats or the lambs from the slaughterer 
will depend, no doubt, on which side of the rail one finds oneself’.354 This might 
be seen as a view driven by the motor lobby, and the car interests certainly 
approved of guard rails as a means to shift blame for accidents from motorists to 
pedestrians.355 The Automobile Association, for instance, lobbied for guard rails 
on the basis of their successful use in mainland Europe, which had a tendency ‘to 
deal with the pedestrian as a traffic unit rather than a separate problem’.356 
 To find a countervailing view one needs to look at two groupings who 
might have felt aggrieved at this interference in the conduct of the streets. The 
first is the pedestrian, and the response of the Pedestrians’ Association (now 
Living Streets), founded by Viscount Cecil of Chelwood in 1929, vacillated 
between qualified support and trenchant criticism. The association had already 
expressed unease in 1934 about the idea of non-junction pedestrian crossings 
(known then as ‘crossing lanes’), fearing that plans to make their use compulsory 
would be ‘a grave interference with the liberty of the public’, commenting that: 
a man whose office or shop is midway between two crossing lanes would have to 
walk a quarter of a mile to make a call on the opposite side of the road and to 
return, or a householder would have to walk the same distance to post a letter in a 
pillar box on the other side of the road. 
Age, class and gender categories were mobilized by the association in its attack on 
the plans as follows: 
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If the crossings are widely adopted, it is right that pedestrians, and particularly 
children and old people, should be urged to use them as much as possible, and 
they will have the strongest inducement, that of self-preservation, to do so—but it 
is unreasonable to ask busy business men to go considerable distances out of their 
way ... The prohibition would slow up pedestrian traffic enormously and cause 
congestion.357 
 The result of the association’s representations to Hore-Belisha on 
legislative prohibition was positive: he abandoned the idea. But when, the 
following year, the East India Dock Road guard rail experiment was announced, 
the association swiftly denounced it as a material alternative to legislative 
prohibition, stating that: 
it represents a blow at the existing rights of foot passengers, and imposes on them 
an enormous inconvenience. It is one more step in the policy of handing over the 
roads to the motorist and depriving all other road users of their rights.358  
Yet it went on to produce a report for local authorities agreeing that ‘anything that 
deters persons, especially the young, from stepping thoughtlessly from the 
pavement on to the roadway will tend to render less frequent one common form of 
accident’, so long as the goal was to promote safety, not speed. Its biggest concern 
was the danger to bus passengers boarding or alighting outside the guard rails, but 
it was also keen to stress that there must be ‘no legal limitation on a pedestrian’s 
right to cross the road at any point’. A further cause for concern was, perhaps 
surprisingly, the convenience of the road-user: 
Has he to stop opposite the house or shop at which he wishes to call and to climb 
through the railings, or to shout and gesticulate until he can attract the attention of 
the frontager to come with a key and remove the railings? 
The association pressed for the rails to be removable by road-users every few 
yards and advised an evaluation of the experiment after 12 months.359 
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 By 1938, the association’s position had hardened into a belief that the 
continuous guard rail idea was part of ‘the movement, encouraged by the 
motoring organisations, for limiting the pedestrian’s right to the use of the road’. 
It recognized that ‘modern conditions call for a certain measure of regulation of 
the movements of all road users’, including the use of short sections of railing at 
particularly dangerous junctions or crossings, but that ‘the general invasion of 
pedestrians’ rights to the use of the Highway under the guise of safety measures as 
an alternative to the restriction of speed is a policy which the Committee has 
stoutly resisted and will continue to resist’.360 A year later, it concluded that the 
experiment was dead, with no further installations planned, as ‘the rails proved 
very unpopular, for they not only caused great inconvenience, but in some 
respects added to the dangers’.361 
 A similarly equivocal reaction came from the second grouping for whom 
the street was a place as much as an artery, namely the local business community. 
The East India Dock Road was largely commercial.362 For these people, the street 
was an intensely local place, control over which was not to be given up lightly. In 
1936, as the rails were being erected, the Poplar Chamber of Commerce passed a 
resolution urging: 
that in the interests of business houses and shops along the routes, and the 
avoidance of congestion by delivery vans at fixed points that prior to the 
commencement of such work, the Borough Councils be instructed to consult with 
local business organisations, and the firms concerned, with a view to their 
convenience being met as far as possible. 
                                                                                                                                     
the interest-group politics of road safety in the 1930s, see Plowden, The Motor Car and Politics in 
Britain, chap. 13. 
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362 Anonymous, The Post Office London Directory for 1936 (London: Kelly’s Directories Ltd, 
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It observed that ‘customers, rather than climbing through the rails preferred to go 
further for their purchases instead of dealing with their regular tradesmen’.363 Yet 
even this response was muted, and was more a chance to criticize the local council 
than a sustained campaign against prohibition. It certainly was not a criticism 
directed at either the Metropolitan Police or the Ministry of Transport. 
 It was easy for Tripp to knock the local authorities, frustrated by having to 
negotiate with so many of them for a single scheme. Yet schemes that affected 
local people raised local issues which the councils were elected to consider, and in 
this episode we clearly see the tension between framing roads as arteries in a 
closed system and seeing them as a succession of places: of localities, workplaces, 
shopping areas or neighbourhoods. This was a period in which the latter view was 
being ‘persistently, if unevenly, revised’, as historian Richard Hornsey has 
described, as ‘the street became culturally redefined no longer as a site of 
heterogeneous social activity, but as a functional conduit whose purpose was to 
facilitate the speedy flow of traffic’.364 An examination of the way London’s 
streets were policed helps illuminate this shift. 
5.5 Policing traffic in the motor age 
When the motor car entered London’s traffic scene at the turn of the twentieth 
century there was no government transport ministry or professional transport 
engineers, and the urban planning profession was, as we have seen, in its infancy. 
The obvious body to control traffic London-wide had long been the Metropolitan 
Police, but it had grown up in a culture of laissez-faire.365 In the 1860s, when 
London’s streets were becoming increasingly congested by commercial vehicles, 
buses and cabs, Sir Richard Mayne, the joint first Commissioner of the 
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Metropolitan Police, held that ‘he did not think the wit of man could prevent by 
any amount of regulation the slowness arising where there is a great traffic along a 
narrow line; all that can be done is to prevent absolute obstruction’.366 The general 
view of the police by 1900 was that its role was to remove blockages, separate 
different classes of vehicle according to their speed, and simply keep traffic 
moving.  
 James Winter has provided an authoritative account of the tension in 
London’s policing scene before the motor age.367 From the start, Winter observes, 
Robert Peel ‘recognized that, in an open society where the desire for order and the 
desire for personal freedom must be in permanent tension, a police force must 
seek to find an equilibrium’.368 Winter expresses the paradox as ‘wanting policing 
to be both “mechanical” and “social”’, but that the police commissioners had ‘no 
intention of trying to solve it’.369 This was a liberal paradox and it underpinned 
London’s traffic scene profoundly. Nowhere was this tension experienced as 
much as on London’s streets, as personal freedom—the ability to move freely—
was only possible if individuals were controlled by an outside force: the state, the 
police. Otherwise one person’s freedom created another person’s restriction—
congestion. Winter reports a set of leader articles in The Times which lamented 
the irreconcilability of the paradox, that the ‘exercise of an unrestricted right to 
come and go as one liked or dared might actually decrease the sum of individual 
liberty’.370 He then summarizes the legislative instruments developed through the 
later nineteenth century to manage London’s traffic, but all with a keen eye on 
ruling with the lightest touch. Throughout was an assumption that pedestrians had 
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rights over vehicles to occupy the streets, and that a crucial role of the police was 
to protect the pedestrian from harm—albeit tempered by an unwillingness to 
submit drivers to undue restriction.371 Carlos Lopez Galviz has further examined 
the Victorian traffic police officer’s paradox, noting that ‘The issue of civil 
liberties and the degree to which they could be, and were indeed, negotiated on 
the streets made the introduction of any form of regulation a challenging affair’.372 
 With this liberal tension as a backdrop, we move into the twentieth 
century, and the reaction of the Metropolitan Police was an amplification of the 
classic tension as vehicle speeds and handling characteristics began rapidly to 
change. The coming of the motor age became characterized in two key ways. 
Firstly, and most commonly, it was a matter of accidents, injury and loss of life. 
In this characterization, speed—the main cause of accidents—was bad, and thus 
congestion was good: it slowed traffic and therefore prevented accidents. But the 
second characterization of the motor age was the old desire for free circulation, 
and here, congestion was bad, as it was circulation’s ‘inextricable other’, as 
Galviz has put it.373 We thus see that in the context of the police, the discourse of 
congestion was intertwined with that of speed, circulation, danger and death.374  
 Two internal histories of the Metropolitan Police’s traffic department have 
picked up the story of the twentieth century.375 In them is described a fragmented 
development in the first two decades, as responsibilities for traffic management 
accreted into one department created in 1919. This department was designed to be 
in close contact with the government’s Ministry of Transport, also created that 
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year. Originally an administrative and advisory body, by 1923 the police traffic 
department started to take a more active role in governing London’s streets, with 
Arthur Bassom, a traffic superintendent known for his knowledge of London 
traffic, appointed as the first Director of Traffic Services.376 Major changes 
occurred the following year with the passing of the 1924 London Traffic Act, 
which created a more active role for the traffic department as well as the body to 
liaise between the police and the ministry known as the London and Home 
Counties Traffic Advisory Committee, on which Bassom sat, discussed in the 
previous chapter. For the first time, London had a capital-wide traffic body with 
Metropolitan Police traffic experts playing a key role, although its powers were 
diluted by the breadth of its membership. 
 Yet the rapid and widespread adoption of motor cars after the First World 
War profoundly reshaped the relationship between the police and the public, as 
Clive Emsley has described. ‘The development of motor vehicles travelling at 
much greater speeds than previous road traffic’, he says, ‘constituted a problem of 
a new dimension. By the early 1920s the use of the law to control motor vehicles 
was jamming the magistrates’ courts and creating friction, hitherto unknown, 
between the police and the middle classes’.377 William Plowden’s account of the 
motor car and politics further highlights changes in the public–police relationship 
with increasing regulation in the 1920s and 1930s.378 And Keith Laybourn and 
David Taylor have provided a detailed account of the effects of motorization on 
policing in the interwar period, describing governments as ‘convulsed with the 
fear of communism and consumed with concern about motorised transport and the 
“road holocaust”’. They note that: 
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the seemingly narrow issue of the regulation of traffic raised wider questions of 
individual freedom and, much to the concern of the police, brought ordinary, 
working-class constables into contact (and conflict) with members of the middle 
classes, who previously had held a positive, if somewhat patronising, perception 
of the British bobby.379 
 Alker Tripp was clear about the role the motor car had played in reshaping 
the relationship between the police and the public. ‘Motor-car law’, he said in 
1928, ‘has brought a new stratum of the public into frequent relations with the 
police. The area of contact, and of potential friction in consequence, increases 
daily’. He went on to note that: 
the individual constable enters on task already handicapped by having to some 
extent lost his reputation as a monument of stolid and tolerant commonsense and 
a barrier against interference with individual liberty. He is too often regarded as a 
busybody, a stickler for trifles ... The police must vindicate anew their quality in 
the public eye.380 
 Tripp’s pedestrian control scheme was thus a radical departure from the 
traffic policing culture of his predecessors. It involved the physical separation of 
the streets and a radical set of prohibitions. Tripp believed that ‘promiscuous 
pedestrian crossing will ultimately have to be prohibited’.381 Yet he favoured the 
employment of technologies that embodied that control in the public itself. Miles 
Ogborn has analyzed traffic lights in this respect, describing them as ‘a branch of 
the undercover police’ which ‘can organise the chaos of urban individualism on a 
grand scale’. ‘In all this’, he says, ‘the traffic-lights signal the dream of the liberal 
state. Their aim is to disappear. They work best when no one notices them, when 
regulation becomes co-ordination and facilitation’. Yet, as he observes, ‘It is only 
under certain political conditions that the signals work’.382 In this mode, then, 
traffic lights reshape the public as much as the relationship between the public and 
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the police—they internalize the police in the public. More broadly, Christopher 
Otter has analyzed the role of infrastructural technologies in embodying control 
and normalizing behaviour, stating that ‘Technology was, and remains, a 
fundamental way of liberally governing the social’.383 Patrick Joyce, too, has 
examined the relationships between technologies, governance and liberalism, 
concluding that it was in ‘the republic of the streets’ where ‘subtlety and 
ambiguity were most apparent’.384 Carlos Lopez Galviz has further reinforced the 
idea.385 And Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose have discussed the 
‘regularisation of liberty’ in the context of ‘fears of the mob, the mass, and riot’, 
which suggests an intriguing wider context to ideas of motorist and pedestrian 
control in London in the 1920s and 30s.386 
 What Tripp really wanted was a grid-plan city like those in the USA, 
which offered multiple routes to bypass congestion and, in their regularity and 
order, lent themselves more readily to control. By the 1930s, US city grids had 
come to make great impressions on visitors from places such as London.387 Tripp 
could not, of course, reshape London’s street plan literally. Instead, he proposed 
to replicate in the British capital’s streets the moving platoons of vehicles and 
pedestrians that occurred in the gridded streets of New York, Chicago and Detroit 
(see Figure 40).  
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Figure 40: Gridded street layout of Chicago business district, c.1898 (Library of Congress, 
Geography and Map Division).388 
This was consciously understood. A Ministry of Transport official said Tripp’s 
pedestrian scheme was designed: 
to split up the distance between signalling installations at important cross roads 
into a number of equal distances, so that, as in the block layout of streets in 
America, an ideal system of flexible progressive working will be possible.389  
Predictability, a sense of systematic order and centralized, absent control was key 
to Tripp’s scheme, rather than the system merely responding to the actions of 
individual actors on the street, as the vehicle-actuated signals favoured by the 
Ministry of Transport appeared to do. By introducing American methods to 
London’s streets, Tripp was attempting to smuggle in their police forces’ city-
wide traffic control—and he had seen what he wanted at first hand. 
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5.6 US traffic control and the governance of London 
One of Tripp’s first major tasks as traffic commissioner had been to go on a fact-
finding visit to the USA and Canada to study control methods, which took place 
over 20 days in October 1934 and included visits to New York, Boston, Detroit, 
Chicago, Toronto and Montreal. Upon his return to London, Tripp prepared a 
substantial report for his police colleagues and the Ministry of Transport detailing 
his findings. The tension between accidents and free-flowing traffic was 
expressed clearly in the report, which was split into two main parts—accidents 
and circulation. But the report conveyed a wider set of issues which shed light on 
the London traffic scene post-1934, which—as we have seen in Chapter 3, Tripp 
significantly shaped.  
 For Tripp, the difference between America and England was the difference 
between prevention and cure. ‘One is conscious’, he began, ‘of what appears to be 
a constant solicitude on the part of the House of Commons for the motorists’ 
interest—a solicitude which arises largely from the desire to protect personal 
liberty’. He went on: 
the Americans seem in one important particular to have been clearer-sighted than 
ourselves: they have consistently relied upon prohibitions intended to prevent bad 
habits of driving (e.g. by speed limits, stop-streets, etc.) instead of merely leaving 
dangerous driving to be dealt with after it has occurred.390  
Tripp called for immediate action: 
Such action lies along the lines of (i) physical safeguards—traffic lights, 
duplicate carriageways, railings ... and (ii) a code of exact law (based on the 
advice of traffic experts to the exclusion of interested parties) which is firmly, 
rigidly and exactly enforced by a more specialised police organisation with the 
help of courts which are more alive to the public danger and less concerned with 
the liberty of action of the motorist.391 
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To get this action, London required one traffic authority. Instead, following what 
Tripp saw as damaging legislation in the 1924 London Traffic Act, which could 
have created such a body, London had ‘local traffic regulations dependent on our 
troublesome, dilatory and old-fashioned machinery of Local Government. There 
are 132 Local Authorities in London’.392 
 Tripp was agitated by what he saw as the lost opportunity of 1924. Traffic 
control on the streets was, he believed, ‘inevitably a matter which must be decided 
(whether in America or England) on the word of the Police authorities who alone 
are responsible for day to day handling of traffic’. He continued: 
the responsible Police Authorities of a great City ... remain the only effective 
regulating agent. New York recognises this fact openly; London (under the Act of 
1924) camouflages it under a system of circumlocution which delays, complicates 
and sometimes aborts—but is never constructive.  
He concluded: 
True, there are many local interests to be balanced and these often conflict; but it 
is those very interests that the Police are already balancing, day in, day out, when 
they deal with street parking, loading, obstruction and a score of other cognate 
matters.393  
For Tripp, a crucial problem in London was the relationship between the 
Metropolitan Police (under the Home Office) and the Ministry of Transport. By 
1934, Tripp was clear that: 
the functioning of the Ministry of Transport, a Ministry created to effect 
unification, has—so far as Traffic in London is concerned—effected partition 
instead. It has driven a line of cleavage between the executive and administrative 
sides of Traffic. The administrative cannot move hand or foot without the 
executive, and the latter is under another Government Department (the Home 
Office).394 
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 Tripp, in London, saw ‘over-complicated machinery’ which produced both 
‘confusion’ and ‘paralysis’, by contrast with America. ‘Traffic policies must be 
widely conceived’, he explained, ‘and to have to argue and negotiate every 
smallest detail with a series of local bodies who have themselves no responsibility 
for traffic is indefensible’. He continued: 
The Police are now [since 1924] made to appear merely as one voice among 
many, and both the public and the Local Authorities will argue and go on arguing 
on equal terms with departments in cases where they would accept as law the 
verdict of the Commissioner of Police, knowing that the Police are not only the 
practical people, but are the only people responsible for getting the traffic 
through.395  
He concluded that the machinery of the 1924 Act was ‘a mischievous sham’.396 
This sets into context Tripp’s frustration over the following two years with his 
pedestrian control scheme in the East India Dock Road. But there was more to his 
frustration than traffic schemes and recalcitrant local boroughs. He wanted to 
change London’s culture of policing. 
5.7 Prohibition and the police state 
By 1932, when Tripp was appointed traffic commissioner, the world had changed 
dramatically compared with a generation before. The rise of the motor-car city 
had coincided with the arrival of the political labour movement and the 
development of an increasingly interventionist state. Martin Pugh has surveyed a 
major social and political shift at the start of the twentieth century, and describes 
what he terms ‘a sustained extension of the role of the state between 1906 and 
1914’.397 Fears of racial deterioration following the Boer War (in part) led to 
demands for more state intervention in everyday life, and the demands of the First 
World War dramatically increased state control of industry, food and wages. This 
was reversed after the war ended, but it signalled a ‘period of confusion’ in the 
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inter-war years in which collectivism vied with capitalism. Under Stanley 
Baldwin’s leadership from 1924 to 1929, social and economic policies were 
implemented in order to prevent a class war. By 1931, with depression, 
unemployment, strikes and fear of revolution and the power of the mass, there 
was a clear concern over liberal laissez-faire governance and an increasing voice 
calling for state control.398 Thus this culture of state intervention in more and 
more aspects of everyday life, along with fears of the mass, can be seen to relate 
to the shifts in police control of London’s streets outlined in this chapter. 
 Tripp’s promotion in 1932 had come just one year after a change at the top 
of the Metropolitan Police, with the retirement of the ‘gentle’ commissioner, 
Julian Byng, and the arrival of the ‘autocratic, intolerant’ Hugh Trenchard, as 
David Ascoli has described them.399 Tripp himself brought a new style. His 
predecessor, Frank Elliott, had been described as a ‘kindly’ and ‘much-liked’ old 
policeman.400 Tripp, by contrast, was ‘forceful and cogent in conference and a 
born fighter, he was impatient of compromise and delay and he both gave and 
took hard knocks’.401 In many ways, Tripp’s 1934 visit to America was symbolic 
of a harder-edged approach to match the changing times. We are looking at a shift 
in the characterization of congestion in the early 1930s paralleling a shift in wider 
relationships between police and public, both in American cities and London. 
Tripp’s rhetoric was about public safety, not individual liberty as had been 
paramount in a previous generation. His was more an American (interventive, 
controlling) police model, replacing an older British one of consent and freedom. 
And in his report of the 1934 trip to America, we can discern disturbing 
influences that were to shape his approach.  
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 Alongside Tripp’s statistical reporting of accident rates and so on, he 
offered verbatim accounts of confrontations between local police and the citizenry 
that throw a frank light on the problems of control in 1930s America. In fact, the 
report’s potentially incendiary nature was recognized by Hugh Trenchard, who, 
asking for it to be made confidential, observed, ‘I do not want to see extracts from 
the report published in every newspaper. I think it would have a very bad effect if 
some of the sentences in it were taken away from their context’.402 Tripp’s visit to 
America came just after the end of the prohibition era. A country-wide ban on 
alcohol had been in operation from 1920 to 1933 and had led to a breakdown of 
respect for law-enforcement bodies, among other effects. Cities such as Chicago 
had become the focus of organized bootlegging gangs operating violent black 
markets, with Al Capone becoming an iconic figure in American criminal lore, 
and it is difficult to overstate the negative effects (though in many cases 
unintended) on American urban culture of this movement.403 Tripp was in 
Chicago just months after prohibition was repealed, and made the following 
observations about the breakdown of civil society in the city and others like it: 
it must be remembered that in these American cities (Chicago especially) there is 
a mixed population, much of which is drawn from the dregs of Europe. Of the 
murders in Chicago about 30% are negroes killing negroes, and, as the Police put 
it, ‘when a negro gets a drop of liquor into him he kills. He will kill for anything. 
He will kill for an electric light globe, a cigar, or really for nothing at all.’ 
Another 10% are Italians killing Italians, and the majority are gangsters killing 
gangsters, or criminals, criminals. The risk to life run by the ordinary white man 
who behaves himself and manages to keep clean of rackets is much lower than 
might be inferred from the statistics.404  
 What this translated to was a ‘bold and rather extreme policy’, in Tripp’s 
words, of active policing.405 He described night-time police cruises in which 
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people deemed suspicious were stopped, searched and, if still suspicious, arrested 
and taken to the police station for questioning. His trip was ostensibly to learn 
about traffic control but, as he later reported, it was these night-time experiences 
that gave him a thrill. ‘I confess that I found it most entertaining’, he recalled. 
‘There was a spice of excitement and adventure about it which was not to be 
denied’.406 In one account, he described an episode in the early hours of the 
morning when the cruiser in which he was riding took a call to attend a robbery-
with-violence on a drug store in a working-class African-American 
neighbourhood. Once on the scene, the police sergeant and Tripp went inside to 
take down details from the owners, a black couple. Tripp reports what happened: 
We found a negro and negress behind the counter looking very anxious and 
worried, for they were afraid of being implicated. Particulars were taken. After he 
had finished, the Sergeant turned to me. ‘Gee’, he said in a tone of supreme 
contempt, ‘they’ve only rolled a nigger for a couple of dahlers, and they call it 
rahbry’.407 
There was also endemic corruption of both the police and the court system as a 
result of prohibition. Police corruption took the form of large-scale political 
interference in the service, individually corrupt officers, corrupt practice in 
compacts with criminals such as Al Capone, and the overlooking of offences in 
order to obtain political advantage. The last type was particularly relevant to the 
traffic service, where widespread traffic offence ticket-fixing took place. 
 The tension here was about individual liberty versus public order, and it is 
clear that Tripp had some sympathy with the American approach. He began by 
remarking as follows: 
one of the main reasons for the results produced in America is that the Police 
(armed with appropriate laws) contrive to make the motoring public ‘toe the line’ 
(so to speak) in a way that we never have succeeded in doing. Speed is lower and 
more uniform and vehicles keep line better. That effect is not produced by 
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exhortation of Press campaign; it is produced partly by mechanical control, but 
especially by intensive law enforcement.408  
He then expanded this theme, stating that the police in all countries had been ‘put 
to the test by the sudden menace’ of motor traffic in the first thirty years of the 
twentieth century, and some had reacted better than others: 
American institutions and methods seem to have reacted more freely and better 
than our own, which have proved too inflexible and conservative. We appear to 
have shown less adaptability of mind; and as a result we have by contrast failed to 
a greater degree. To say this is not of course to decry the British character or to 
exalt the American by contrast. Undue quickness of reaction may easily lead to 
instability; the fiasco of Prohibition is a case in point.409  
Yet the idea of American people submitting to curbs on personal liberty for the 
greater public good seems as surprising as expecting the British people to do so. 
Clearly, prohibition is an important concept in understanding Tripp’s policing 
culture. But there was more to it than that. By looking closer at the particular 
conditions in America in the 1920s and 1930s we can find a more complex story 
of why, it seems, Chicagoans, New Yorkers, Londoners and Detroiters reacted to 
police traffic controls in the ways they did. In particular, and in light of the racist 
culture of policing witnessed by Tripp, we will look at the role of segregation in 
US cultures of governance. 
5.8 Segregation and cosmopolitanism 
Following his return from America in 1934, Tripp made the following observation 
about exclusion in the context of traffic in US towns: 
Regulation of traffic is all in favour of the private car; commercial vehicles are 
rigorously excluded from many of the main traffic arteries in towns, while in the 
country the parkways, which are specially constructed motor roads, exhibit 
notices ‘No buses, no trucks, no commercial traffic’.410  
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In London, twenty years later, notices reading ‘no blacks, no dogs, no Irish’ were 
commonplace. Tripp became a prolific writer on matters relating to traffic and the 
public. Throughout his work, there is a strong rhetoric of exclusion—as part of a 
culture of categorization—and it was in the categorization of pedestrians that the 
language of separation was most clear. The term Tripp consistently used for the 
separation of pedestrians from vehicles was ‘segregation’, giving a new meaning 
to a term that had been used by his predecessors from the early 1920s to mean 
separating horse-drawn traffic from motor vehicles, or freight and public-service 
vehicles from private cars.411 In Tripp’s influential 1938 book Road Traffic and 
Its Control, he described two forms of pedestrian separation, namely place-
segregation and time-segregation, as follows: 
In the case of new roads required for the needs of wheeled traffic, pedestrians can 
be excluded altogether. In the case of existing roads, footpaths provide the means 
of segregation, so far as pedestrians proceeding longitudinally are concerned—
more especially if guard-rails are added. For pedestrians crossing the road, 
however, a system of place-segregation (by bridge or subway) is very costly, and 
the less straightforward plan of time-segregation must generally be invoked. 
In this case, pedestrians and motor vehicles needed to share the same physical 
road space but not at the same time, and crossings protected by traffic signals 
provided the segregating technology. However, care needed to be taken, cautioned 
Tripp, to balance the needs of pedestrians to cross the road with the need for 
‘vehicular fluidity’ in order to prevent the latter’s ‘virtual immobility’. And he 
concluded with the warning that pedestrians would never be fully safe as long as 
they were ‘free to neglect such means of safety as are provided for their 
benefit’.412 
 He had been presenting the notion of pedestrian segregation since his 
appointment as traffic commissioner. In 1933, in front of the Institute of 
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Transport, he made a bold set of claims about the unfairness of the road scene 
towards motorists: 
Pedestrians demand the right to use any part of the footway or carriageway at 
their discretion. The footway is forbidden ground for vehicles; but the 
carriageway is not forbidden ground for pedestrians ... Vehicles are herded into 
droves on each side of the road, and are ordered about by police officers and 
traffic signals and made to use one way streets and so forth; pedestrians are 
completely free agents.413 
 The solution was that ‘steps should be taken wherever possible to 
segregate vehicular and pedestrian movement, and that in the case of arterial 
routes, the segregation should be absolute’.414 This was a solution based on 
classification and the apportionment of value to citizens and their use of the road. 
Tripp concluded: 
The first step towards solution of the whole problem of the design of streets and 
traffic requirements must be a critical analysis of the demands of the various 
classes of road users, and a strict assessment of them in order to determine which 
are legitimate and which excessive and therefore inadmissible.415 
 To what extent might this culture of segregation and exclusion have been 
influenced by American ideas of race? A clue lies in the concept of 
‘cosmopolitanism’. While in Chicago, Tripp had asked why there was no 
jaywalking law prohibiting pedestrians from crossing except at fixed places. He 
recalled the reply: 
The Chicago Police told me that they thought it would be difficult to enforce such 
a law ‘in a cosmopolitan city like Chicago’, but they added that a law had been 
successfully enforced in Minneapolis where the population is more 
homogenous.416  
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The term ‘cosmopolitan’ is telling in this context. Characterizations of major US 
cities had for many years been provided by tourist literature and guide books 
written by English and French authors which, as David Gilbert and Claire 
Hancock have shown, significantly shaped the European experience of 
America.417 In this literature, cosmopolitanism was a distinctly pejorative term, 
meaning ‘monstrous’ ethnic diversity, a degenerative state close to the negative 
American concept of mongrelization, although its meanings were complex and 
variable. Tripp was not alone in taking part in a sightseeing tour of Chicago’s 
poor neighbourhoods. ‘Slumming’—treating mass immigration as a tourist 
spectacle—was a standard experience in the average European visitor’s itinerary 
in major US cities, with ethnic neighbourhoods in New York in particular acting 
as ‘a kind of museum of humanity, where the customs of the world could be 
examined’, as Gilbert and Hancock put it, and at its heart, they contend, the 
conception of the ‘cosmopolis’ as a ‘city polluted by diversity’ was racist.418 
Tripp’s accounts of New York and Chicago fit well into this culture of touristic 
slumming and the sordid thrill of what one 1924 guide described as ‘motley 
cosmopolitanism’.419 
 The first three decades of the twentieth century was a period in which 
racial segregation became normal in the USA, not just in the Southern states, 
which practised extensive and overt spatial segregation in its towns and cities, but 
also in the Northern states, which did so with the less overt segregation of 
residential neighbourhoods, and which were led by Chicago.420 In reporting his 
experiences in Chicago and other American cities, Tripp described local police 
forces that were consciously aware of—and prejudiced negatively against—
minority groups. Black people were ‘negroes’ and ‘negresses’ or ‘niggers’. Black 
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men were likely to be rapists and white women were fair game; both were 
sexually promiscuous.421 Homosexual men were ‘fairies’ or ‘pansies’.422 For the 
Chicago police, the local population was an assemblage of distinct identifiable 
groups to be categorized and controlled. But segregationist ideas were not 
restricted to America—they were growing in the UK at this time too, and by 
reflecting on the mutability of the concept we can start to understand the context 
in which Tripp chose to shape London’s traffic scene by segregation. There is no 
suggestion that racial segregation was implied or considered by Tripp in his 
proposals for London’s streets, but it is notable that he chose to use this term 
consistently, and he was certainly operating in a segregationist culture of public 
governance which viewed the classification of people along ethnic, gender and 
sexual lines as normal.  
 Paul Rich has examined the situation in Britain in the early twentieth 
century, decades before the emerging racial conflict following the Second World 
War and the ‘new racism’ of the 1970s. Describing segregation in the USA at that 
time, he observes that it: 
fell substantially into the arena of mainstream political discourse of ‘middle 
opinion’, and ... for a significant period from the 1890s up to the 1940s the 
concept seemed eminently reasonable even to people of moderate and liberal 
political persuasion. 
Rich notes the ‘international nature’ of segregation and the ‘readily exportable’ 
nature of the term, going on to explore its meanings in Britain.423 Susan Smith has 
also written on the politics of race in the UK in this period, describing how 
ideologies of racism, nationalism and segregationism express a complex network 
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of beliefs.424 We can observe a nationalism in Tripp’s rhetoric of the London 
police with respect to non-British forces, and this becomes racially inflected when 
words such as cosmopolitan are deployed and in his extensive negative 
descriptions of racial and cultural diversity. Then at the local London level, 
segregationist ideas—the geographical allocation of space according to culturally 
constructed categories such as ‘pedestrian’ and ‘motorist’—can be seen to be 
heavily inflected with gender, class, race, age and other embedded prejudices. 
Thus, whilst not necessarily overtly racist, nevertheless we can see in Tripp’s 
localized pedestrian segregation/exclusion an expression of a global movement. 
For Smith, culture ‘is not a rigid formula transported between continents, but a 
system of meanings, norms and expressions, moulding and adjusting to new 
challenges and changed circumstances’.425 
 In this context, it is hard to read a comment made by Tripp in 1936, 
expanding on his theme of pedestrian segregation in London, without hearing 
echoes of the American racial debate. This time he was introducing stronger 
notions of dominance, coercion and promiscuity, as follows: 
The principle to be aimed at must be to give the wheeled traffic a defined 
dominance over pedestrian traffic in all roads of an arterial character, but at the 
same time to provide regulated zones of safety for the pedestrians. In addition, in 
order to prevent promiscuous crossing by pedestrians, it may be necessary, as I 
have long advocated, to provide guard rails along main roads ... If such facilities 
and safeguards are provided it will pay both vehicular traffic and pedestrians to 
conform to orderly movement, and they will do so without any form of coercion 
by the police.426 
One might substitute ‘whites’ for ‘wheeled traffic’ and ‘negroes’ for ‘pedestrians’ 
and hear a culture of racial categorization and exclusion common to both contexts. 
Yet there may be a further and closer link between traffic infrastructure and 
segregation. By examining the origins of segregationist concepts in the European 
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colonialist context we can discern ideas linking race to health, injury, death and 
disease through material technologies.  
5.9 Promiscuity, disease and impurity 
Carl Nightingale, following the work of Daniel Headrick, has plotted a 
racialization and shift in the meaning of segregation in the 1890s following 
outbreaks of plague in Hong Kong and India.427 In response, city public health 
officials began removing infected citizens to hospitals or ships. ‘This technique’, 
Nightingale describes, ‘they called isolation, or, increasingly, segregation. Race 
mattered: the main goal was to protect Europeans, and local Asian people got the 
roughest treatment’.428 The plague and its segregationist control response quickly 
spread to America, Europe and Africa, adding to local cultures of disease, vector 
and fear. In Dakar, Headrick observes, colonial officials enforced a rigid 
segregation of Europeans from Africans: ‘Quickly the idea spread in the 
administration and in the white community that all Africans were suspect and 
should be evacuated’.429 
 Moreover, there was an existing colonial background of the building of 
expensive infrastructure to reinforce segregation and public health control—
sewers, water supply and building regulations.430 Stephen Legg has discussed the 
case of hygiene and urban housing congestion in colonial Delhi in the 1930s and 
governmental responses to the problem in relation to local populations.431 Class 
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blended with race in these infrastructural interventions. Describing colonial cities, 
Headrick explains as follows: 
Here, among Europeans and those few who could afford to emulate them, a 
growing concern for hygiene provided the motive for segregation, while new 
technologies of water supply, sewage disposal, and building materials provided 
the means. And since these technologies were costly, they were reserved for the 
better-off.432  
Legg has also explored the use of spatial segregation to control prostitution in 
India in the first decades of the twentieth century, demonstrating that local 
cultures of governance intertwined notions of race with gender, class, 
homosexuality, cosmopolitanism and promiscuity through notions of disease, in 
this case venereal, with segregation a crucial method of control. His argument that 
the Indian colonial state had embedded within it ‘a spatial and governmental 
mindset that assumed segregation was the most effective means of controlling 
both the prostitute and ... the military’ helps shed light on the arguably related 
situation of ‘promiscuous pedestrians’ mixing with modern vehicles on London’s 
streets.433  
 Anne McClintock has gone further. Examining the ‘degeneration’ trope of 
the late nineteenth century, she observes the following: 
In the metropolis, the idea of racial deviance was evoked to police the 
‘degenerate’ classes—the militant working class, the Irish, Jews, feminists, gays 
and lesbians, prostitutes, criminals, alcoholics and the insane—who were 
collectively figured as racial deviants, atavistic throwbacks to a primitive moment 
in human prehistory, surviving ominously in the heart of the modern, imperial 
metropolis.434 
She goes on to explain the social purpose of such characterization, stating that: 
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social classes or groups were described with telling frequency as ‘races,’ ‘foreign 
groups,’ or ‘nonindigenous bodies,’ and could thus be cordoned off as biological 
and ‘contagious,’ rather than as social groups.435  
This cordoning-off activity she considers part of Julia Kristeva’s notion of 
‘abjection’, the process by which a social being creates itself by expelling 
‘impure’ elements, which never truly disappear but ‘haunt the edges of the 
subject’s identity with the threat of disruption or even dissolution’. Crucially, she 
explains that: 
Certain threshold zones become abject zones and are policed with vigour: the 
Arab Casbah, the Jewish ghetto, the Irish slum, the Victorian garret and Kitchen, 
the squatter camp, the mental asylum, the red light district, and the bedroom.436  
In 1930s London, we can consider a new ‘abject people’ and their ‘abject zone’: 
pedestrians on the pavements who, in Tripp’s characterization, were racialized, 
gendered, sexualized, aged and classed; a contagious group which was infecting 
the busy businessmen driving through the streets—yet which could only be 
marginalized, not eradicated, as even the driver was a pedestrian before getting 
into the car. 
 Ideas about segregational infrastructure were thus in the air in the 1920s 
and 1930s, and the connection between traffic segregation and injury, death and 
disease was expressed repeatedly in Tripp’s writings and the pronouncements of 
his peers. At one 1932 public conference attended by Tripp, Sir Henry Pigott, 
Deputy Secretary to the Ministry of Transport, said that: 
every day, on an average, 18 people were killed and some 550 injured, many of 
them maimed for life, on the roads of Great Britain. If some disease or plague 
were to claim victims on that scale the whole medical faculty would be mobilized 
to meet the situation and provide a remedy.437  
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Tripp opened his own 1938 book with the notion of motor traffic ‘beginning to 
strangle its own circulation’, asking for pedestrian segregation from roadways to 
rectify the ‘inevitable and automatic’ effect of non-segregation, namely ‘death and 
injury’, although he appreciated that the situation was probably inevitable, as to 
have placed restrictions on motor traffic sooner ‘would have thrown upon the 
infant enterprise a heavier burden than it could bear, and would perhaps have 
stifled it at birth’.438 The influential 1939 report of the House of Lords select 
committee on road accidents, to which Tripp substantially contributed and which 
Joe Moran has observed was regarded as a motorist’s charter, was itself structured 
in two parts: ‘The Disease’ and ‘The Remedy’, where the first section in the latter 
part was entitled, ‘Segregation must come’.439 Tripp himself had provided the 
committee with a detailed report which included a description of the ‘cure’ needed 
for the traffic problem.440 
 It therefore seemed natural that physical, spatial segregation was an 
appropriate response to death and disease, and whilst the intensity of disease-
spread segregation had receded by 1920, it was replaced by the emerging culture 
of urban planning. As Nightingale has described: 
For the new breed of comprehensive city planner who led this movement, the 
connection between sanitation and segregation was the stuff not of fear or disgust, 
but of the grandest hopes of Western empire and civilization. From this exalted 
inspiration arose the colonial era’s most extravagant monuments to urban 
segregation.441  
Amid all this international rhetoric of public health and the enforcement of spatial 
segregation through infrastructure, we can see that the response to the disease 
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crisis mirrored closely Alker Tripp’s response to the epidemic of injury and death 
on London’s shared road space as motorization took hold: different groups should 
be isolated from one another through the built form of the city. This was 
expressed in two ways. The first was Tripp’s plans to reshape the relationship 
between pedestrians and motorists on London’s streets using the control 
technologies of guard rails and traffic lights. But Tripp’s more widespread 
expression of spatial segregation came from his influence over generations of 
urban planners, and which we still live with today. 
5.10 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have tracked the Metropolitan Police’s approach to traffic 
congestion and circulation from that of a nineteenth-century liberal, reactive, 
reluctant, consensual, localized and fragmented body to a twentieth-century 
interventive, proactive, holistic, coordinated and planned force. This mirrored 
British society’s journey from liberal to state-controlled. In many ways, the 
Metropolitan Police in the 1930s, under traffic commissioner Alker Tripp, was 
keener for change on the streets than one might have thought, given its 
conservative history. On the surface we can see this partly as a power struggle 
between the police and other professional groups over who controls the streets and 
the movement that takes place in them. Two critical relationships in the case of 
the Metropolitan Police were with the engineers and scientists at the Ministry of 
Transport, and with the emerging town planning profession. But we can also see 
this as the circulation of ideas on policing and social control between major cities 
around the world. Thus concepts originating in American cultures of prohibition 
and racial tension, or Indian notions of sexual promiscuity, impurity and disease, 
found new meanings in London’s particular circumstances.  
 Partly these circumstances relate to London’s structures, including its 
ancient non-gridded layout and its complex layers of local governance. These 
structures live long and assert dominance. In the case of layout, Tripp sought to 
introduce grid-like traffic behaviour, because a gridded structure offers more 
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opportunities to reduce congestion, as traffic can take many different routes 
between two points—there is much redundancy—whereas London’s traffic can 
easily be halted by blockages at a handful of key junctions or river crossings. 
Wren failed in the seventeenth century to change the layout, with grid historian 
Hannah Higgins offering clues as to why, remarking that ‘the gridiron is an 
expression of a highly regulated, tightly administered culture’.442 This 
demonstrates the connection to Tripp’s second problem, that of a lack of 
centralized governance and a single traffic body for London. Both its physical 
layout and its political governance express a liberal society and, despite the 
sweeping changes of the twentieth century, cities change more slowly than one 
might think.  
 But the reception and transformation of ideas such as segregation from one 
place and culture to another are not just shaped by structures such as layouts and 
governance. Individuals in the network matter too. What is clear is that Tripp was 
not just a traffic policeman. He was also an engineer and a planner as well as an 
enthusiastic campaigner and politician. As a figure moving between the margins 
and the mainstream of planning, his ideas came to the attention of planners 
sensitive to visions of holistic control and took root. Long after Tripp’s retirement 
in 1947, his notions of segregation had helped shape a generation of planners to 
view pedestrians as an impurity to be isolated—to be marginalized. But this 
account is a messier reality than conventional ideas of powerful top-down state 
control and planning might suggest—such ideas were challenged by London’s 
physical and historical reality as well as by the actions of individuals from 
councillors to shopkeepers seeking to preserve their place in the network. 
Embedded infrastructures (in the socio-politico-technical sense) have long lives, 
and control of London’s traffic has always been about retrofitting the 19th century 
city, with only partial success.  
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Chapter 6. Economists, Prices and Markets443 
 
Eccleston Place, Victoria, 17 February 2003. The capital’s mayor, Ken 
Livingstone, is standing in front of a bank of screens monitoring London’s most 
congested streets and junctions, housed in a brand-new traffic control centre near 
Victoria Coach Station. Alongside Livingstone is Michèle Dix, Transport for 
London’s director of congestion charging. Soon after Livingstone arrives, a ring 
of number-plate recognition cameras begins charging a five-pound fee to every 
vehicle entering central London. The capital’s congestion charge has started. 
 
 
Figure 41: Traffic control centre, Eccleston Place, London, August 2004 (© TfL from the London 
Transport Museum collection).444 
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6.1 Introduction 
Congestion charging was established in London in 2003, but its theoretical origins 
can be dated to the 1920s and its practical development tracked back to the 1950s. 
It may feel like a recent introduction but its gestation took many decades. This 
chapter looks at its origins in road pricing, an approach to traffic originally formed 
by economists in direct opposition to planners’ hegemonic view of hard 
reconstruction, and excluded by the planning profession from its dominant 
discourse. The intellectual and ideological trajectory of the idea of road pricing 
through the battleground of post-war British politics will be examined, where 
neoliberals influenced by the likes of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman 
sought to counter the Keynesian consensus of centralized planning and large-state 
tax-and-spend. Its prime architect, Alan Walters, returned to the concept of road 
pricing time and again through his long career into Thatcherism and beyond.  
 Yet, while it was one of the earliest expressed free-market policies, road 
pricing did not achieve the success associated with other infrastructure 
marketizations such as power, water or telecommunications, nor with wider policy 
areas such as health care or education. Road pricing in the neoliberal project, with 
its focus on detailed tracking of vehicle journeys in space and time to construct a 
use-based charge, foundered on traditional Tory concerns over individual freedom 
and big-state taxation. It also foundered on the nature of Thatcherism, which was 
not straightforwardly neoliberal, employing marketization but with an acute 
political concern with class politics and, of course, electoral success. The 
aspirational, lower-middle-class car driver was at the heart of these concerns. This 
chapter thus recounts a significant episode in traffic planning that was actively 
marginalized by the planning profession but, by considering a wider network, can 
be seen centrally within the context of twentieth-century British political history. 
In this network, too, road pricing moved between the margins and the mainstream, 
demonstrating the portability and mutability of characterizations of traffic in 
socio-political contexts. 
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 Road pricing failed as a consciously neoliberal policy, but it did not die. 
Instead it was transformed. Having existed since the 1960s in a parallel social 
democratic discourse, it was picked up in the late 1980s as an early example of the 
more social democratic tendencies of the Blairite turn, which used market 
mechanisms to achieve social ends. Here, the moral force of the argument for road 
pricing was transformed, with traffic congestion becoming a public bad rather 
than a market externality. Thus, road pricing became congestion charging. 
Drawing on an emerging international politics of the environment, as well as the 
complex local politics of London, the policy was promoted by both Conservative 
and Labour governments in the 1990s before being introduced (albeit in a crude 
form) in London by mayor Ken Livingstone in 2003—although the policy was not 
his own.  
 How do policies travel, and how is their journey one of transformation and 
reinvention? This chapter will look at four key episodes. The first is the 
emergence of a group of transport economists, catalysed by Alan Walters, who 
engineered an opportunity to present their ideas on road pricing to the British 
government as a counterpoint to the work of urban planner Colin Buchanan. The 
second episode to be examined is the outcome of this work, known as the Smeed 
Report, and the work of its authors in negotiating a political outcome from a 
technical brief. The third episode involves the activities of British neoliberal 
think-tanks in promoting the ideas embodied in the Smeed Report as part of their 
free-market policy portfolio. They were conscious that this was a long-term 
project and that short-term failure might nevertheless lead in the end to success. 
This will lead to the final episode, in which road pricing, having failed to gain 
traction on the road to Thatcherism, found new meanings in social democracy 
amidst the environmental turn and, through changes in primary legislation 
enabling proceeds to be earmarked for public transport improvements, was finally 
implemented in London as a consciously left-wing policy.  
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6.2 Creating road pricing, 1920–62  
In 1951, Alan Walters, then aged 25 years, joined the University of Birmingham 
as a junior lecturer in econometrics under transport economist Gilbert Walker. 
One of his first major pieces of work was to develop a free-market approach to 
road use, using marginal cost taxation to correct the market failure of traffic 
congestion. ‘It is clear’, he wrote, ‘that measures such as an annual licence fee for 
vehicles using the central areas of large towns would be a move in the right 
direction. For example, a special “London licence” would have to be acquired and 
displayed before vehicles could use the roads of central London between 8 a.m. 
and 6 p.m.’445 The idea of a London licence had first been proposed in 1941 by 
planner Stanley Adshead, who saw a return to the ancient tollgate system the 
cheapest way to solve London’s congestion problem, although there is no 
evidence Walters was aware of it.446 While Walters was working out his ideas in 
the UK, the US political economist James M. Buchanan was developing ideas 
independently on similar lines.447 Buchanan, who studied under Frank Knight at 
the University of Chicago in the late 1940s, set out to counter the prevailing 
doctrine in the USA of street building and reconstruction, believing that urban 
congestion could not be solved by engineering. Instead, he set out firm arguments 
for the use of ‘the rationing device of the free economy, namely price’, for 
distributing existing road space among potential users.448  
 But Walters’s and James Buchanan’s work drew upon a theoretical 
expression of a market-based approach to congestion first mooted in the 1920s by 
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two towering figures of the field, namely Arthur Pigou at Cambridge University, 
in a canonical 1920 work, and Frank Knight, then at the University of Iowa, in a 
1924 riposte.449 They established the theoretical problem of ‘two roads’. One was 
good but narrow; the other wide but poor. With free access, most motorists would 
choose the good road, but it would soon get congested—an externality, a failure 
of the market. Instead, if a charge for use of the good road was levied, either by 
government intervention or by private enterprise, some motorists would choose to 
take the cheaper, poorer road, and if the charge was set just right, the good road 
would become just decongested enough to become free-flowing but not under-
used. Market failure would be corrected and the system would be efficient, the 
price giving motorists the information they needed about the state of the roads 
ahead to enable rational decisions to be made.  
  But Pigou and Knight were not concerned with real roads. For them, 
traffic was a metaphor for wider aspects of political economics and market 
failures, and took place amidst a complex discourse within the economics 
discipline. As it happened, Knight won the roads battle, with Pigou quietly 
withdrawing his metaphor, but this barely matters. This was a time when schools 
of thought crystallized into teaching and research programmes, and we can see 
that Pigou and Knight’s two roads, as well as acting as a direct influence on James 
Buchanan, also influenced a generation of scholars as they became embedded in a 
culture of economic theory that was to last for many decades.450 One example of 
this disciplinary influence came from the Cowles Commission for Research in 
Economics. Cowles scholars took a highly theoretical and econometric approach, 
modelling economic systems as sets of interacting variables expressible by 
simultaneous equations in which, as Johan van Overtveldt has described, 
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‘everything was linked to everything’.451 Their Chicago base shared a building 
with the department run by Knight, at which economists such as Buchanan and 
Friedman had studied, but by the 1950s the Cowles school had developed a 
distinct Keynesian flavour increasingly at odds with the classical approaches 
taken by Knight. Relationships between the two groups frayed, and in 1955 the 
Commission had moved to Yale University.452 There, Martin Beckmann and 
Charles McGuire completed a study of transport economics begun at Chicago 
with Christopher Winsten, an Oxford University economist based there from 1952 
to 1954. Their research developed Pigou’s two roads into an econometric model 
with ‘efficiency tolls’ levied on congested roads.453 
 The Cowles project had arisen out of work being done by economist 
William Vickrey on pricing structures for the congested New York rapid transit 
system.454 In 1959, following research into the technology of vehicle monitoring 
and toll collection, Vickrey presented evidence to the US Congress that offered 
the first detailed account of a practical congestion charging system.455 Vickrey’s 
work was technically advanced and set the foundations for much subsequent work 
on road pricing, drawing from vehicle tracking technologies developed for freight 
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railways and bus companies (see Figure 42) as well as computerized pattern-
recognition systems that analyzed images.  
 
Figure 42: Electronic vehicle-tracking system, with on-vehicle identification units and roadway 
sensor coils, connected to central tracking computer, developed by Link Aviation for US urban bus 
networks and freight railways, demonstrated by William Vickrey to Congressional Committee, 
1959 (Link Aviation).456 
 But Vickrey’s work also raised the spectre of the politics inherent in the 
scheme. His own analysis was that ‘while this makes sense to economists, it 
seems to be politically ... somewhat unpalatable’. The committee chairman’s 
response was blunter: ‘I would not think it would be a good platform, perhaps, 
Professor, to launch into a political career on’.457 Yet a highly significant political 
career was indeed being launched on that platform, as Alan Walters had by then 
begun fleshing out his earlier ideas on congestion pricing.458 In this new work, 
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Walters applied a recently published methodological model by Milton Friedman 
that combined both theoretical and empirical analysis of real-life problems using 
statistics and econometrics.459 
 In Britain, these strands were drawn together at the government’s Road 
Research Laboratory (RRL), which played a crucial role in formalizing and 
legitimizing the political and economic concept of road-use charging. A 1960 
RRL report on urban traffic congestion tolls was followed in 1961 by an 
influential paper by the laboratory’s deputy director of traffic and safety, transport 
statistician Reuben Smeed.460 In 1961, Gabriel Roth, a transport economist at 
Cambridge University who had worked at the laboratory from 1956 to 1959, 
published a paper in which he expressed exasperation that progress had not been 
made on this matter sooner. The case for a congestion tax, Roth observed: 
was argued by Pigou as long ago as 1920. Economists who have studied the 
problem agree that a tax on vehicles using congested streets is the appropriate 
economic answer to the problem. Why has this not been widely advocated?461  
Yet Roth’s wish was about to be granted. The early 1960s was a time of great 
change in British transport politics. Ernest Marples, the transport minister from 
1959, instigated major studies into the railways, led by Richard Beeching, and 
urban traffic, led by Colin Buchanan and discussed elsewhere in this thesis. Yet a 
third study, led by Reuben Smeed, emerged from his department, which is less 
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well known, and which drew on the distinct approach taken by the transport 
economists.  
6.3 The Smeed Report, 1962–64  
It is important to observe from this history that road pricing was not created as a 
neoliberal idea, though some of its early proponents could be described as 
neoliberals. Keynesians, welfare economists and technocrats were developing 
such ideas too, but it was to be the neoliberals who took them up most 
enthusiastically in the 1960s, partly because they struggled least with the 
distributive aspects of road pricing. This complexity can be clearly discerned in 
the Smeed committee’s work. In May 1962, Smeed, Gabriel Roth, Alan Walters, 
Christopher Winsten, Michael Beesley from the London School of Economics 
(LSE) and Christopher Foster from Oxford were invited to join Ministry of 
Transport officials in a discussion on road-use charging, which took place on 12 
July.462 Following a wide-ranging exchange of views, the meeting concluded that 
further research was needed on the technical possibilities, with Smeed agreeing to 
chair a committee to carry out the research. Two years later, the group’s report, 
entitled Road Pricing: The Economic and Technical Possibilities, was published, 
but received nothing like the attention heaped on Colin Buchanan’s Traffic in 
Towns, published a few months earlier.463 It was not that Smeed’s group lacked 
experience or political clout—Walters and Foster both went on to play crucial 
roles in British political life. Yet it is Traffic in Towns which has come to be seen 
as the paradigmatic statement on British post-war urban transport policy—in 
opposition to the views of the economists, as both Peter Hall and Simon Gunn 
have observed.  
                                                 
462 For the full committee membership, see Ministry of Transport, Road Pricing, iv. 
463 Ministry of Transport, Road Pricing; Ministry of Transport, Traffic in Towns. 
6. ECONOMISTS, PRICES AND MARKETS  202 
 
 
 
 Noting a ‘broad consensus’ that emerged on the aptness of the proposals 
outlined in Traffic in Towns, including motoring pressure groups, professional 
periodicals and the government, Gunn explained as follows:  
The only dissenting voices appeared to be from the transport economists, who 
argued that Buchanan had overlooked the effects of urban dispersal, exaggerated 
the future rate of traffic growth, and ignored the possibility that environmental 
concerns could be solved more effectively by the market than statutory means.464 
For Hall, this clash between Buchanan’s absolute environmentalism and the 
relativism of the economists took the form of ‘fundamental and repeated 
conflict’.465 
 Hall and Gunn’s perceptive observations aside, there has so far been little 
critical attention paid to Road Pricing when compared with that afforded to 
Traffic in Towns. This may be due to the limited scope of Smeed’s work, which 
was restricted to examining details of economic theory and technologies of 
charging. Studies of road pricing history have generally taken place internally 
within the disciplines of economics and transport planning and have situated the 
Smeed Report on a linear progression, although Martin Richards’s comprehensive 
insider’s account and Pierre-Henri Derycke’s subtle comparative analysis stand 
out in exception.466 Most others have taken the form of extended literature 
reviews.467 Yet Road Pricing was about more than just traffic—it expressed a 
political view and was born out of dissent with the planning approach that defined 
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Colin Buchanan’s Traffic in Towns study. In 1961, Roth had launched a stinging 
attack on congestion relief by material intervention:  
We are often told that the alternatives before us are either the reconstruction of 
our city centres, or else slow stagnation as more and more vehicles try to use the 
limited road space available. Are there no other possibilities?468  
He concluded, ‘Before pulling down the fabric of the country let us consider at 
least the economic implications of what we are doing’.469 In April 1962, Roth 
authored a paper with Beesley, who had worked alongside Walters at Birmingham 
University through the 1950s, which they submitted to Buchanan’s steering 
committee secretary.470 It was backed by Walters, Foster, and four other eminent 
economists, and in their covering note they stated: 
We are convinced that little progress can be made in alleviating the difficulties 
caused by urban traffic congestion until the underlying economic factors are 
recognised and taken into account by traffic and town planners.471  
A couple of months later they submitted a further paper.472 Both were sent to 
Buchanan’s steering group in a pack of papers for their July 1962 meeting, but the 
group’s secretary discouraged any discussion of them, directing that ‘Mr 
Buchanan hopes that the Steering group will not spend too much time on them’, 
as they were ‘not very closely related to his line of work’.473 Buchanan himself 
told them that he was against the idea.474  
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 Roth later recalled that Buchanan’s team ‘had little use for road pricing’, 
an opinion echoed by Peter Hall, but that Foster had showed the economists’ 
paper to Ministry of Transport officials who seemed interested in its contents.475 
The Ministry of Transport meeting in July 1962 and the Smeed Committee that 
followed were the result. But if the planners and the economists were at odds, it is 
also true that all was not well between the economists themselves. The 
committee’s first draft report was ready in January 1963. It explained:  
we have sought to avoid the major social and political issues inherent in our 
subject. We are, however, fully aware of their importance, and we would not wish 
our approach to the subject to be misinterpreted on account of our limited terms 
of reference.476 
The Ministry of Transport had forced them to stick to econometrics and 
technologies but, as they considered devices ranging from sensors (see Figure 43) 
to vouchers and meters (see Figure 44), some on the committee had a problem.  
 
Figure 43: Road Research Laboratory drawing of proposal submitted by Joseph Lucas Ltd to 
Smeed Committee for urban road-pricing system, with vehicles tracked by roadway sensors 
connected to central computer, c.1963 (Crown Copyright, Open Government License v3.0, 
courtesy of The National Archives).477 
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Figure 44: Road-pricing technologies proposed to Smeed Committee, c.1963: Road Research 
Laboratory drawing of proposal for roadside voucher vending machines by Ferranti (left) and a 
range of on-vehicle road-pricing meters (right) developed by Pye Telecommunications (Crown 
Copyright, Open Government License v3.0, courtesy of The National Archives/Pye 
Telecommunications, courtesy of Philips).478 
 As the draft reports were prepared and discussed, we can discern a 
political battle about the proper role of the panel. On one side were Walters and 
Roth, who saw the committee’s work as an opportunity for a wider political 
exercise. Their proposal was that road pricing should be partnered with reductions 
or even abolition of the two main charges motorists already incurred, namely the 
annual licence fee and fuel duty. This was an argument for a full overhaul of the 
motor tax system, with revenues from road pricing earmarked for road spending. 
Their goal was no net increase in revenue raised under the new road pricing 
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system but rather a redistribution of costs according to the market mechanism. 
Winsten and the Ministry officials felt, however, that this was overstepping the 
panel’s remit by making political recommendations masquerading as economic 
theory.  
 Winsten felt the first report draft was ‘still far too slanted towards 
particular points of view and far too little a technical assessment of different 
methods of road charging’. Raising the spectre of income tax redistribution if the 
charging scheme was part of a wider taxation overhaul, as the draft suggested, he 
observed that ‘In discussing these questions one is essentially striking a political 
attitude and this is inappropriate for the Committee to do, nor should it conceal a 
political attitude under an apparently technical discussion’. He concluded: 
I feel that the report tries much too hard to advocate one particular solution rather 
than listing possibilities ... If it were put through in its present state then there 
would be many parts to which I would feel very reluctant yet to put my 
signature.479  
In his own response, Ministry economist Richard Bird (later Barbara Castle’s 
Principal Private Secretary) said, ‘this whole passage reads, in my opinion, rather 
like a party political speech’, which contained a ‘considerable number of 
unsupported value judgment[s]’.480 
 Roth felt that an opportunity to press for a wholesale motoring tax 
overhaul was slipping from his grasp owing to cautious officials and academic 
economists debating the niceties of theory. He wrote an exasperated letter to his 
ally, Walters, following the interventions of Winsten and Bird. Decrying the 
‘nebulous and unconstructive approach of most of the economists’, he exclaimed, 
‘Here we have a Government coming to us and wanting to know what they should 
do about the pricing of roads, and all we seem to say is that the problem raises 
great difficulties in the economic field’. He concluded by saying, ‘If we cannot 
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explain to a layman the things on which we are agreed, how on earth can we 
expect him to provide the funds to enable us to explore the things that need 
exploring?’481 
 To circumvent the political veto imposed on their work, Roth led a 
publishing campaign, sending one of the papers they had originally submitted to 
the Buchanan Committee onwards to The Town Planning Review.482 He also 
wrote about income distribution in Crossbow, the magazine of the Conservative 
Party’s Bow Group, and co-authored a paper with committee secretary Michael 
Thomson for the monthly magazine, Aspect, on road pricing as part of a wider 
road-tax overhaul.483 Foster, too, had been writing on ‘the transport problem’, 
publishing a book in 1963 that rather tersely observed that the Smeed panel report 
was ‘as yet ... unpublished’.484 In fact the committee’s final report had been 
submitted to the Ministry of Transport in June 1963. It concluded that ‘there is 
every possibility that at least one of these proposals could be developed into an 
efficient charging system and could yield substantial benefits on congested 
roads’.485 Yet the report was destined to sit on transport minister Ernest Marples’s 
desk for a full year before it was released, overtaken by the publication of 
Buchanan’s Traffic in Towns in November 1963.  
 For Marples and for the Treasury, the Smeed Committee’s report could not 
have been less welcome. It flew in the face of two political truisms. Firstly, 
motorists resented being taxed. Secondly, the Treasury did not believe in taxes 
being specifically earmarked—or ‘hypothecated’—to any particular category of 
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spend.486 It is notable that the Smeed panel had not been instigated by Marples but 
by his officials, and the Minister had nothing to do with it until its report was 
completed.487 In fact, in a recent memoir, Foster has suggested that Marples tried 
to stop the report’s publication but was unable to do so directly because the RRL 
was part of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, not his own 
Ministry of Transport.488 Furthermore, the Ministry’s hand had been forced by 
Roth’s publication drive. In September, Marples agreed to publish, but only with 
major revisions.489 Winsten again expressed his concerns and later revealed 
tension in the committee’s meetings, describing discussions as ‘harrowing’ and 
observing that some of his reservations had not been discussed ‘given the time 
and atmosphere’.490 
 Roth was appalled at the delay, writing to the Ministry on 15 November to 
complain that no publicity was planned for their work and also the following:  
no effort is being made to relate the publication time of our Report to the 
publication time of the Buchanan Report ... You now have the two reports. They 
are very relevant one to the other. It would surely be better for them to appear as 
part of a coherent pattern than as a couple of unconnected items.491 
He had previously expressed grave concern about the nature of publicity 
surrounding the report, having told Smeed the following:  
When all is said and done, very few people will read our Report; most will rely 
on the newspaper reports which will depend on the press hand-outs. I feel that it 
is essential for the RRL to have a hand in preparing these, and I would gladly be 
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of assistance in this respect. We must avoid being stabbed in the back by a hostile 
or ignorant press officer. 492 
But it was not until 25 November that Winsten finally gave his approval to the 
report’s wording and by then it was too late to publish alongside the Buchanan 
Report, which was released two days later.493 Perhaps this had been the Ministry’s 
intention, but in any case, the report was still in the sand, as the Treasury still 
objected to hypothecated tax revenues.494 Roth had by now despaired of the report 
being published with any meat on its bones. Responding to Smeed’s proposals for 
further amendments, he complained of the ‘Treasury’s noose round our necks’ 
and pushed for the panel to publish its original report by itself, stating the 
following:  
The position of the Ministry and RRL members of the Panel is clearly somewhat 
delicate, but other members of the Panel are not so constrained. We can command 
some influential support, even within the Treasury. Why should we put up with 
this shabby treatment? If we wait much longer the election may be on us.495 
Roth was right to be concerned; it has been said that Alec Douglas Home, who 
replaced Harold Macmillan as prime minister in October 1963, said to officials, 
‘let us take a vow that if we are re-elected we will never again set up a study like 
this one’.496 By March, though, the report had been watered down enough to 
secure Treasury approval, and Marples told the House that it was to be 
published.497 But Roth was, in the end, unable to garner the publicity fanfare that 
had accompanied Buchanan’s ideas, nor to retain in the final Smeed Report the 
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wider issues of taxation and distribution that had been proscribed from the start. 
While Marples finally released the report in June 1964, he did so with the 
minimum of fanfare.498 
 The Smeed Report had finally joined the Buchanan Report in public view, 
but the two sides had not reached any kind of rapprochement, as was witnessed 
first-hand by Peter Hall. On Buchanan’s side, dealing with environmental 
concerns such as noise and congestion was an absolute requirement. The 
economists, Hall observed, ‘had a hard time with that, because it flatly 
contradicted their basic assumption that everything had its price and that 
everything was tradable off against everything else’. Hall recalled attending a 
lecture at the LSE in 1964 ‘when Buchanan confronted Beesley and Foster; there 
was no meeting of minds at all, just mutual incomprehension’.499 But outside 
official political channels, road pricing gained new life.  
6.4 Think-tanks and the neoliberal project, 1963–89  
Four months after the Smeed Report’s publication, Labour won the general 
election and Harold Wilson took over the premiership. British politics was still in 
the post-war consensus where Keynesian policies formed an orthodoxy across the 
mainstream parties. But Daniel Stedman Jones, Richard Cockett, and others have 
described the development of a concerted neoliberal project in the mid-twentieth 
century dedicated to fighting the consensus, where the term ‘neoliberal’ is defined 
by Stedman Jones as ‘the free market ideology based on individual liberty and 
limited government that connected human freedom to the actions of the rational, 
self-interested actor in the competitive marketplace’.500 This project involved the 
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development of ideas expressing the neoliberal viewpoint to a broad range of 
opinion-formers—academics, students, journalists, and politicians—in the hope, 
over a 20-year period, of reversing the post-war consensus. Here, economics and 
politics were tightly intertwined, and the Buchanan–Smeed episode represents 
these polar opposites in political economy. Colin Buchanan and the post-war 
urban planners represented the consensus, with Traffic in Towns enshrining the 
centrally planned city built through Keynesian ideology on the proceeds of 
taxation or deficit spending. Reuben Smeed, on the other hand, led a discourse 
that could represent individualism and economic liberalism, with Road Pricing 
expressing the marketization of road space paid for by those who use it. The work 
of Alan Walters in the 1950s and on the Smeed Committee is notable given his 
later prominent role in the Thatcherite neoliberal revolution. By the mid-1960s he 
was, as Cockett observes, ‘an ardent economic liberal’.501 By 1975, having 
advised and been sacked by Edward Heath, he was informally advising Margaret 
Thatcher on her economic approach to government based on a broadly neoliberal 
agenda, and in 1981 she hired him as her personal economic adviser to steer 
through an austerity budget. In 1989 he returned to her side—leading to the 
resignation of her Chancellor, Nigel Lawson.502 Through all this, he continued to 
work on road pricing.503 The origin of congestion pricing proposals in the work of 
public-choice theorist James Buchanan is equally suggestive of a neoliberal 
reading, with Stedman Jones placing him alongside other US thinkers such as 
Milton Friedman and George Stigler as ‘intellectual nodes at the heart of a 
                                                                                                                                     
‘Liberalism and Neoliberalism in Britain, 1930–1980’, in The Road from Mont Pelerin: The 
Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective, ed. Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009), 68–97; Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal 
Reason; Ben Jackson, ‘The Think-Tank Archipelago: Thatcherism and Neo-Liberalism’, in 
Making Thatcher’s Britain, ed. Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 43–61. Peck discusses definitions of neoliberalism at length in chap. 1. 
501 Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable, 153. 
502 David Smith, ‘Walters, Sir Alan Arthur (1926–2009)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, January 2013. 
503 Alan Walters, The Economics of Road User Charges (Washington: International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 1968); Walters, ‘A Life Philosophy’, 20. 
6. ECONOMISTS, PRICES AND MARKETS  212 
 
 
 
transatlantic network ... who spread an increasingly honed political message of the 
superiority of free markets’.504 
 Within that network, neoliberal think-tanks played a highly significant 
role. At a time when the political consensus meant discussion of anti-Keynesian 
policies fell largely on deaf ears across the political spectrum, it fell to outsiders to 
debate, develop and promote economic liberalism. Until the mid-1970s, one 
institution held the reins in the UK: the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), 
described by Stedman Jones as ‘the single most important organization promoting 
neoliberal ideas in the 1960s’.505 Founded in 1955, the organization’s purpose was 
to develop a long-term programme of research and dissemination of market-
economy policy ideas to secure a ‘transformation of the intellectual climate’, as 
Cockett has put it.506 Simplification of the neoliberal message for public 
consumption was crucial.507 From the outset, the IEA therefore exploited the 
power of publication, and appointed economist and writer Arthur Seldon as its 
editorial director. Its publications were written by well-informed academic 
economists and were short, pithy, and cheap. The point was to build up a wide 
range of ideas, each promoting the market economy, which together could form 
an intellectual manifesto for change. As part of his programme, Seldon 
commissioned a series of publications on the financing of industry and social 
services. Alan Walters and James Buchanan both wrote for the series.508 With the 
disappointing reception of the Smeed Report in 1964 fresh in the minds of 
Walters and others, Seldon saw urban traffic as a useful policy area for promoting 
market ideas, and commissioned a total of three books on the topic. Gabriel Roth 
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wrote the first two. His first, Paying for Parking, was published in 1965. In 
Seldon’s preface, he observed that ‘Roads must in practice be rationed in one way 
or another: by edict, licence or congestion—or by price’. He went on, ‘In 
distinction to the solutions usually offered by physical planners and social 
engineers, Mr Roth has proposed a structure of market prices’.509 The following 
year, Seldon published Roth’s A Self-Financing Road System, in which Roth 
outlined his Smeed-Committee plans for a total overhaul of the tax system for 
motorists in favour of a system based entirely on road-use pricing.510 
 But Seldon also wanted a direct neoliberal critique of Colin Buchanan’s 
Traffic in Towns, so in 1966 he turned to transport economist, Dennis Reynolds, 
who had worked in the late 1950s with Michael Beesley at the RRL on the cost–
benefit analysis of the M1 motorway.511 In 1963, having left the laboratory, 
Reynolds had published an article expressing disappointment that ‘planners seem 
to have taken little interest in economics (or, with certain exceptions, economists 
in planning)’, painting a picture of idealistic, other-worldly planners who would 
benefit from a dose of reality:  
not only might the framework and methodology of economics, eg divergence 
between private and social costs, be of general help to the planner in his daily 
task, but it might help to reconcile him to the logic behind many of the harder 
realities of economic life, eg the scarcity of resources.512 
Reynolds’s 1966 IEA monograph focused this rhetoric in a direct attack on Colin 
Buchanan. In it, he sought to ‘call a timely halt to the divorce between the 
technical proposals of enthusiasts and economic realities’. Described by Seldon as 
‘originally a Buchanan enthusiast’, Reynolds dismissed planning policy as 
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arbitrary, in Seldon’s words, and expressed doubt, following recent work by 
James Buchanan, that the state could ever direct resources efficiently.513 But his 
target was not just the planner; he also criticized cost–benefit analysis being 
championed by Beesley, seeking to distance himself from their joint work carried 
out in the 1950s.514 Ultimately, his proposals took the form of population dispersal 
to new towns with an overlay of market pricing to curb the excesses of the urban 
planners. In this mode, congestion pricing was a useful tool in rendering busy 
urban centres less attractive, with the anticipation that flight to the suburbs would 
follow.  
 In the end, Reynolds’s work simply pointed up the inability of the 
economics discipline to present a united message—as Roth had observed many 
times—and appeared to the wider world as an austere and theoretical opposition 
to the potential revolution called for by Colin Buchanan. The book was reviewed 
separately by Beesley and Winsten, both of whom were decidedly lukewarm in 
their assessment.515 It was then left to transport engineer Dennis Gilbert, who 
worked with Buchanan at his newly formed consultancy, to deliver the final 
blows. He found Reynolds’s assessment of the costs of Buchanan ‘rather 
misleading as well as lacking rigour’ and considered that ‘It seems clear that the 
author has not troubled to check his ideas about the report by careful reading’.516 
 We have so far charted a subtle transformation of road pricing from its 
inception in 1920s welfare economics to 1950s and 1960s counter-Keynesian 
economic liberalism, even if its early promoters such as William Vickrey were not 
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involved in the neoliberal project. But, while other market policies such as those 
relating to health care and education took root in Margaret Thatcher’s government 
after 1979, road pricing did not, as we will see. Yet, for Seldon, Reynolds’s book 
served its purpose in contributing to the intellectual debate on resource allocation 
and raising the idea of markets for road space. It was not unusual for individual 
neoliberal ideas to fail, according to one prominent free-marketeer in 1968:  
It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that liberalism claims to cure more ills than 
patent medicine. Are you worried about the world monetary crisis? Flexible 
exchange rates will ease your mind. Is urban congestion a problem in your town? 
Enquire about road pricing today. Have you lain awake at nights, praying for 
choice in education? The voucher scheme is meant for you. Do high prices make 
you feel faint? Abolition of RPM will soon do the trick. Naturally it is easy to 
mock at this out-pouring of ideas—and probably some of them will not work—
but it is the mark of a dynamic philosophy that it provides clear, consistent and 
above all, simple solutions to the problems thrown up by society and the 
economy.517 
What mattered most was the development of a wider argument applicable in any 
receptive political environment, and in 2003 road pricing was introduced—under 
a Labour government.  
6.5 The environment, social democracy and the politics of London, 1963–
2003  
Road pricing was a neoliberal fire that burned brightly and then burned out—as 
many did. But the promotion of road pricing in the neoliberal think-tanks through 
the 1960s and beyond took place against a broader political background, and road 
pricing was also considered as part of a broad social democratic discourse, which 
embraced it within the planning paradigm rather than in opposition (where the 
term ‘social democracy’ is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘a system 
of liberal democracy that retains a commitment to social reform and social 
justice’).518 Over the year 1962–3, in parallel with the sitting of the Smeed 
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Committee, the journal Socialist Commentary convened a group of transport 
specialists to discuss transport from a ‘left’ perspective. As Joe Moran has 
observed, Socialist Commentary had long advocated the targeting of floating 
voters during Labour’s long period in opposition, and in Transport is Everyone’s 
Problem, the pamphlet written by group member Peter Hall that emerged from the 
meetings, a direct appeal was made to the ‘memory of Orpington’, claiming that 
‘the anger of commuters in a hundred such constituencies may decide the outcome 
of the next General Election’.519 
 The group strongly advocated Smeed-style road pricing in urban areas as a 
‘first essential for intelligent city traffic planning’ and, as the Smeed Committee 
was discussing at the same time, also advocated a taxation overhaul, stating the 
following:  
The introduction of ‘congestion charging’ would not mean an increase in the total 
level of motor taxation, merely a rearrangement of the burden ... The object is 
merely to relate the burden of motor taxation more accurately to the true costs of 
each journey (including the social costs) than is attempted at present.520 
Yet in this context, road pricing played just one part in a total transportation plan, 
which recognized that ‘transport planning is a central part of positive national and 
regional, economic and physical planning’.521 The common denominator across 
both the Socialist Commentary and the Smeed groups was the economist and civil 
servant Christopher Foster, who acted as a conduit for ideas to pass from the latter 
to the former. Foster, who later advised on rail privatization and the poll tax, but 
was also an advisor to Anthony Crosland and Barbara Castle, cannot be situated 
on a simple political spectrum. This episode therefore undermines the notion of an 
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unproblematic, fixed consensus in British politics in the 1950s and 1960s. As 
Daniel Stedman Jones has observed, the history of market-based politics at this 
time was one in which ‘ideas move, change, become distorted, and sometimes 
even mix with their polar opposites in the messy world of electoral politics, policy 
and government’.522 
 Whether neoliberal or social democratic, road pricing was not taken up in 
the 1960s.523 Labour’s October 1964 election win signalled a period of 
ambivalence towards the policy. Ernest Marples was replaced first by Tom Fraser 
and then, from December 1965, by Barbara Castle. Both ministers took steps to 
continue the analysis of road pricing, but with little zeal. In May 1965, Fraser 
appointed a body to develop the work of both the Buchanan and the Smeed 
groups, looking at methods of restraint more broadly than just by price.524 Castle 
made clear her own support for congestion pricing, countering suggestions that 
such a policy would favour the rich.525 But it was clear that this was not a popular 
scheme. Both the Conservative party and a range of road-user groups, including 
the Automobile Association (AA), Royal Automobile Club (RAC), and British 
Roads Federation, lobbied hard against the ideas, and the result was a 1967 report 
which concluded that short-term restraint would be most easily achieved by 
parking controls in central London, with Smeed-style road pricing put on the back 
burner.526 Smeed committee secretary J. Michael Thomson responded with details 
of a simple daily licence scheme for central London (the boundaries of which are 
shown in Figure 45), and further experiments were carried out on road-pricing 
meter technology (such as that shown in Figure 46), but neither licences nor 
meters came to anything in 1960s London. A further powerful influence against 
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any restriction on car use came from the British car manufacturing industry, as 
Simon Gunn has argued.527 
 
Figure 45: Boundary of proposed Central London Daily Licence scheme, 1967 (J. Michael 
Thomson).528 
 
Figure 46: Experimental road-pricing meter, late-1960s (Topix).529 
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 Into the 1970s, under Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher, there was 
little appetite to revive the scheme, despite Walters’s prominent role in setting 
economic policy. The prevailing dogma, ‘kept alive by the AA and the RAC’, as 
William Plowden put it, was twofold: that motorists possessed the inviolable 
freedom to drive without restriction, and that motor taxation was too high and its 
proceeds not correctly applied to the road system.530 Despite dreams of a total 
overhaul of motor taxation, in reality the market principle of road pricing 
appeared irreconcilably to signal both an increase in taxation and a loss of 
freedom, unacceptable in Thatcher’s car-owning democracy.531 Through the 
1970s, parking restraint formed the principal focus for Tory urban congestion-
management policy.532 
 A form of road pricing was eventually introduced in London by the left-
wing mayor, Ken Livingstone, in 2003, but the political shifts that enabled it 
began in the 1980s.533 Treasury policy changed to permit the proceeds of a 
congestion charge to be hypothecated to public transport improvements, owing in 
large part to a major shift in global politics towards environmentalism some 25 
years after Colin Buchanan raised the flag. At the national level, this saw transport 
policy start to move from a ‘predict and provide’ model to a more contested 
approach focused on a ‘new realism’.534 Concern over the environmental effects 
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of transportation had been growing since the early 1960s. In 1987, the World 
Commission on Environment and Development published a highly influential 
report, which catalysed policy debates over the environment.535 In 1989, 
Department of Transport predictions of a huge growth in car use led to the 
publication of a multi-billion-pound road building programme, but the predictions 
also prompted concerns about the effects of unchecked traffic and the inability of 
road building alone to solve congestion.536 The politics of transport were 
becoming more contested and, after the shock 1989 growth forecasts were 
digested, new approaches on an environmentally aware restraint model were able 
to gain space at the table—with road pricing linked to wider packages of public 
transport improvements in London and other urban centres.  
 A slew of reports was published from 1989 to 1991, recognizing the need 
for balanced transport policies with some element of road pricing.537 One was 
particularly significant, for while neoliberal think-tanks were still occasionally 
promoting the policy from a right-wing perspective (with Gabriel Roth continuing 
to lead the charge), Patricia Hewitt, deputy director of the newly formed Institute 
for Public Policy Research (IPPR), offered a consciously left-wing interpretation 
in the group’s first green paper, published in 1989:  
On the political right (in, for instance the proposals of the Adam Smith Institute) 
it is seen as an extension of free market principles ... On the left, road pricing is 
often condemned because it appears to favour the rich at the expense of the poor 
and average citizen. IPPR takes a different approach ... Road pricing—or, more 
accurately, charges for car use on heavily congested roads—are an important 
application of the ‘polluter pays principle’, a principle to which lip-service at 
least is paid by conservative, liberal and left politicians alike.538 
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That both the Adam Smith Institute (ASI) and the IPPR were promoting free-
market approaches to roads lends weight to Richard Cockett’s analysis that the 
new left consciously modelled its policy-making strategy on the neoliberal think-
tanks such as the IEA and its younger siblings, the ASI and the Centre for Policy 
Studies (CPS).539 Clearly, policies as well as strategies were borrowed and 
transformed by all sides. One ASI proposal, written in 1989, proposed road 
pricing with hypothecation to the urban bus network—but a deregulated, free-
market bus network, and it was a 1995 CPS paper that described most closely the 
technological approach adopted in 2003 where the congestion charge was 
enforced by automatic number-plate recognition cameras.540 But Hewitt’s 
rhetorical transformation of the argument from road pricing (as it tended to be 
termed in the neoliberal discourse) to congestion charging (which incidentally had 
been Hall’s terminology in the 1963 Socialist Commentary report) signalled a 
shift away from the motor taxation debate towards the marketization of 
environmental pollution.  
 The journey taken by road pricing from Hewitt’s crucial 1989 IPPR paper 
to the 2003 London congestion charge is described comprehensively by Martin 
Richards.541 To summarize, this was a combination of Labour and Conservative 
policy. Hewitt’s argument persuaded John Prescott to include road pricing, with 
proceeds hypothecated to public transport improvements, in his 1989 transport 
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policy statement.542 In 1991, the Department of Transport set up a London 
congestion charging study, later sponsored by the Government Office for London 
(GOL) following its creation under John Major’s government in 1994, which 
reported in July 1995 in favour of a London congestion charge.543 Meanwhile, in 
1992 the UN Earth Summit had been held in Rio de Janeiro, focusing particular 
attention on the environmental impact of road transport, and attention in Britain 
had reached a critical moment in 1994 with the publication of a Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution report, which was highly critical of the 
government’s transport policy, recommending a reduction in road traffic growth 
and expansion of public transport.544 
 The GOL report was kicked into touch by the Conservative government.545 
However, the incoming Labour government seized the opportunity to respond to 
the environmental debate by rolling together the ministerial responsibilities for 
transport and the environment into a single department under the deputy Prime 
Minister, John Prescott, who, as we have seen, was already in favour of a 
congestion charge if it enhanced public transport.546 In July 1998, he published a 
White Paper announcing local authority powers to charge for road use.547 At that 
stage, work was in progress, led by the GOL and its director, Genie Turton, in 
drawing up legislation to establish the Greater London Authority, led by an 
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elected mayor. A new research project was formed, led by Turton, looking at 
powers for the new mayor to introduce road charging, which reported in March 
2000.548 In July, the winner of the mayoral elections, Ken Livingstone, took up his 
post and immediately began setting up a congestion charging scheme.549 It is 
important to remember that the London congestion charge was not Livingstone’s 
own policy—it was an option available to whichever candidate won the mayoral 
election, and it had been long in development—but its conversion from policy to 
reality was no easy task. Livingstone’s opportunism and his grasp of public 
politics finally broke the logjam. After much lobbying of stakeholders, a 
workable—and, moreover, politically palatable—charge scheme was created. 
Livingstone’s rhetoric—framed around the damage caused by congestion to the 
environment and people’s quality of life—echoed that of Patricia Hewitt over a 
decade earlier.550 In February 2003, the London congestion charge went live. 
Described by Tony Travers as ‘the single most radical policy introduced by Ken 
Livingstone in his post-2000 administration’, its subsequent history is a story only 
now being told.551 
6.6 Conclusions  
Debates over traffic congestion mirrored wider concerns over the politics of 
planning. In the post-war Keynesian consensus, it made sense that centralized 
urban planning was the dominant discourse in which congestion was framed, but 
this chapter has described an alternative, marginalized view. At its most 
straightforward level this was, as Peter Hall has argued, a disagreement over 
                                                 
548 Government Office for London, Road Charging Options for London: A Technical Assessment 
(London: The Stationery Office, 2000). 
549 Greater London Authority, Hearing London’s Views: A Discussion Paper on the Mayor’s 
Proposals for Congestion Charging in Central London (London: Greater London Authority, 
2000). 
550 Compare for instance ibid., 1; and Hewitt, A Cleaner, Faster London, 5. 
551 Travers, The Politics of London, 190; see also Dave Wetzel, The London Congestion Charge 
Scheme (New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 2012), 
http://schalkenbach.org/papers/London-Congestion-Charge-Scheme-RSF-Dave-Wetzel[10].pdf. 
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standards—in this case environmental ones—with Colin Buchanan considering 
them absolute and the economists believing they were relative and thus tradable. 
Looking broadly, however, this appeared to map onto a world view that abhorred 
state-controlled allocation of resources in principle, and for whom Buchanan’s 
proposals for expensive state-funded interventions in the urban realm were 
anathema. Thus, we see the agitation for an alternative committee—Smeed— 
which attempted at least to temper the perceived excesses of the town planners 
and vest some control in individual drivers, and we see the active participation of 
the IEA and Alan Walters in promoting a policy of road pricing in the neoliberal 
context through specialist transport economists such as Gabriel Roth and Dennis 
Reynolds. Traffic in Towns and Road Pricing represented far more than 
alternative solutions to congestion. They expressed a fundamental and critical 
debate in mid-twentieth century British history.  
 For the IEA, congestion charging was just one more free-market policy 
idea, and the social and cultural context in which an idea is floated makes a 
difference to its reception, as do local politics, which vary hugely in time and 
place. The success or failure of congestion charging as a policy was not, therefore, 
inevitable. As it happens, it did not catch on during Margaret Thatcher’s reign, as 
other marketizations did. There was, of course, more to Thatcher than 
neoliberalism, and her pragmatic class politics, framed around the aspirational car 
driver and a long memory of Orpington man, meant road pricing was an unlikely 
policy for a leader famously dismissive of public transport. More fundamentally, 
road pricing clashed with the great Tory beliefs in individual freedom and low 
taxation, as without a wholesale prior dismantling of the existing motor taxation 
system—which the Treasury was not prepared to entertain—road pricing looked 
like additional expense on drivers, and any system that tracked the movement of 
citizens going about their daily business looked decidedly like a loss of liberty. As 
William Vickrey had said in 1959, it was always destined to be ‘politically 
unpalatable’ when framed in an economic discourse. It is perhaps not surprising, 
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then, that road pricing became one of the policy ideas that failed to gain traction in 
the 1960s and 1970s.  
 But transport is an area of politics that always evades simple 
categorizations, presenting a Janus face and reflecting multiple, competing, 
concerns which can only be teased out by considering a wide network of actors, 
ideas, technologies and politics. These multiple concerns were expressed in 1963 
in the Socialist Commentary report arguing for both planning and marketization of 
road space, and in the New Labour world of Tony Blair’s government, the 
manifestation of urban road pricing that finally emerged from over 80 years of 
discussion could be seen as social democratic or neoliberal, right-wing or left-
wing, an expression of markets, or of state planning, or of all these things. It was 
the moral dimension of the argument that had changed, in which congestion had 
been reframed from a market failure to an environmental evil, and free-flowing 
traffic framed as a social as well as an economic end. Whatever the origins of road 
pricing, or the journey it took, it was neither inevitable nor fixed in meaning. With 
a global focus on the environment, and local shifts in the politics of the markets 
and of London, a context emerged in the 1980s and 1990s which saw value in 
restricting car use and hypothecating charge revenues to public transport. This 
was the scheme Ken Livingstone introduced in 2003, but only because of that 
‘messy world of electoral politics, policy and government’. 
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Chapter 7. Scientists, Sensors and Surveillance 
 
Talgarth Road, Hammersmith, Spring 1967. Ministry of Transport engineers are 
installing vehicle queue detectors near each set of traffic lights in the area. Each 
installation comprises electronic control equipment in a box under the pavement 
connected to a pair of wire loops buried in the roadway. To reduce traffic delays, 
the engineers use 60-horsepower circular saws to cut the three-inch-deep slots 
needed to house the cables. Once the sensors are installed, the slots are re-sealed 
with hot asphalt and the crew moves onto the next installation.552 
 
 
Figure 47: Typical layout of vehicle queue detector equipment in West London Traffic 
Experiment, 1967 (Crown Copyright, Open Government License v3.0).553 
 
                                                 
552 R. Ham, ‘West London Area Scheme: Vehicle Queue Detection Using Inductive Loop 
Detectors’, Traffic Engineering & Control, March 1967, 671. 
553 Ibid., 670. 
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7.1 Introduction 
This chapter opens out the discourse of electronic networks touched on in the 
previous chapter, and widens the network of practitioners interested in the 
opportunities that electronic sensors and computers offered in measuring, 
understanding and controlling the traffic network (in the socio-technical sense that 
runs throughout this thesis). It explores a series of 1960s experiments in London 
and Glasgow on computer controlled networks of vehicle sensors, CCTV cameras 
and traffic lights running pattern-recognition software. This was the work of a 
range of practitioners including statisticians, modellers, computer programmers, 
systems analysts and electronic engineers, collectively termed ‘scientists’ to 
recognize an approach based on experimentation and the manipulation of data. 
This approach combined measurement (gathered by sensors and surveillance) 
with models (run on electronic computers) to simulate traffic problems as well as 
to respond to real situations on the ground. It thus embodied network ideas of 
traffic into and over the streets as well as in computer networks; traffic, in this 
characterization, was conceived more from the atomic level of the single vehicle 
upwards, than from the holistic planner’s top-down conception of aggregate 
flows. In 1971, the Times technology editor, Kenneth Owen, reported on the 
results of the experiments, describing a ‘computerized way out of the clogged 
streets’ in which advanced electronics, combined with developments in 
cybernetics, could offer new methods to control road traffic across cities. 
Automation on the streets of London was fast approaching, through a combination 
of technology and mathematics—all with the express intention of unclogging the 
traffic.554 As journalist Tony Aldous later put it, the traffic problem in London 
was being solved by ‘six computers and a room full of cathode ray tubes and 
policemen just off Victoria Street’.555  
                                                 
554 The Times, 7 May 1971, 24. 
555 New Scientist, 21 July 1977, 147. 
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 What did the computer offer to London’s traffic problem to enable it to 
become so central, so quickly, to the story of congestion? The answer came in the 
form of systems analysis—a mathematical approach to understanding and 
controlling a complex interacting network in its entirety. But it was also political. 
We have seen, time and again, a desire, in those who have sought to solve 
congestion, for control of the traffic over a wide area of London—a desire to look 
beyond the local and see London as a whole system which could be analysed, 
understood and controlled. Local schemes were all very well but the effect on the 
whole was never clearly understood, nor clearly enough under the control of a 
single body. The digital computer, connected to a network of sensors and 
cameras, appeared to offer both those facilities, and went on to grow profoundly 
over subsequent decades. This chapter will chart its growth and its relationship 
with cultures of control and surveillance in the capital. The first trial of the new 
technology was a prime London location: the London districts of Knightsbridge, 
Chelsea, South Kensington and Hammersmith, in a project known as the West 
London Traffic Experiment. 
7.2 The West London Traffic Experiment, 1963–68 
By the 1960s, it was generally held that London’s traffic had become dire.556 One 
Ministry of Transport official summarized the problems in a speech as follows: 
The remorseless growth of road traffic, the resulting overloading of urban road 
networks, the congestion, the frustrations and delays that result: all these effects 
are there in our cities for everyone to see. The cost of the delays to the 
community is enormous. The cost of new roads etc., and of comprehensive 
redevelopment to provide for extra traffic is so high, and imposes such strains on 
the civil engineering and building industries that in practice progress cannot keep 
pace with traffic growth. Then there is also the danger that wholesale rebuilding 
may destroy the essential character of our cities.557 
                                                 
556 See Gunn, ‘The Buchanan Report, Environment and the Problem of Traffic in 1960s Britain’; 
and Gunn, ‘Introduction to Traffic in Towns’. 
557 TNA: MT 111/64, ‘Area Traffic Control by Digital Computer’, draft of a speech by an 
unidentified Ministry of Transport official, n.d. but probably 1963–6. 
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What was the solution? The Ministry engineer continued as follows: 
In these circumstances it is essential to obtain the utmost efficiency from existing 
streets. Much can be done, of course, by traffic engineering measures—by one-
way streets, by banned turns, by waiting restrictions and so on but when all is 
done that reasonably can be done by such means we are still left with congestion 
and delay. One major source of delay which remains is delay at signal controlled 
junctions. 
The idea of getting more capacity from the existing road network—traffic 
management—had been given practical form in 1960 with the establishment by 
new transport minister Ernest Marples of the London Traffic Management Unit, 
following a study visit by him to the USA. Within months, a swathe of new 
projects was underway in the capital, including the Tottenham Court Road and 
Gower Street one-way network, the creation of box junctions, an increase in lane 
markings and traffic signs, and countless minor physical alterations to road widths 
and corners.558 Traffic management was a synthesis of earlier approaches that we 
have examined already, including traffic control, engineering and planning. But, 
as the Ministry of Transport official quoted above explained, one problem 
remaining to be solved was the flow of vehicles through junctions, and addressing 
delays at intersections in dense urban street networks demanded improvements in 
two areas: firstly, a better understanding of the way traffic flowed, and secondly, a 
better system of timing traffic signals to respond to changing traffic conditions.  
 Proposals for computer control of traffic signalling over a wide urban 
area—known as area traffic control—dated back as early as 1950, with the 
Institute of Transportation and Traffic Engineering in Los Angeles proposing a 
computerized traffic sensor network operating tidal flow lanes and signs showing 
optimum speeds. In 1954, the same group proposed an elaborate computer 
simulation of an area-wide signal network.559 Other ideas followed. Yet in the UK 
                                                 
558 J. M. Thomson, ‘The Value of Traffic Management’, Journal of Transport Economics and 
Policy 2, no. 1 (January 1968): 5; Buchanan et al., Transport Planning for Greater London, chap. 
9; Starkie, The Motorway Age, chap. 3. 
559 TNA: DSIR 12/92, ‘Control of Automotive Traffic on an Area Basis’, by D. L. Gerlough, 
Institute of Transportation and Traffic Engineering, Los Angeles, unpublished technical 
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it was the agitation of electronics and defence firms in 1960, keen to generate new 
business in Harold Macmillan’s lucrative spending market, which prompted the 
Ministry of Transport to examine the matter in detail, asking firms to submit 
proposals.560 Ernest Marples took particular interest in area traffic control and, in 
March 1961, promised to support research—one idea being for the government’s 
Road Research Laboratory (RRL) to ‘be given the Western Approaches to 
London on which to experiment’.561  
 It got its way. A panel was set up to investigate innovations in traffic 
control, as well as to propose a forward programme of research.562 Its July 1962 
report recommended a trial installation of new technologies and, in 1963, a 6.5-
square-mile area of west London, containing 100 sets of traffic lights, was 
selected for a £550,000 Ministry-of-Transport-led experiment in area traffic 
control.563 The aim was to bring traffic signals under computer control in three 
ways: firstly, by altering the timing of each signal according to traffic flow models 
responding to changing traffic patterns; secondly, by diverting traffic away from 
congested areas; and thirdly, to operate tidal flow lanes for morning and evening 
peaks.564 The west London area was chosen, it was said, as a ‘commuter corridor’ 
which included ‘some of the busiest roads in London servicing museums, concert 
halls, exhibitions, a football ground and major shopping centres and hotels as well 
                                                                                                                                     
memorandum, 1954, cited in ‘A Review of Developments in Area Traffic Control’, Road Research 
Laboratory, October 1961. 
560 TNA: DSIR 70/6, ‘Proposals for Research on Area Traffic Control’, Road Research 
Laboratory, October 1960; TNA: DSIR 12/92, ‘A Review of Developments in Area Traffic 
Control’, Road Research Laboratory, October 1961. 
561 TNA: DSIR 70/6, memorandum of interview, 20 March 1961. 
562 TNA: DSIR 12/185, ‘Road Research Board Panel on Area Traffic Control, Minutes of First 
Meeting’, 16 October 1961, and ‘Minutes of Second Meeting’, 13 December 1961; detailed 
reports informing and arising from the panel’s work are contained in TNA: DSIR 12/92, including 
descriptions of the worldwide state-of-the-art in traffic control technologies in 1961. 
563 TNA: DSIR 12/92, ‘Panel on Area Traffic Control, Report to the Board’, July 1962. 
564 TNA: MT 106/405, ‘Area Traffic Control in London’, minute, unidentified author, n.d. but 
probably 1966; TNA: MT 111/59, ‘West London Experiment Tenth Report to the Management 
Committee on Behalf of the Working Party’, June 1967. 
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as the main route to and from London Airport’, and the experiment involved ‘a 
configuration of data processing and traffic control equipment unique anywhere in 
the world’.565 Figure 48 shows the area covered. 
 
Figure 48: Main routes covered by West London Traffic Experiment showing some of the 
controlled traffic lights (Crown Copyright, Open Government License v3.0).566 
 Yet, in reality, it was chosen not because its roads were especially 
congested. The area lent itself to the trial because it was fairly close to the RRL 
site near Heathrow Airport; it had enough signals to allow extensive trials; it had 
limited numbers of roads in and out of the area; it had several main thoroughfares, 
enabling quick assessment of equipment; it had wide variation in traffic patterns; 
                                                 
565 TNA: MT 106/405, ‘An Experiment in Area Traffic Control in Glasgow’, RRL minute, May 
1965; TNA: MT 111/110, press release issued by Plessey, 17 November 1967. 
566 D. A. B. Williams, ‘Area Traffic Control in West London 1: Assessment of First Experiment’, 
Traffic Engineering & Control 11, no. 3 (July 1969): 125. 
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and, as the RRL put it, ‘traffic is relatively free in the area’, although it observed 
that intense congestion ‘will probably have to be tackled at a later stage’.567  
 The ultimate objective of area traffic control was to reduce the total 
journey time of all traffic passing through the area to a minimum. This would 
increase capacity on the road network, especially on through routes, and was 
partly designed in order to reduce the incidence of motorists using residential 
side-roads as rat-runs to avoid congestion. Co-ordination of traffic lights along a 
particular street was not new, as was shown in Chapter 5. Locally interlinked 
traffic light networks had been installed on London’s roads as far back as the 
1930s. But the rise, during and after the Second World War, of the electronic 
computer and developments in fields such as operations research and systems 
analysis, offered a new opportunity, namely to understand and shape the 
behaviour of traffic across a whole area. One Ministry of Transport engineer 
described the problem of locally interlinked traffic signals, each running to its 
own timing plan, as follows: 
In an area one route intersects with another, each requiring separate plans at 
different times of day to minimise the delay, and these routes again are crossed by 
further routes and so on, each intersecting with the other and forming a series of 
loops which make the problem of devising one total plan to minimise journey 
times extremely complex. It is in a situation such as this that the power and 
flexibility of a computer can be used to the full.568 
 The digital computer enabled a systems approach to traffic congestion, 
following earlier experiments with remote traffic control at isolated locations 
including Vauxhall Cross and the elevated section of the M4.569 Unlike the 
existing installations, the West London trial treated a wide area of London as a 
single system in which traffic flows in one area affected those elsewhere, and 
                                                 
567 TNA: DSIR 12/92, ‘Proposal for an Investigation into Area Traffic Control by Co-ordination of 
Traffic Signals’, Road Research Laboratory, February 1962. 
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made use of a network of vehicle detectors connected to the central computer. 
These sensors measured the volume of traffic in the system, the number of 
vehicles approaching each junction, traffic speed, the length of queues building 
up, and the presence of slow-moving or stationary traffic. Work began in 1964 
under the leadership of Ministry of Transport traffic engineer Brian Cobbe, who 
was given a new department to run in collaboration with the Greater London 
Council (GLC), RRL and Metropolitan Police. After tendering, lead contractors 
Plessey Automation and GEC were appointed to develop the hardware, but early 
Ministry plans to recruit in-house software and systems specialists from within the 
Civil Service foundered after a fruitless two-year search, which included 
advertisements in the national press. Instead, the entire project relied on a 
specialist programming team supplied by the Plessey company itself.570 After 
almost four years of field research, design, planning and construction, the West 
London Traffic Experiment went live on 22 January 1968. Inside its New 
Scotland Yard control room, staffed by police officers, Ministry of Transport 
operators (trained by Plessey specialists) and a computer manager, two Plessey 
XL9 computers sat ready to tune the lights: one to handle the second-by-second 
stream of incoming data and outgoing commands flowing through telephone lines 
to each intersection, and the other to use pattern recognition to select the best from 
a library of plans for different traffic situations.571 When Minister of State Stephen 
Swingler switched the computer on, 150 miles of streets came under computer 
control. 
7.3 Cybernetics on the streets of London 
The central computer was seemingly the most novel part of the experiment, and 
the traffic signals at each junction the most visible, but it was the vehicle sensor 
                                                 
570 PRO: TNA, MT 111/59, reports of the Working Party to the Management Committee, 1964–8. 
571 TNA: MT 111/110, press release issued by the Ministry of Transport, 22 January 1968; details 
of data transmission technologies in TNA: MT 111/64, ‘Traffic and Computer Control’, draft of an 
article for the Journal of the Institution of Highway Engineers, 1968. 
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network that was the most physically complex and costly part of the project, 
comprising the interconnection of 500 vehicle-sensing loops in the roadway—
some new, some from existing vehicle-activated traffic lights—with electronic 
control equipment in boxes under the pavement or on posts nearby.572 Altogether, 
20 miles of new cabling connected the sensors, control boxes, data out-stations 
and pedestrian controllers to the network.573 Figure 49 depicts a post-mounted 
installation. Figure 50 shows an installation for a footway box. 
 
Figure 49: Queue-detector equipment in a roadside post-mounted box (Crown Copyright, Open 
Government License v3.0).574 
                                                 
572 One of the earliest practical demonstrations of a computerized vehicle-sensing network was 
given by William Vickrey to the US Congress in 1959; see Vickrey, ‘Evidence’. 
573 TNA: MT 111/64, ‘West London’s Computer Traffic Control System’, draft of an article for an 
unidentified journal, n.d. This article offers substantial detail about the sensor network. 
574 R. Ham, ‘Area Traffic Control in West London 2: Vehicle Counting Detectors’, Traffic 
Engineering & Control 11, no. 4 (August 1969): 175. 
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Figure 50: Queue-detector equipment for housing in an underground footway box (GEC Road 
Signals Ltd).575 
Once installed, the experimental sensor system could detect the number of 
vehicles flowing through the west London road network in real time. This was not 
new; existing vehicle-actuated traffic lights had operated using pneumatic sensors 
for many years. But they could only detect freely moving vehicles. The new 
system went an important step further. Its sensors could detect the presence of 
stopped or sluggish traffic. Figure 51 shows the location of some of these sensors. 
This was a significant moment in the history of London traffic. For the first time, 
congestion could be sensed automatically, remotely, over a large area of the 
capital—and, moreover, it could cause its own reduction, in a cybernetic system 
of feedback and control.576 
                                                 
575 Ham, ‘West London Area Scheme: Vehicle Queue Detection Using Inductive Loop Detectors’, 
671. 
576 Ham, ‘Area Traffic Control in West London 2: Vehicle Counting Detectors’. 
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Figure 51: Location of queue detectors (black triangles) where traffic normally flowed freely 
(Crown Copyright, Open Government License v3.0).577  
 In reality, the west London experiment was (of course) a system with both 
human and non-human actors, and the central control room in New Scotland Yard 
was the location for human surveillance of the network. At its heart was a 
dynamic map display which normally showed an overview of the system—for 
instance showing the signals currently at green—but on which operators could 
call up the indication of any traffic light or vehicle sensor in the system at any 
time.578 Critical intersections could be called up on mimic panels, including a 
display of all the light phases available at that junction. Intersections could be 
switched to manual control directly from the control room, or placed under local 
controls operated by police officers at the scene. Alarms sounded when abnormal 
                                                 
577 Ibid., 172. 
578 V. E. Miller, ‘Area Control by Digital Computer’, Traffic Engineering & Control 5, no. 6 
(October 1963): 365. 
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situations developed—such as blockages owing to accidents—or if the computer 
did not recognize the pattern of traffic behaviour, and in such cases the computer 
made its best guess but could be overridden.579 Figure 52 shows the display. 
 
Figure 52: West London Traffic Experiment control room showing map and CCTV monitor 
screens (© Metropolitan Police Service, courtesy of the Metropolitan Police Heritage Centre).580 
 A critical element of the west London system was the inclusion of eight 
closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras mounted high above the streets at key 
intersections, enabling officers in the control room to observe the traffic on the 
streets below. Figure 53 shows an artist’s impression of the camera’s view of 
Knightsbridge junction.  
                                                 
579 TNA: MT 111/64, ‘West London’s Computer Traffic Control System’, draft of an article for an 
unidentified journal, n.d. 
580 Metropolitan Police Heritage Centre. 
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Figure 53: Artist’s impression of Knightsbridge junction, showing equipment boxes on right-hand 
traffic island, 1967 (© Illustrated London News Ltd).581 
A newsreel film shot as the system was being completed explained: 
The ‘traffic eyes’ will help to spot and sort out some of the tangles that often 
come close to completely choking the streets of the capital ... the high-mounted 
cameras can take in a large area, and the man at control sees at a glance exactly 
what’s happening, and quickly gets to grips with the overall problem ... If the 
                                                 
581 Illustrated London News, 10 June 1967, 23. 
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system is fully developed, it could prove a vital breakthrough to one of London’s 
biggest headaches.582 
We will return to the CCTV aspect of the project presently. 
 The west London experiment followed developments in several north 
American cities which, in the words of a 1968 Times editorial entitled ‘The 
Computer is Watching’, ‘tried to use the computer to break the bottlenecks as 
motorists pour on to the roads at peak hours’.583 But the UK incarnation was more 
complex, being described by one Ministry of Transport engineer as ‘probably the 
most advanced application of process control by computers which has yet been 
attempted’, and by another as ‘almost frightening in its complexity’, involving not 
just engineering but ‘planning and social issues’.584  Minister Swingler was at 
pains to point out the experimental nature of the west London scheme and the 
sophisticated system it was designed to assist. Observing that London had long 
had traffic lights that responded to vehicle levels, rather than the American system 
of fixed-time-cycle lights, he explained that the addition of computer control 
offered ‘less room for improvement, less slack to be taken up and the problem of 
achieving greater efficiency is that much harder’. He was managing the 
expectations of motorists and journalists, noting that: 
there are going to be no immediate, dramatic results ... we shall be learning as we 
go along ... we shall be checking the delays and journey times of vehicles 
travelling through the area and this information will be going into the computers 
for analysis.585  
Even preliminary findings would take months. 
                                                 
582 British Pathé, Closed Circuit TV for Traffic [film], 1967. 
583 The Times, 24 January 1968, 9. 
584 TNA: MT 111/60, ‘West London Experiment Management Committee: Report to Minister’, J. 
G. Smith, 19 July 1965; TNA: MT 111/64, ‘Traffic Control’, draft of a speech to the Institute of 
Transport by F. B. Green, November 1965. 
585 TNA: MT 111/110, press release issued by the Ministry of Transport, 22 January 1968. 
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 In part, the politicians were downplaying the potential of the scheme 
because they were still wedded to the reconstruction schemes explored in Chapter 
3; success with computerized traffic management would diminish the perceived 
need for new roads. But this was a genuinely new technological field of a hitherto 
unknown complexity. The key issue raised by the 1968 Times editorial concerned 
what the paper called the ‘social problem between the motorist and the traffic 
planner’, namely whether the human actors in the network would follow the rules 
or not. Four years previously, following area traffic control experiments in 
Toronto, the newspaper had described a future in which the computer was a ‘road 
“overlord” ... squatting in a central office’ where it would ‘rule the cars by altering 
traffic light sequences, and directing traffic down side streets when jams begin to 
build up’.586 The west London scheme’s head, Brian Cobbe, stated that ‘as long as 
motorists obey the traffic lights, the computer will do the rest. The system’s 
success depends on obedience, laced with common sense’.587 
 But for Swingler, there was no issue: the cameras and sensors were merely 
extensions of the human system already established to control London’s streets. 
‘Computers are not robots and they need the human touch’, he remarked. 
‘Essentially it is the police and the traffic engineers in the control room and the 
police on the ground in West London who will provide this’.588 A spokesman for 
Elliott Automation, a traffic control equipment manufacturer, had explained that 
computers could ‘never perform calculations beyond the capacity of a small 
child’, but could perform them very quickly, concluding that ‘the computer is a 
moron, but a very high speed moron at that’.589 But the cybernetic computerized 
system was far more than merely a high-speed calculator. It represented a 
                                                 
586 The Times, 6 May 1964, 11. On the Toronto system, see TNA: MT 106/405, ‘Toronto’s Digital 
Computer Controlled Signal System’, Bureau of Public Roads, 8 April 1965. 
587 The Times, 13 January 1967, 10. 
588 TNA: MT 111/110, press release issued by the Ministry of Transport, 22 January 1968. 
589 TNA: MT 111/45, ‘Planning and Control of Systems for Road and Rail Traffic’, symposium 
paper, H. A. Codd, Elliott Traffic Automation, 5 November 1963. 
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fundamental shift towards a world view in which vehicles could be reduced to 
computer bits and traffic reduced to probabilities—with a concomitant shift in the 
location of congestion. It was leaving the streets and moving to the humming 
computers at New Scotland Yard. We shall now turn to the modelling and 
simulation of congestion. 
7.4 Modelling and simulating congestion 
The technologies and practices required to enable large-scale modelling and 
simulation of traffic in networks such as London was not available until the 1950s 
with programmable computers, operations research and systems analysis. Linked 
to this were ideas about mathematically modelling cities in general which 
emerged from the schools of urban planning and geography. Together, this 
combination of high-speed digital computation, systems analysis, post-war urban 
planning and the quantitative turn towards spatiality in geography nurtured a 
culture of positivist modelling in which cities could be reduced to idealized 
models, vehicles to atomistic computer digits, and the decisions of road-users to 
statistical probabilities. The 1960s thus saw a huge increase in research into the 
science and mathematics of traffic, one 1964 bibliography comprising over 1,000 
papers relating to the topic.590 
 A typical example came in 1961, when the traffic statistician Reuben 
Smeed, Deputy Director of the Road Research Laboratory who was by then 
getting involved with road pricing as discussed in Chapter 6, published a 
mathematical model of a theoretical town in a bid to understand the space 
requirements of its ideal road system. He introduced it as follows: 
It will be supposed that the town is circular and symmetrical about the centre. All 
the N workers work within a radius r of the town centre and live between circles 
of radii r and R. Except in the space required for roads, the work places are 
uniformly distributed in the central part of the town, within the radius r and their 
                                                 
590 Frank Haight, ‘Annotated Bibliography of Scientific Research in Road Traffic and Safety’, 
Operations Research 12, no. 6 (1964): 976–1039. 
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houses are uniformly distributed over the rest of the town between the circles 
radii r and R. In his journey to work, the worker travels along the straight line 
from his home to the town centre until he reaches radius r. He then travels 
directly towards the place at which he works, the position of which is not 
correlated with the place at which he lives or with the point at which he reaches 
the outer part of the town centre.591 
After 36 pages of mathematical calculations, one of Smeed’s conclusions was that 
‘in cases where the central area is concentrated, and the numbers of persons large, 
it would not be possible to enable every person to travel to work by car unless 
roads were built on top of one another’.592 Of course, Smeed was aware that the 
assumptions in his model did not apply to a real town, but he concluded that it 
was useful enough to meet his aim of calculating road space requirements of 
different forms of transport. ‘Congestion’, he exclaimed, ‘is rife during large 
portions of the day in many urban areas. Road traffic is reduced to a crawl, 
passengers crowd into trains until no more can be packed in. The urban areas 
themselves are becoming larger and larger’.593 He simply wanted to offer a 
comprehensive quantitative analysis of the problem, and continued to work on the 
problem throughout the 1960s.594 
 Much has been written about computer urban modelling in this period, 
often focusing on combined land-use–transport models such as Ira Lowry’s 1964 
model of Pittsburgh, USA, which sought to understand the spatial generators and 
attractors of vehicle journeys in cities as part of the urban planning process.595 In 
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fact, it was early successes in computerized traffic models in the 1950s which led 
to large-scale modelling of the urban environment, as Lowry himself 
acknowledged in his study.596 As Michael Batty put it, ‘the idea of urban planning 
as “architecture-writ-large” waned, as systems, models and computers became the 
fashion’ in the 1950s and 60s.597 Theirs was not the only world view, however; 
the reductionist approach of the modellers attracted early and trenchant criticism 
from social theorists such as David Harvey and Andrew Sayer who, in different 
ways, questioned the entire basis of abstracted modelling and its assumptions of 
efficiency.598 Yet, however worthwhile its practice, traffic simulation and 
modelling represented a paradigm shift of thinking in this period.599 
 An early example of simulating traffic using a digital computer was Daniel 
Gerlough’s 1955 doctoral thesis at the University of California.600 The popular 
science periodical Science News Letter was captivated by the possibilities of 
Gerlough’s model, exclaiming ‘Electronic “Brain” Can Solve Traffic Problems’ 
before going on to describe ‘a miniature highway intersection simulated inside the 
metallic guts of an electronic computer’ which was to study traffic flow at 
highway junctions. By today’s standards it was rudimentary, as the following 
description made clear: 
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Electrical impulses, each representing a car, are ‘stopped’, make right and left 
turns, obey ‘traffic signals’ and watch out for ‘pedestrians’ and ‘other cars’ in the 
maze of circuits ... Such electronic ‘brains’ could help designers find the most 
efficient pattern for a specific intersection and perhaps show ways to improve 
traffic conditions at present highway junctions.601 
Gerlough’s work in the USA was just pre-dated by research carried out at the 
UK’s RRL, first on an electro-mechanical computer and then on Alan Turing’s 
Pilot ACE computer at the National Physical Laboratory, which simulated a four-
way junction at six times life-speed.602 Both simulations were limited, however, 
by a focus on a single intersection rather than a network of roads. However, this 
computer simulation work was taking place alongside research into the statistical 
mathematics of congestion and queuing, which meant that the methodology was 
ready as soon as the hardware speed caught up (which happened rapidly in the 
1950s).603 By the early 1960s, as the west London experiment was being 
established, work on computer simulation of complex multi-lane urban road 
networks was being routinely carried out, such as the 19-road, four-lane network 
depicted in Figure 54 which comprised nine intersections (based on a real layout 
in Manchester) and was modelled on a Mercury computer at Manchester 
University in 1962.604 The following year, Daniel Gerlough published details of a 
simulation of 80 intersections and 217 road links.605 
                                                 
601 Science News Letter, 19 February 1955, 120. 
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Figure 54: Multiple-road traffic network in Manchester simulated by computer in 1962 (Courtesy 
of the Institution of Civil Engineers).606 
 What was at stake here was not simply a better understanding of traffic in 
cities. Through mathematical models and computer simulation, the systems 
analysts were creating virtual cities, withdrawing into a world in which 
experimentation could take place far from the dirt and politics of the real streets. 
They were also creating a scientific discourse of traffic. An IBM analyst explained 
the role of simulation as a means of representation as follows: 
Airline pilots receive training and experience through simulated flights without 
actually flying the real aeroplanes ... simulation is like experimentation which is a 
primary tool of chemistry, physics and other sciences. In the study of vehicular 
traffic, however, experimentation is not always possible. There are too many 
variables to allow experimental study under a rigorously controlled environment 
without enormous expenditure and unbearable inconvenience to the motoring 
public ... The experience and knowledge gained from simulation studies can be 
                                                                                                                                     
Symposium on Theory of Road Traffic, sponsored by the Road Research Laboratory, 25–27 June 
1963. 
606 Grimsdale, Mathers, and Sumner, An Investigation of Computer Controlled Traffic Signals 
(O.C. 6645), 2a. 
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used to construct more sophisticated mathematical models and control strategies, 
which in turn provide a better simulation.607 
 The west London scheme did not incorporate the latest in modelling and 
simulation. It was a scheme in which the computer responded to real traffic by 
selecting from a library of timing plans written by traffic engineers. It was 
strongly driven by political concerns and a requirement to unclog the capital’s real 
streets as quickly as possible as part of Marples’s London traffic management 
project. Yet, given this backdrop of over a decade of academic research into 
mathematical modelling and computer simulation, it is not surprising that the 
mathematicians, programmers and systems analysts wanted to go further in 
distancing the computer from the human world—they wanted to experiment, but 
politics dictated that London was not the place to do so. But far away from 
Marples and the controlling hand of the Ministry of Transport, the RRL had a 
second project.  
7.5 Glasgow, the digital city 
In Glasgow, the RRL began a series of experiments in November 1967 in which 
computer simulations of traffic flowing around the central area under five 
different mathematical models were compared with reality in an elaborate 
computerized network of lights, sensors and controllers.608 If west London was 
primarily about rapid calculation, using a computer in a quick empirical trial, 
Glasgow was about experimentation: abstract congestion in an idealized city.609 In 
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the Scottish installation, 80 traffic signals covering one square mile of the city 
were brought under computer control, compared with west London’s 100 signals 
in 6.5 square miles.610 Figure 55 shows the Marconi Myriad computer and its 
operators in the Glasgow control centre on the Broomielaw quayside. 
 
Figure 55: Glasgow experiment computer control room, c.1968 (Crown Copyright, Open 
Government License v3.0).611 
 Why was Glasgow chosen for this elaborate series of experiments? One 
reason, as has already been suggested, was that it was far away from Westminster 
politics. The RRL wanted a test-bed and time to carry out extensive tests, and 
internal departmental correspondence shows that the transport ministry cared little 
for any experiment outside London; it was happy to let Glasgow go ahead so long 
as progress on west London was not jeopardized.612 But another reason was that 
Glasgow had particular characteristics that suited the RRL’s requirements. Its City 
Corporation had expressed enthusiasm in experimenting with area traffic control. 
The RRL’s Scottish Branch was nearby. And the city centre was compact with a 
high density of traffic lights. These were the reasons given publicly for its 
                                                                                                                                     
LMA): LMA/GLC/TD/T/08/001, ‘A System for the Monitoring and Control of Road Traffic’, 
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selection.613 But there were two further characteristics of Glasgow’s road network 
that are significant in this study of London’s traffic problem.  
 
Figure 56: Network of traffic signals in Glasgow controlled by computer, 1968 (Crown Copyright, 
Open Government License v3.0).614 
 The first was its layout which, as Figure 56 shows, takes a grid form. We 
have seen in Chapter 4 how engineer Charles Bressey wanted to overlay a 
concrete grid over the existing streets, and in Chapter 5 how traffic commissioner 
Alker Tripp sought to impose grid-like behaviour onto London’s unruly street 
pattern using segregation. For the RRL, 1960s Glasgow seemed to offer a real 
grid network on which to experiment—a layout that could readily be modelled 
using the computer technology of the day. Yet, as with London, Glasgow refused 
to conform to classical grid behaviour despite its similarities with city centres 
such as Chicago and New York. RRL statistician Joyce Holroyd noted in 1971: 
It has sometimes been suggested that the results obtained in Glasgow owe 
something to the particularly “grid-iron” nature of the street layout ... This is not 
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believed to have been a significant factor because steep hills in some parts of the 
city effectively prevent major through movements.615  
Grid historian Hannah Higgins has asserted that the street patterns of New York 
and Chicago were ‘not responsive to unique functions and features of the 
landscape’.616 That might be true but, in Glasgow at least, the landscape certainly 
made its presence felt as vehicles laboured up Douglas Street (see Figure 57) or 
took detours around North Portland Street to avoid the treacherous gradients.  
  
Figure 57: Douglas Street, Glasgow, March 2016 (David Rooney). 
 In part, Holroyd’s comments were an attempt to play down Glasgow’s 
uniqueness, as the RRL intended to export its models, systems and expertise to 
cities around the world. But they must also remind us that, where traffic is 
concerned, cities are experienced as much in elevation as in plan; and, more 
generally, they must be seen as an admission that specific local conditions will 
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always shape the adoption and operation of global or idealized models. Ideas 
travel, but are modified. 
 The second characteristic of Glasgow’s road network which shines light 
onto its selection as an RRL experimental site is the wider context of planning in 
the city. Here we have further evidence of tension between the Abercrombie-era 
planning approach discussed in Chapter 3, with its brutal segregated concrete 
urban rings and arteries, and a new systems approach based on efficiency, models 
and flow—in effect, seeing the city as an analogue for a piece of computer 
software. For Glasgow in the 1960s was one of the sites where the brutalist 
approach was most advanced and, for some, becoming most contested.  
 Simon Gunn has observed that, in the 1950s, ‘in cities like Birmingham 
and Glasgow urban motorways were seen as markers of civic ambition’ but that 
the period was ‘marked by a deep duality that was to colour both political and 
popular responses to automobility throughout the 1960s’.617 Proposals for urban 
motorways across the city originated in principle in the 1945 Bruce Report, and 
the Abercrombie Report the following year.618 From 1960 onwards, these ideas 
matured into firm plans for a 48-mile city-wide network of motorways, published 
and approved in 1963, with construction of the first phase—today’s M8 which 
encircles the city centre—starting in November 1965 and being completed two-
and-a-half years later.619 By 1967, therefore, as the RRL statisticians were setting 
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up their computer control room on Glasgow’s quayside, a few blocks away the 
city was in the process of being torn apart by diggers and road-building 
machinery, and concerns over the pro-urban-motorway paradigm were beginning 
to accelerate rapidly as environmental politics was gaining a voice.620 One of the 
experiment’s engineers remarked that ‘At present the rate of increase in road 
traffic is far greater than the rate at which roads are built to handle it’.621 
Government ministers and transport specialists were sensing a shift in the mood of 
the populace away from the brutal approach of Abercrombie, as the diggers 
advanced, and, perhaps unwittingly, the RRL picked a city that was to become a 
symbolic location of the tension between roads and environment.  
 This tension was all the more marked when one learns that digital 
computers had been in use since the early 1960s to model traffic along Glasgow’s 
streets—but, unlike the RRL programmers trying to squeeze more capacity from 
the existing streets, these early programmes were written by consultants working 
on the city’s motorway programme to model predicted flows on the new 
network.622 The new electronic networks offered digital futures, but those futures 
remained ambivalent: they could support or dismantle Abercrombie’s dream. 
Whichever side of the road-building debate they sat, the programmers and 
statisticians agreed on one conclusion: that ‘we are entering a period where the 
digital computer will become a tool of major importance in relieving congestion 
and delays in the cities of today and tomorrow’.623 Furthermore—in a plotline 
anticipating the film WarGames by some 15 years—they envisaged a time when 
the computer could learn from its surroundings and adapt its behaviour according 
to experience.  
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 The politicians agreed—early indications from west London and Glasgow 
were that the computerized signals were indeed reducing congestion and 
increasing journey speed. All the signs pointed towards a more ambitious 
experiment, bringing together simulation, machine-learning and the politics of 
London’s government. As early as 1966, even before the west London and 
Glasgow experiments went live, plans began to be put in place to extend area 
traffic control across London using new computers in an ambitious £3.75-million 
programme.624 Together, the west London and Glasgow experiments were to feed 
directly into a scheme called ‘CITRAC’, London’s first city-wide traffic control 
system, which began to be installed in 1968. This time, though, the nascent GLC 
was in the driving seat. 
7.6 CITRAC and the remodelling of London, 1968–78 
In the decade following the launch of the West London Traffic Experiment in 
1968, area traffic control grew like Topsy across the capital, in a project that 
became known as CITRAC—Central Integrated Traffic Control. It began formally 
in December 1968, when approval was given by the GLC to bring 300 traffic 
signals in London’s West End district under computer control. This phase—as 
well as 40 signals in the City of London—went live in 1972, and was housed in 
the existing control room at New Scotland Yard along with new computer 
graphics facilities to supplement the wall map. The following year, a new 
CITRAC Centre was established in the building, incorporating a new Police 
Operations Room staffed by police officers (replacing the old West London 
facility, which moved to the new suite), a Computer Suite staffed by GLC staff, a 
Fault Control Room also staffed by GLC engineers, and a suite of offices for 
supervisors, systems analysts and programmers.  
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Figure 58: Areas covered by West London Traffic Experiment and different phases of the 
CITRAC scheme, c.1977 (© Metropolitan Police Service, courtesy of the Metropolitan Police 
Heritage Centre).625 
 In 1974, a further 150 sets of traffic lights were incorporated into CITRAC 
covering the area encircling the west end. Two years later, work towards 
incorporating 500 more lights into the scheme was underway and the ultimate 
system of 1,000 traffic lights over 246 square miles of London was completed by 
about 1978. Figure 58 shows a diagram of the area. Three Siemens 306 digital 
computers, plus a Marconi Myriad II, had joined the original two Plessey XL9s at 
New Scotland Yard.626 Figure 59 depicts the central area CITRAC console. 
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Figure 59: CITRAC control console, New Scotland Yard, 1980s (© Metropolitan Police Service, 
courtesy of the Metropolitan Police Heritage Centre).627 
 CITRAC combined elements of both the west London experiment, which 
tested technologies of vehicle sensing and rapid computerized calculation, and the 
Glasgow city-wide scheme, in which mathematical traffic models were simulated 
in the computer before being tested on the real-life streets.628 In CITRAC, 
Glasgow-style computer models were dreamt up by GLC analysts before being 
tried on London’s traffic, meaning that congestion-management strategies could 
change in real time with shifting traffic policies. This was a significant 
development. CITRAC had been born in the 1960s world of the GLC’s Ringways. 
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This was a world of capacity expansion, so CITRAC’s original models were 
designed to increase traffic capacity on the new and existing roads—to speed the 
flow. These included an RRL model tested in Glasgow known as ‘TRANSYT’, 
which attempted to create free-flowing traffic whatever the class of vehicle.629 
But, by 1974, as we have seen, road-building in London was all but off the 
political map, replaced by a new politics of public transport and traffic restraint. 
In this new policy world, another RRL model known as ‘Bus TRANSYT’, which 
gave more green signal time to public transport at the expense of the private 
motorist, made more political sense, so the system was switched over to the 
revised model.630  
 But CITRAC could do more than simply usher a few more buses through 
each green phase. As well as attempting to smooth traffic flow, it could literally 
move congestion from one place to another. Its sensors could detect queues 
forming on bus routes and switch the signal timings in order to shift the queues 
onto what the police euphemistically termed ‘storage space’—in reality, 
commuter routes such as the Westway which carried no buses. Furthermore, 
policies to limit the number of private vehicles entering central London were 
enacted live on the streets by creating real-time ‘restraint cordons’, signalling 
incoming traffic onto orbital routes when traffic levels rose. A police report noted 
the power of the electronic system over the traditional approach of physical 
intervention as follows: 
The accommodation of queues and blocking of ‘rat-runs’ is obviously a difficult 
environmental and planning matter. The advantage of introducing the restraint by 
signals would be that it could be controlled to suit traffic conditions and could be 
made automatically regulating by means of detectors.631 
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(Crowthorne, Berkshire: Transport and Road Research Laboratory, 1977). 
631 TNA: MEPO 2/10898, ‘GLC Traffic Restraint Policy—Effect Upon Area Traffic Control’, 
internal Metropolitan Police minute, 1 April 1974. 
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By the re-programming of its models, CITRAC could enact new government 
policies overnight. If transport policy changed back from restraint to expansion, 
CITRAC could make the adjustments simply by loading in the old TRANSYT 
tape during the nightly update. The systems analysts could do what no urban 
planners—from Wren onwards—had ever succeeded in doing. They could 
reshape London’s streets, automatically, second-by-second. The computer 
overlord, with its eyes in the sky and its electronic sensors under the streets, was 
solving the capital’s chronic congestion problem without flattening cherished 
buildings. But it was not just traffic policy that CITRAC could help implement. It 
was easy to believe that the system was truly automatic—a mechanism for liberal 
democracies to exert benign control. But what was the system really keeping an 
eye on? Who was being watched, and why? In particular, in an automatic system 
of sensors and simulations, why was the control room staffed by Metropolitan 
Police officers, while the systems owners, the GLC, were relegated to a back 
room? If congestion was a pathological form of disordered streets, we will now 
conclude by examining the place of CITRAC in public order. 
7.7 Surveillance and the creation of ordered streets 
We have seen that the West London Traffic Experiment, which went live in 
January 1968, included eight CCTV cameras offering visual surveillance of 
critical traffic junctions. But that was nothing compared with CITRAC that 
followed it. By the time of its completion in the late 1970s, the city-wide scheme 
had augmented that modest number of cameras by a further 150—all monitored in 
the police control room with facilities to pan, tilt and zoom the cameras. For the 
first time, the whole of Greater London’s main road network was under the 
remote gaze of the traffic police, who had recognized that central control would 
enhance their presence on the streets. A police briefing on the CITRAC system 
under construction in 1974 explained the situation as follows: 
In addition to all the sophisticated equipment provided by the project, Area 
Traffic Control Room staff have direct tactical control of police resources in the 
street. This ensures that all incidents can be dealt with speedily and efficiently—
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either by operations room staff alone in some instances, or combined with traffic 
patrol units in the street when necessary.632 
But it was not just the traffic cops who could see through the eyes of CITRAC. By 
examining the rhetoric of congestion, we can see a significant relationship 
between traffic and the rise of public-area CCTV surveillance in Britain’s towns 
and cities. To do so, we need to track two parallel debates, namely traffic and 
public order, and the ways they have intersected with each other. 
 The management committee of the west London trial commented in 
September 1968, after nine months of the scheme’s operation, that there had been 
‘a few “Big Brother” comments about the closed-circuit television’.633 In fact, 
British police forces had begun experimenting with CCTV cameras for traffic 
congestion reduction as early as 1956, with a small experiment in the northern 
cathedral city of Durham. After that, a series of CCTV experiments for public-
order purposes was carried out by the Metropolitan Police in London starting in 
1960, as we shall see presently. Following these early experiments—and at the 
same time that CITRAC was being installed by the GLC—the Metropolitan 
Police went on to install its own dedicated CCTV network across London to 
provide surveillance of political demonstrations and other street activity. But, 
crucially, these public-order cameras were presented in public as part of the 
CITRAC traffic scheme.  
 Most writers have dated the introduction of public-area CCTV in the UK 
to the 1980s, in a context of Tory policies to address fear of crime.634 However, 
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Chris Williams has correctly shifted that date some 15 years earlier, examining 
the installation of the technology by UK police forces in the 1960s in the context 
of centralized information-gathering and concerns over public disorder, calling 
partly on the work of Sarah Manwaring-White, who reported on Metropolitan 
Police activity in the 1960s (including CITRAC) as early as 1983.635 Writers for 
the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science described police use of the 
CITRAC system in 1985 but without dating it to the 1960s.636 We have already 
seen that electronics manufacturers were lobbying government departments in 
1960 for area traffic control experiments, and Williams notes that at the same 
time, they were also promoting CCTV installations to the Metropolitan Police, 
which held an internal exhibition of the technologies. The overt context was 
traffic control, but this was a Trojan horse, as the original police files betray. One 
police superintendent who examined the exhibits made the following 
observations: 
Traffic problems near the House of Commons, Trafalgar Square and Hyde Park 
are well nigh a permanent feature today. To relieve the congestion with its 
resultant saving in man-power, I consider that a constructive step to improvement 
would be the introduction of TV Closed Circuit system in these areas ... The 
cameras could be suitably disguised, where necessary ... The value of this system 
where political meetings break out in disorder would prove of immense value and 
enable reserves to be despatched to the exact seat of the trouble with a minimum 
of delay.637 
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Another superintendent who attended the exhibition made similar comments: 
I was very impressed with the closed circuit television demonstration ... It was 
portable, reasonably small, and easily concealed, and for difficult observation 
purposes, particularly in the CID field, has I feel considerable possibilities. It 
could also have a useful application in the control of difficult traffic junctions and 
where extensive road works are being undertaken.638 
 Following the exhibition, two trials were held in Trafalgar Square that year 
using equipment lent by the manufacturer EMI. The first monitored the July state 
visit of the Thai royal family (widely reported in the national press as a traffic-
control experiment), with the second observing crowds on Guy Fawke’s night.639 
Figure 60 shows one of the cameras monitoring the royal visit, described by the 
EMI press office as ‘believed to be the first time that closed-circuit equipment has 
been used for such a purpose in this country’.640 The technical quality of the 
pictures was disappointing, however, and it took five years until another trial took 
place, this time to combat theft at Hatton Garden and Ruislip.641  
                                                 
638 TNA: MEPO 2/9956, report by Superintendent Lacey, 1960 (emphasis added). 
639 Williams, ‘Police Surveillance and the Emergence of CCTV in the 1960s’, 13–14; for the press 
reaction to the royal visit, see clippings from the Daily Telegraph, the Evening Standard and The 
Star in TNA: MEPO 2/9956. 
640 TNA: MEPO 2/9956, picture caption, July 1960. 
641 Williams, ‘Police Surveillance and the Emergence of CCTV in the 1960s’, 15. 
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Figure 60: CCTV camera installed to monitor crowds and traffic during Thai royal family visit, 
July 1960 (EMI Electronics Ltd).642 
 A further police experiment in 1965 saw cameras monitoring traffic at two 
busy junctions in London’s Clerkenwell as part of Birmingham University 
research into traffic control technologies, and a similar installation was erected on 
Hammersmith Bridge to operate a tidal flow system, part of congestion-reduction 
measures on the nearby Hammersmith gyratory system. CCTV cameras were 
already assisting police on the M6 motorway and the new M4 London section was 
being similarly fitted out. At this time, though, cameras for crime prevention were 
not gaining support, partly owing to technical limitations in low light revealed by 
the Trafalgar Square and Hatton Garden trials.643  
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643 TNA: MEPO 2/9956, report by Metropolitan Police Research and Planning branch on CCTV, 
16 March 1965. 
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 However, a breakthrough in the public order debate came in 1968. The 
previous year, the Metropolitan Police had set up a temporary four-camera CCTV 
installation in Croydon to help detect crime. Originally, the cameras were to be 
relocated to Chelsea for further trial, but this plan was abandoned in summer 1968 
following widespread disorder at an anti-Vietnam march in London in a year of 
escalating political protest and tension worldwide. With a further demonstration 
due in Grosvenor Square that October, police made plans to reinstall the Croydon 
cameras to cover the route of the march.644 This 1968 experiment was the first to 
be widely seen by the police as a public-order success, and three of the cameras 
were made permanent, joined by the erection of two more the following year to 
cover demonstrations by groups as diverse as Vietnam protestors, Irish 
republicans, Ulster solidarity campaigners, Communists, anti-apartheid protestors, 
and the Universal Coloured Peoples and Arabs Association.645 Williams has 
described this 1968/9 five-camera police CCTV network, covering the heart of 
government in Whitehall and Parliament, as ‘the first permanent surveillance 
system’ in London.646 However, he has not noted the eight permanent cameras of 
the West London experiment, which were operational in the Scotland Yard 
control room by January 1968, nor the ambitious CITRAC plans in place for so 
many more cameras to be installed through the 1970s. Was there no connection 
between the CITRAC cameras and the public-order installations? 
 By 1970, following the apparent success of remote surveillance in policing 
the political demonstrations of the late 1960s, CCTV was seen by the police as a 
highly desirable public order and surveillance tool. The force’s commissioner, Sir 
John Waldron, had decided he wanted ‘much wider coverage of street locations’, 
and plans for additional permanent CCTV cameras at Hyde Park Corner, Oxford 
Circus and Piccadilly Circus were well advanced. Police attention then turned to 
                                                 
644 Williams, ‘Police Surveillance and the Emergence of CCTV in the 1960s’, 16. 
645 TNA: MEPO 25/7, list of forthcoming events requiring CCTV coverage by police, May 1969. 
646 Williams, ‘Police Surveillance and the Emergence of CCTV in the 1960s’, 17. 
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the eight cameras in the west London experiment, previously seen as purely a 
traffic control tool. Now that CCTV for public order had become a priority (that 
use itself having developed from traffic control), the west London traffic cameras 
took on a new use in general public surveillance, as the police started monitoring 
the camera feeds in their Operations Room the same year. The force’s CCTV 
network for public surveillance therefore doubled in size overnight. What was 
more, 1970 saw the CITRAC plans starting to be noticed outside the traffic 
branch, too. For the first time, senior officers observed that the GLC scheme’s 
first phase would soon add 45 CCTV cameras to the streets of the West End, 
vastly greater than the number being planned under the ‘official’ public-order 
scheme.647  
 From 1971 onwards, the two schemes became intertwined. Plans were 
made with the GLC for the CITRAC cameras to be routinely available for public-
order use once installed, and the public-order cameras being installed by the 
Metropolitan Police themselves were made available to the traffic control room in 
a reciprocal arrangement.648 By 1975, the CITRAC cameras were beginning to 
come on line—just fourteen at first—but dozens more soon followed and by 1979 
the entire scheme of some 150 cameras was complete and available to the public 
order division as well as the traffic cops.649  
 If the traffic and public-order discourses and camera networks intersected 
with each other behind the closed doors of New Scotland Yard and the GLC’s 
County Hall, a similar obfuscation took place in public. Cameras within the traffic 
field had been well-known since 1967, with Pathé newsreel films making clear 
that the streets were coming under the gaze of the eye in the sky, but The Times 
offered a cautionary narrative, noting the ability of the cameras to pick out 
                                                 
647 TNA: MEPO 25/7, notes of a meeting about CCTV, 9 June 1970. 
648 TNA: MEPO 25/7, notes of a meeting about CCTV, 23 June 1971; note on Area Traffic 
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number plates and the drivers’ faces with their telephoto lenses, advising that ‘in 
west London, Big Brother may soon be watching you’.650 This manifestation of 
CCTV was certainly pretty hard to miss, and the muted public reaction to the west 
London cameras—few commentators appeared to pick up the Times line on Big 
Brother—gave the police confidence to increase their scope to public order three 
years later. Traffic became a fig-leaf. In a Times editorial in 1973, a police 
spokesman stated that the public-order cameras in Whitehall and Grosvenor 
Square—set up for the 1968 Vietnam protests—were in fact part of the CITRAC 
traffic scheme, a claim hotly denied by property-holders whose buildings housed 
the cameras.651 However, by 1979, this fiction had gone away. The CITRAC 
network was complete, parallel working between the public order and traffic 
functions was routine, and the ‘TV eye’ was well-known to the public for both its 
purposes.652  
 Traffic congestion had helped create a culture of remote surveillance that 
found new value in late-1960s fears of civil disorder. Congestion was the 
mechanism by which police control of political demonstrations transitioned from 
boots on the ground to the eye in the sky. This offers us a different route into the 
CCTV story of surveillance and crime-reduction with which we are familiar: in 
the new reading the cameras were domesticated by their use in the benign social 
good of reducing congestion. But the cameras also played a crucial role in our 
wider account of electronics and sensor networks offering an alternative future for 
urban traffic—an alternative to the physical brutalism of planning. Alongside the 
loops in the road and the statistical models stored in the computer, the cameras 
demonstrated that cities could be modern and decongested without the cost and 
dislocation of destruction and construction. Area traffic control created new space 
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for vehicles; the price was a requirement for all of us to submit to remote control, 
to accept remote surveillance, and to become statistics in the algorithms. 
7.8 Conclusions 
In the sixties heist movie The Italian Job, Turin is brought to a standstill by Benny 
Hill’s ‘Professor Peach’, who knocks out the CCTV network and loads a new 
program into the computer controlling the city’s traffic light network. Michael 
Caine’s ‘Charlie Croker’ moves in to capture four million dollars from a bullion 
van caught up in the gridlock. ‘Just think of it’, he had mused as the plan was 
formed. ‘A city in chaos. A smash-and-grab raid. And four million dollars through 
a traffic jam’.653  
 Writer Troy Kennedy Martin had bought the film’s plotline from his 
brother, Ian, who had sold a London-based version to the BBC for a television 
play entitled ‘Ritual for the Steal’, which was never made.654 Ian later recalled: 
Computerised traffic lights had just come into central London, so I put ... the big 
robbery ... in central London, with green lights all the way out and creating traffic 
jams. I think the BBC felt that this would be too expensive to do, you know it 
was just ludicrously expensive to try and do this in London. So Troy bought 
these, it was two plays actually, and turned them into The Italian Job.655  
The plot for one of the most iconic British films of modern times had come 
directly from the west London and CITRAC traffic-light schemes—and the film 
was almost set in London. Computer control had reached cult status. 
 This chapter has examined an approach to traffic which appeared to offer a 
digital future more in harmony with public concern than the future offered by the 
post-war planners, with their brutally interventive road-building. This was a new 
                                                 
653 Paramount Pictures, The Italian Job [film], 1969. Thanks to Mark Swenarton for raising the 
significance of the film’s plotline. 
654 Lez Cooke, Troy Kennedy Martin (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 12. 
655 Ian Kennedy Martin, interviewed on 19 March 2004, in ibid., 45–6. 
7. SCIENTISTS, SENSORS AND SURVEILLANCE  265 
 
 
 
way of thinking in which traffic was a system that could be controlled if it could 
be expressed in a mathematical model. Congestion was treated as a normal state 
which simply needed to be characterized in the algorithm. It existed inside the 
computer and could be reduced by the computer, rather than by concrete and 
construction. Unlike the civil engineers discussed in Chapter 4, these traffic 
specialists were not seeking super-efficiency, but simply least-worst delays. They 
wanted to usher a few more vehicles through each green phase in order to keep the 
diggers at bay. And if the diggers came, they were happy to offer their modelling 
skills to the about-to-be-built roads too. They were happiest working with virtual 
roads, but they were not divorced from the real world. They knew their models 
were complicated by hills and punctures and equipment failures. And they knew 
their models were political. 
 The 1960s catalysed debates about holistic traffic control that had begun 
much earlier, as we have seen in the discussions about police officers and 
highway engineers in the 1930s. Technology determined the new approach, to an 
extent. In a landmark 1968 House of Commons debate on commuting, at which 
Margaret Thatcher made an early contribution as shadow transport minister, the 
Minister of Transport, Richard Marsh, described a culture of technological 
urbanism as follows: 
No one form of transport—rail, bus or private car—can be seen in isolation from 
the whole ... we should look at the hardware and the software available to our 
urban problem as a whole and see how we can use it. There is a wide range of 
hardware available to us at present—computerised traffic schemes, dial-a-bus, 
pedestrian aids, self-drive taxis, bus lanes and so on. A whole new field of traffic 
engineering is open to us.656 
But systems thinking was also constructed by social and political conditions at 
large, whether the public unrest of 1968, or the decline of the post-war consensus, 
a story which we considered in Chapter 6. Whilst the technology offered a more 
holistic approach, the local London politics remained febrile. Area traffic control 
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in London had begun as a Ministry of Transport project, supported by the RRL, 
but had been taken over by the GLC and the Metropolitan Police as it spread 
across the capital. For the police—who took sole charge of the CITRAC control 
room—this appeared to be the successful conclusion of a long process of empire-
building. The new system was ostensibly a GLC-owned network, but by taking its 
control centre into the heart of New Scotland Yard, the Metropolitan Police was 
seeing off the challenge, with one senior police commander noting as follows: 
the more we can do to blur the sharp division of responsibilities, without 
conceding independence of action, the less likely that arguments in favour of a 
separate traffic enforcement agency will be expounded, at any rate by the GLC.  
He went on as follows:  
we need the GLC’s capital investment and scientific know-how in the design and 
provision of traffic surveillance equipment and they need our experience and 
man-power in dealing with abnormal congestion. Some sort of ‘marriage’ is 
inevitable and a join traffic control operation centre should provide the setting not 
only for the ceremony but for a suitable honeymoon period thereafter.  
He concluded that such a ‘marriage’ was vital ‘if the police are to continue to have 
the dominant role’.657 
 However, it would be wrong to conclude that this was a sinister police 
takeover of a benign traffic technology in order to further an agenda of 
surveillance and control. The reality was more complex (as throughout this thesis) 
and more ambivalent. It took several years for the police to see CCTV as a 
desideratum outside the narrow confines of traffic. Perhaps it feared job losses if 
cameras could take over the work of foot-slogging constables, or perhaps it was 
just slow to move, lacking a technology champion such as Alker Tripp in the 
1930s. A more nuanced conclusion is that network infrastructures take time to 
take root but, once embedded, reconfigure the options available to actors when 
external circumstances change, as happened in this instance with the popular 
unrest of 1968. A final comment is to observe that this computerized network is 
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an information technology: it gathers and processes data about people’s 
movement around London. If, as we saw in Chapter 6, road use can be 
marketized, then knowledge of the state of the market second-by-second could 
come to have great value.  
 
268 
 
 
 
Chapter 8. The Traffic Problem and the Mobilities of Capital 
 
Lupus Street, Pimlico, 16 April 1967. A Greater London Council traffic 
management order comes into effect. This legal document converts a series of 
roads in a quiet residential area into one-way streets and bans certain turns. For 
months, construction workers have been building out pavements at junctions, 
installing seating, planting trees and installing new signage in a bid to reduce rat-
running through what is now known as the ‘Pimlico Precinct’, the first conversion 
to one of planner Colin Buchanan’s ‘environmental areas’.658 
 
 
Figure 61: Exit from Charlwood Street into Lupus Street, Pimlico, showing footpath widening and 
conversion to one-way traffic with parking bays, c.1969 (Courtesy of Westminster City 
Archives).659 
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8.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, traffic in the history of the planning of London was surveyed. This 
raised a number of interrelated themes common to the dominant characterizations 
of the traffic problem, including ideas around governance, technologies and 
segregation. Treating traffic as a socio-technical assemblage, this survey in turn 
offered encouragement to widen the network being examined, exploring these 
ideas in disciplines outside urban planning, as well as looking at proposals put 
forward to complement, or to oppose, the hard interventions favoured by the 
mainstream planning discipline. Chapters 4 to 7 offered case studies in response. 
One particular actor in the traffic network has hovered at the margins particularly 
of the accounts explored in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, namely capital, with both 
road pricing and electronic traffic management being framed in opposition to the 
capital-intensive road building programmes of the urban planners. It is necessary 
now to bring capital from the margins to the centre of the story in order to 
examine its role in the traffic network. To do so, this chapter will return the focus 
back to the professional planner, and will consider how aspects of the plans 
surveyed in Chapter 3—particularly those of Patrick Abercrombie at the LCC, 
William Holford at the City of London and Colin Buchanan at the Ministry of 
Transport—were turned into tangible reality on the streets of London after the war 
and the passing of the 1947 planning act. In doing so, the chapter will explore the 
role of traffic and planning policy in the relationships between capital and 
property. 
 No plan is a singular artefact or statement, but a messy expression of 
countless ideas, all of them with histories and multiple authors, only some of 
which become reality through long processes of negotiations, and those 
negotiations ineluctably involved bargaining with private land-owners, 
speculators, investors and developers seeking to profit from property. As Stephen 
Elkin has remarked, ‘development control was the principal means by which the 
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[London County] Council attempted to serve its planning ends’.660 This tense 
process means that the story of realizing traffic plans after 1947 involves people—
politicians, planning officers, landowners, financiers, developers, road-users, 
residents and campaign groups—and capital. This chapter will demonstrate that 
long before the 1970s decline of the post-war consensus and the rise of overtly 
market-led approaches, plan-realization was a matter of negotiation in which 
traffic congestion had exchange value and created opportunities for the 
accumulation of capital.  
 The first location for study will be the junction of Tottenham Court Road 
and Oxford Street—St Giles’ Circus—to look at the developer-led construction by 
the London County Council of a traffic gyratory, part of a priority scheme in the 
1951 LCC Development Plan. This will conclude that wider planning ends could 
be harmed if planners used developers to secure particular traffic projects—
developers could extract planning permissions that were weighted strongly in their 
favour. Next, the focus will move to London Wall, a City Corporation-built dual-
carriageway opened in 1959 which was proposed in the Holden and Holford plan 
of 1947. A planner-led Corbusian techno-modernity of grids, vertical separation 
and total reconstruction will be explored, concluding that here, planners drove a 
harder bargain than at St Giles’ Circus, and used planning permissions in a more 
muscular attempt to see their traffic goals achieved, but that this, too, stumbled 
and fell owing in large part to the shifting sands of property capital. Finally, a 
patchwork of residential streets in Pimlico will come into view. In 1967, this area 
was turned by Westminster Council into the ‘Pimlico Precinct’, London’s first 
‘environmental area’ following Buchanan’s Traffic in Towns report. This project 
expressed a particularly complex relationship between traffic, property and 
capital, and it will be concluded that traffic problems at a variety of scales offered 
opportunities that could be exploited for profit through the local planning system. 
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8.2 St Giles’ Circus 
Both the LCC traffic planners and the Ministry of Transport (MoT) desperately 
wanted a roundabout at St Giles’ Circus. This junction (shown in Figure 62) was a 
critical intersection where Tottenham Court Road, Charing Cross Road, Oxford 
Street, New Oxford Street and St Giles’ High Street met, and it had been on the 
Council’s priority list for re-engineering since the 1951 Development Plan placed 
it as London’s sixth most congested junction.661 The MoT felt it was even more 
urgent than that.662  
  
Figure 62: Police officer at St Giles’ Circus intersection, looking west, c.1955 (© Russell Wilfred, 
courtesy of the Museum of London).663 
 The problem was money. It was one thing to build roads in the outer 
reaches of London where land prices and the densities of existing buildings were 
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low. It was quite another to buy up prime central London properties for 
demolition to make way for tarmac. In April 1955, Kenneth Robinson, Labour 
MP for St Pancras North, led a Commons debate on London’s roads. During it, he 
remarked on proposals to improve the St Giles’ Circus junction which was, he 
said, ‘one of the worst congested intersections in London’. He used the junction 
daily and supported the plan. ‘But these improvements are to cost nearly six 
million pounds and it is important to see what value we are to have for the 
money’.664 This was the challenge facing the transport officials. 
 But there was a solution, and it came in the form of planning policy. In the 
mid-1950s, changes in planning legislation to favour private property 
development (including the abolition of the development charge), combined with 
easing of restrictions on building licences and materials, and a growing demand 
for office space in central London, saw the start of an office property development 
boom that was to last a decade—‘a decade of uncriticised and virtually untaxed 
profiteering’, in Simon Jenkins’s words.665 Planning permission was the 
negotiating tool allowing London’s councils to use the developers to provide the 
necessary land for road projects. The snag, as has been shown comprehensively 
by Jenkins, Oliver Marriott and Stephen Elkin, among others, was that the 
developers held the whip hand, making fortunes out of property schemes that 
never quite delivered the traffic benefits promised, and promoting discrete road 
improvements that did not join up as the comprehensive plans intended.666 And 
why should they? As will be seen, traffic congestion had value; without it, those 
fortunes might never be made. 
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 The bargaining chip in the property boom was known as ‘plot ratio’, and it 
worked as follows.667 All property developers wanted to build as much as possible 
on the land they acquired. This was how they made their money. Planning 
authorities, on the other hand, had wider concerns to take into account, and sought 
to restrict building density using the planning system. Before the Second World 
War, the tools they used under the London Building Acts were firstly a restriction 
on building height, and secondly by the prescription of the angle from the 
opposite pavement to the top of the new building, which usually resulted in 
structures that stepped back from the road. After the war, a new system to control 
density, designed by William Holford, was introduced. Plot ratio was the 
relationship between the total amount of floor space within buildings erected on a 
development site and the actual land area of the site. It was prescribed as part of 
the planning process—5:1 for most of the West End and City, for instance—and 
this gave the developers more options than under the old Building Acts. Figure 63 
shows the plot ratio zones in the 1951 Development Plan.  
 
Figure 63: Plot ratio zones for central London defined in the 1951 Development Plan (London 
County Council, courtesy of London Metropolitan Archives).668 
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Other restrictions aside, it meant that, for instance, in a 5:1 zone a five-storey 
building occupying all of the site was equivalent to a twenty-storey building 
occupying only a quarter of the site, or any ingenious permutation in between the 
two extremes. The example of St Giles’ Circus demonstrates the process. In 1966, 
a 34-storey skyscraper named Centre Point, designed by Richard Seifert’s prolific 
practice, opened on the site. It was said by Oliver Marriott the following year that 
Centre Point was probably ‘in absolute terms the most profitable single building 
ever promoted in this country’.669 It came about because of the LCC planners and 
their wish for a congestion-busting roundabout. The story has been well told by 
Marriott, Jenkins and Elkin, from whose detailed accounts the following summary 
has been drawn.670  
 In the early 1950s the LCC and the MoT began negotiations to secure a 
ministry grant towards the cost of reconfiguring the St Giles’ Circus intersection 
into a roundabout, widening certain roads to reduce the traffic congestion that had 
long dogged the junction. By 1956 a deal had been agreed and the LCC approved 
plans to begin the work. The first step was for the Council to purchase the 
properties on the area to be developed. One option open to the LCC was to declare 
the site a Comprehensive Development Area (CDA). This legislation enabled the 
Council to compulsorily purchase land for large-scale redevelopment in areas of 
wartime damage, obsolete development or bad layout, or to allow for the 
construction of an area defined in the Development Plan, and development could 
be carried out either by the Council itself, a private firm, or both, so long as the 
plan itself was that of the LCC.671 However, at this stage, St Giles’ Circus was a 
simple roundabout scheme, rather than comprehensive development, and the LCC 
could not afford to buy more land than was needed for the road. This led the 
Council to opt for an alternative: to use nineteenth-century legislation which was 
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normally far cheaper but which risked legal action on the part of the property 
owners who would often press for greater compensation than the legislation 
allowed for. The LCC clearly hoped for a speedy resolution of any litigation, but, 
as has been observed, 1956 was right at the start of the property boom for central 
London office accommodation and one key property owner on the site—herself a 
developer—was not willing to sell, so the case became mired in a lengthy Lands 
Tribunal.672 
 As the property litigation rumbled slowly on, the LCC began to have 
second thoughts about the scheme, moving towards a view that the road-only 
option would lead to a loss for planning, as the area surrounding the Circus would 
be ugly and the opportunity to improve it would be lost. Thus, in January 1957, 
the LCC entered into discussions with the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government to see if it would support the Council declaring a CDA after all. It 
would not be impossible, the Ministry responded, but would be risky, as the 
Council’s Development Plan would need to be altered, and the case might require 
a public inquiry, taking time and increasing costs. On balance, they advised 
against. This left the LCC in a bind. They felt it would be wrong to leave the 
wider area undeveloped, but they recognized the awkwardness of switching to the 
CDA option having begun proceedings under the nineteenth-century Acts. One 
solution would be to work with a private developer so, in March 1957, LCC 
planners put forward a wider scheme which could work either under a CDA or for 
private development. 
 Traffic congestion shines a light on the ambiguities of planning in London. 
The driving force behind the St Giles’ Circus development was the LCC’s desire 
to reduce congestion with a new gyratory intersection. To get it, the Council was 
now considering allowed a private developer to build offices to finance the 
scheme. Yet at the same time, the LCC was seeking to restrain office 
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development in central London, because it believed the office boom was 
increasing traffic congestion.673 These were the same Council planners, and the 
irony must not have been lost on them, but what else were they to do? Property in 
central London was colossally expensive, so they had to take seriously the option 
of getting into bed with property developers. The problem was that they were out 
of their depth. For Marriott, the LCC’s planning department up to about 1955 was 
a ‘team of brilliant creative minds’ that were ‘essentially academics’ who 
‘displayed a mistaken naïveté about the developer’.674 William Holford, author of 
the plot ratio system, preferred negotiating with architects than developers, ‘due to 
a perceived mismatch of cultures’, according to Bronwen Edwards and David 
Gilbert.675 Jenkins felt that it was inevitable that the LCC’s officers, ‘trained in 
such conservative professions as architecture and quantity surveying were not to 
be a match for the ingenuity of property developers and their allies’.676 
 Underlying the paradox of the potential offices-for-roads deal was the 
internal politics inherent in any organization. It is by now familiar that London’s 
road schemes were at the mercy of warfare between Ministries, borough councils, 
and the LCC (or GLC from 1966). St Giles’ Circus was no exception. But the 
LCC itself was no homogeneous body; its engineers, planners and accountants by 
no means always saw eye to eye. The proposal put forward by LCC planners 
restricted office space in the new development to more-or-less existing levels, 
with the central roundabout left clear of buildings. The engineers agreed. But 
accountants in the comptroller’s department disagreed, proposing that a developer 
be allowed to build offices and shops to the maximum allowable under the 
Development Plan in order to maximise the return to the Council from rents. The 
planning committee which considered the proposal recognized the tension but 
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committed itself to comprehensive development of the area one way or another, 
unlocking the door for discussions with private developers. Matters rumbled on.  
 By 1959, it was clear that no money would be forthcoming from the LCC 
itself owing to financial pressures, which meant that the CDA option was off the 
table. Further pressure came from the report of the MoT’s Nugent Committee on 
London Roads, which revealed to Parliament the problems the LCC was having at 
St Giles’ Circus.677 And there was a new pressure. Litigation over the Council’s 
original property purchases was still ongoing, and new procedures were about to 
be introduced that would frown on the use of the nineteenth-century Acts for 
compulsory purchase, which did not allow a public hearing. The clock was 
ticking. Thus, in order to meet its commitment to comprehensive development, 
and to resolve its legal problems quickly, the planning committee now had only 
one option: to work with a developer, who could buy off the litigants at above-
market rates, a tactic the Council itself was not able to exercise. 
 In the meantime, word had got out into the property world, with a 
developer showing interest in autumn 1958. In July 1959, with the Council now 
actively looking for a partner, the developer formally met with LCC officials and 
proposed to take on the scheme, but only if it could be progressed quickly. The 
developer was Harry Hyams, and the deal he placed on the table was simple. He 
would buy out the recalcitrant landowner as well as the rest of the sites needed for 
the development. He would then donate the land needed for the road intersection 
to the LCC. In return, he asked for a favourable planning permission for the rest 
of the site—and that would mean a tower block in the centre of the roundabout. 
This sort of deal was not at all unusual at the LCC; it had struck similar deals to 
fund traffic developments at Knightsbridge, Victoria and Euston, as well as one at 
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Piccadilly Circus which, as Edwards and Gilbert have shown, ended up being 
abandoned.678 
 When it worked, the Council got the land it needed without having to pay; 
the developer was allowed to develop the adjacent land for profit; and surprisingly 
enough the whole deal was considered entirely proper. Why would developers 
give valuable land to the council for roads? The subtlety was in the plot ratio. The 
developer could transfer the plot ratio of the entire site onto the area left over for 
the office block. The developer therefore got the same lettable floor space; the 
downside, if one saw it as such, was that the building had a higher density than the 
planners had prescribed: essentially, taller tower blocks. Not only that, but when 
the LCC was so reliant on the developer for help in assembling the land, the 
developer had a strong hand in negotiations and would push for even higher plot 
ratio.  
 This tactic was described by the anonymous journalists of the Counter 
Information Services in their 1973 ‘Anti-Report’ on property developers, which 
‘advised’ budding developers that, when obtaining planning permission for an 
office development: 
Any problem with this can ... usually be solved by doing a deal with the council. 
These deals typically involve giving the council land for uses such as public 
housing or roads, in exchange for the necessary assistance with [Compulsory 
Purchase Orders] or satisfactory planning permission ... it is ... wise to keep a job 
open in the office for any helpful, but underpaid, local authority official that you 
may run across.679 
 Hyams acted through his architect, Richard Seifert, whose first request 
was for a drawing showing the proposed route of the road network in the area. 
The LCC’s engineers reluctantly put out a drawing, concerned that they were 
doing so blind to the developer’s wider plans. Soon after, in late August 1959, 
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both the LCC engineers and the developer’s architect had second thoughts (or 
rather, they were working out how far they could push the deal). On Seifert’s side, 
the proposed floor space was ratcheted up, in order, he claimed, to cover higher 
than anticipated land acquisition costs. He observed that this would nevertheless 
cause the LCC’s legal challenges to disappear and that they would get their road 
at little cost. The LCC engineers, on the other hand, saw an opportunity to get 
wider carriageways in their roundabout now that the scheme was developer-led. 
Both sides came to agreement—an agreement which meant that a 30-storey block 
would occupy the roundabout, with a linked block to one side. In November this 
was agreed by the LCC planning committee. 
 More horse-trading ensued, with the engineers pressing for even more 
land-take for their road and the architect demanding an even taller tower and a 
higher proportion of its floor space given over to office use in return. This is 
where the internal politics at the LCC reveals where the power really lay, as all 
three key departments—engineering, planning and finance—began to argue. Who 
won? Clearly, the traffic engineers and the accountants had the loudest voice on 
the Council; the pleas of the planners to restrict office space and to keep the 
roundabout clear were overruled. The new proposal included the engineers’ wider 
roads as well as a tower now reaching 34 storeys, a higher plot ratio and a higher 
proportion of offices than previously existed. April 1960 saw the final agreement 
and work began. Figure 64 shows the intersection in 1961 as builders prepared to 
demolish buildings including the one shown centre-left where the tower block 
now stands. 
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Figure 64: St Giles’ Circus, looking roughly south-east, showing preparations for demolition to 
build Centre Point where the building centre-left stands, 1961 (London County Council, courtesy 
of London Metropolitan Archives).680 
 When Centre Point was completed at the centre of the roundabout in 1966, 
it rose to a towering 398 feet and its emergence from the ground had taken 
Londoners by surprise, such was the secretive nature of its planning permission 
(exceptions to this rule of secrecy tended to backfire against the developer, as Jack 
Cotton discovered to his cost at Piccadilly Circus).681 The building lay unlet for 
many years—a profitable technique allegedly engineered by Hyams, though one 
which he denied until his death in 2015—and eventually netted the reclusive 
tycoon an estimated profit of some £11.7 million.682 But what had been the public 
cost of this episode in post-war planning realpolitik? In financial terms it was not 
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so bad. It cost the LCC less to get its road scheme than it would have done even 
under the original minimum scheme, although a deal on ongoing rent payments 
went against the Council. Yet in planning terms, as has been described, the ideals 
of the Council had been ridden-over roughshod. Office space in the area had 
significantly increased in direct opposition to LCC planning policy, and a tower 
block in a sensitive area had always been against the planners’ wishes. Writing 
about the tensions of planning in the office boom in 1963, while it was still 
booming, Donald Foley claimed that ‘Despite diverse and powerful political and 
developmental pressures, the London County Council acted with resourcefulness 
and firmness’.683 With a decade of hindsight, Jenkins described deals such as St 
Giles’ Circus as ‘totally ad hoc ... concerned mainly with a vague desire to get 
development under way without impeding the traffic’.684 A rueful planning officer 
explained the reality of such situations: ‘it all hinged on how badly you wanted 
the road’.685  
 But there was a further irony. After all that, the roundabout was not even 
needed. Long before the new tower block was completed, in December 1960, the 
Ministry of Transport had come up with a different scheme to solve the 
congestion in St Giles’ Circus: the extensive Charing Cross Road–Tottenham 
Court Road–Gower Street one-way system mentioned in Chapter 7, part of the 
new London Traffic Management Unit project. As Marriott concluded in 1967, 
‘the roundabout lay useless and unused’.686 Jenkins was even more scathing in 
1975: ‘the developer, Harry Hyams, was permitted almost twice the normal plot 
ratio on his portion of the site in return for half a roundabout. This road has never 
been used’.687 The LCC was furious, and objected to the MoT, but could do 
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nothing.688 Across London at Euston, the LCC had granted permission for a huge 
office development in order to get an underpass built more cheaply, but this too 
showed who came out on top in the deal. ‘The LCC was under the impression that 
the underpass would relieve traffic congestion’, commented the Counter 
Information Services journalists. ‘Ironically, it has had the opposite effect’, they 
concluded.689 Traffic congestion drove LCC planning decisions—inside the 
Council, the engineers had the upper hand over the planners. But this just meant 
that the LCC could be played: by the MoT, but more significantly by the property 
developers. Every actor was playing off the others to advance a position or make a 
profit. The traffic problem had value. But was it inevitable that property capital 
held the whip hand over the planners? The case of London Wall, to which focus 
will now turn, involved a more muscular planning approach, though this too fell 
foul of the developers in the end. 
8.3 London Wall 
We met Michael Caine in the previous chapter, when we explored London’s first 
computer-controlled traffic light system. There, we saw that the plot of Caine’s 
1969 film The Italian Job was drawn from the scriptwriter’s experience of the 
real-life computerized experiment. Throughout this thesis, we have been charting 
alternative solutions to the traffic problem, and with this in mind it is easy to read 
The Italian Job as a comment on alternative modernities, with soft solutions such 
as traffic control coming off badly. The film presents us with a vision of a so-
called high-tech smart city—in which traffic was controlled by electronic 
networks—failing spectacularly at the hands of Benny Hill’s computer geek, 
Professor Peach. It also presented a fleeting glimpse of the hard solution. After his 
release from prison, Michael Caine’s bullion-robber Charlie Croker hitches a ride 
on an early-morning milk-float which passes along London Wall, a newly built 
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dual-carriageway to the north of the City of London. The road is almost deserted. 
Tower blocks rise on either side as Caine passes underneath a pedestrian 
walkway. There is no congestion, no traffic, no chaos. All is ordered. This, we are 
encouraged to feel, is the true modernity, the true technological vision. It is a 
modern planned city, unlike crowded, noisy Turin which, even with the computer, 
still could not beat its congestion problem (or rather, the computer just made it 
worse). 
 The origins of the London Wall road project dated back to Holden and 
Holford’s post-war report for the City of London which designated a new ‘Route 
11’ for the upper half of an inner ring road to ease congestion.690 The bombing of 
the City of London in the Second World War had resulted in devastation across a 
large area to the north and north-east of St Paul’s Cathedral and, using new 
powers granted by 1940s planning legislation, some 40 acres of land was bought 
by the City Corporation for redevelopment. The 1947 planning act gave planning 
control to the London County Council (which was keen to ensure a coherent 
planned approach rather than piecemeal developments) and, in the ensuing years, 
plans were worked out between the two bodies for a four-part scheme.691  
 First came the modest Golden Lane residential estate, designed by 
Chamberlin, Powell and Bon from 1952, based on slab blocks arranged on a 
controlling grid plan around a central tower block, with motor vehicles excluded 
under Alker Tripp’s precinct or horizontal-segregation system. The second phase, 
planned from 1956 onwards and built through the 1960s and 1970s, was the much 
larger Barbican residential development by the same architects, again with slabs 
and towers laid onto a grid but with the addition of vertical segregation, with 
motor vehicles operating at street level and a two-storey pedestrian-only podium 
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above. The pedestrian podium extended south to the third part of the scheme, a 
commercial development along the realization of part of the proposed Route 11 
highway, renamed London Wall, which stretched from St Martin’s Le-Grand in 
the west to Aldgate in the east. Plans were released in 1955 and comprised six 
commercial tower blocks and several smaller slab blocks, each arranged on a grid 
with pedestrian circulation at the podium level above the spine road below, which 
was opened in 1959 and dubbed ‘the first new road to be built in the City of 
London for 88 years’ (see Figure 65).692 The fourth aspect of the scheme, from 
1959 onwards, was the extension of the raised pedestrian circulation network to 
the entire City of London, drawing from the conceptual framework for 
pedestrianism laid out in the Holden and Holford plan.693 
 
Figure 65: London Wall and its tower blocks, c.1964 (Courtesy of the BBC).694 
 London Wall was, of course, the conventional Modernist techno-utopia 
that was surveyed in Chapter 3: the progressive vision of broad grid-plan 
highways and skyscrapers; vertical separation of pedestrians from vehicles; the 
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linear city made manifest through total brutal reconstruction in concrete and steel. 
It was, as Nikolaus Pevsner observed, Le Corbusier’s Ville Radieuse realized.695 
Numerous 1960s films besides The Italian Job used London Wall as a location.696 
Back then it must have seemed like a planning dream come true. At the time the 
scheme was being constructed, commentators were gripped by its implications for 
urban planning. In 1963, Peter Hall observed that: 
the architect–planner no longer works in two dimensions, but in three; he has a 
series of blocks to fit into spaces, in an infinite number of surprising 
combinations. Not merely three levels are possible, as along London Wall, but 
six, seven, eight, all carrying separate functions.697  
Edward Carter noted the rapid extension of the idea in London, stating that: 
the new way of segregation, by the complex interrelation of traffic and pedestrian 
routes on several levels, is now being applied by Chamberlin, Powell and Bon in 
their scheme for the Barbican; by the LCC architects in the latest part of the 
South Bank; and by Sir Leslie Martin in his scheme for the University Precinct.698  
 But one of the most complex critical analyses came in 1964 from Reyner 
Banham, who was working up ideas about the relationships between people, 
architecture and technologies that were to be published a few years later.699 In the 
1964 BBC documentary film A City Crowned with Green, Banham urged the 
repopulation of central London under modern conditions, in compact high-rise 
flats with elevated segregated circulation for pedestrians and the demotion of 
motor traffic to the existing streets.700 He introduced his idea as follows: 
In the old London and in the new, the vital thing is always the handling of the 
pedestrians. If there is something that is worth fighting for in the heart of London, 
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something that is worth keeping, even when we knock down the buildings, it is 
the network of pedestrian communications and squares—to stroll in, to sit in, just 
stand about in.  
For Banham, pedestrianism was the basis of European civilization, but it was 
under threat from modernity: 
If we’re going to keep it, then our urban renewal experts are going to have to find 
a way of keeping it alive, even under the apparently hostile conditions of 
motorized traffic systems. The best offer we have to date is to keep it not under 
that system but literally above it.  
The camera tracked along the completed office tower blocks and unfinished 
building sites along London Wall. Banham observed the following: 
The high-level pedestrian terraces and the subterranean car parks along London 
Wall are our most extensive effort to date in dealing with the growing problems 
posed by the crush of cars, and in creating a complete second city for foot 
passengers, raised a couple of storeys above the world of wheels; made 
independent of the street pattern below, by providing bridges, and other 
connections, that make it never necessary to come down to street level and fight 
your way through the traffic. The idea’s not new. It’s been proposed before in 
London. But it just hasn’t caught on. 
 
Figure 66: Still from Reyner Banham’s 1964 BBC film A City Crowned with Green, depicting the 
raised pedestrian walkways of the London Wall development (Courtesy of the BBC).701 
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 The irony in Banham’s footage of the London Wall development was that 
it depicted the vast majority of pedestrians down at street level, rather than using 
the pedestrian walkways, as Figure 66 shows. Partly this was simply owing to the 
fact that the elevated network was not complete. But, over the ensuing years, the 
‘pedway’ scheme (as the walkways became known) failed to live up to its 
planners’ hopes, as Michael Hebbert has shown.702  
 The pedway experiment came about through the unusual planning regime 
under which the London Wall commercial development operated, driven by the 
LCC’s involvement and its fears of a piecemeal developer-led assemblage of 
buildings.703 This planning regime was quite different from the more submissive 
approach experienced at St Giles’ Circus and elsewhere. Under the leadership of 
the City’s planning officer, H. Anthony Mealand, and the LCC’s architect, Leslie 
Martin, the modular layout, heights and bulks of the sequence of the six towers 
and numerous slabs were strictly defined before plots were sold off to commercial 
developers for design and construction. But, crucially for the present story, the 
planning permissions contained strict requirements for developers to include 
integrated pedestrian walkways and podium decks, and connections to the 
Barbican estate and across London Wall. Hebbert connects this to two movements 
that were considered in Chapter 3: the first being the idea of vertical segregation 
through multi-level development which was strongly held by architects and 
planners at the LCC; the second was large-scale post-war urban redevelopment 
which took the idea to heart.704 To these movements can be added a third: the 
office development boom that was considered in the previous section.  
 The London Wall and Barbican scheme gave the LCC planners their 
chance to realise technological utopias of vertical segregation. Urban 
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reconstruction provided the political traction, but in this model it was the 
commercial developers who were expected to pay for and build the planners’ 
pedway network. It started out well. In 1957–60, developers (including Harry 
Hyams) were quick to buy up the London Wall tower-block plots, with their 
commitments for podium decks and walkways.705 The six towers were built as 
planned, ‘not one of which yielded its lucky developer less than a million pounds’ 
profit’, stated Simon Jenkins.706 Things were moving quickly and the office boom 
was at its height so the scheme was expanded. The City Corporation, by then as 
committed to modernism and segregation as the LCC architects, decided to 
incorporate provision for pedestrian walkways into all new commercial 
developments in the Square Mile and began enacting this new policy through the 
planning consent system, sure that in the property boom, a 30-mile network would 
emerge quickly. Figure 67 shows the network as proposed (in secret) in 1963.  
 
Figure 67: 30-mile ‘pedway’ network across the City of London proposed in 1963 (Courtesy of 
Michael Hebbert).707 
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 And the network did indeed start to emerge through the 1960s, as major 
new developments incorporated the prescribed provision for upper-level entrances 
and reception halls, with abutments for connecting bridges. This was all part of 
the 1960s world of negotiation, of extracting commercial benefit from traffic 
plans, but it seemed to be going more in the planners’ favour than at St Giles’ 
Circus. London Wall, based on a vast City-owned reconstruction site, 
strengthened the planners’ resolve, with the office boom apparently enabling the 
model to be applied on a widespread basis without crippling public cost. As 
Hebbert notes: 
The City of London seemed to have achieved the benefits of comprehensive 
redevelopment without the expense and intervention of public land assembly. 
Developers, for their part, were happy enough to include upper-level circulation 
in exchange for plot ratio concessions.708  
In 1969 the Greater London Council took on similar planning powers to create 
pedway networks elsewhere in London for eventual connection to those of the 
City, working with Westminster Council on bold plans for a comprehensive 
segregated network for pedestrian movement.709  
 But the realization of a techno-utopian segregated city was as short-lived 
as the office boom, which was rapidly cooling in the early 1960s and pretty much 
bust by the middle of the decade. As early as 1966, the City of London was 
acknowledging a ‘failure of planning’ owing to ‘lack of office development 
permits’, leading to an abundance of ‘partly completed re-development units’ as 
well as ‘pedestrian walkways going from nowhere to nowhere’, in the words of its 
planning committee chairman.710 By the early 1970s, as an economic recession 
was starting to take hold, the vertical utopia looked increasingly costly to build 
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and maintain, as well as simply unwanted by its intended users. As we saw in the 
Banham documentary, the public generally preferred street level. ‘Why reproduce 
a ground-level network that, despite bombing and reconstruction, was still largely 
intact and intensively used’, asks Hebbert.711 There was simply no pay-off. 
Pedestrians did not want to use the pedways, developers resented the space they 
took up, councils increasingly had to pay for their upkeep, and the model of 
creating a network out of many independent commercial developments had 
broken down.  
 The wider modernist planning dream that was turning sour, too. As far as 
the residential Barbican was concerned, the cracks started to appear before the 
development had even been completed. David Heathcote observes that from the 
early 1970s, ‘the majority of comments about the project were negative’. He cites 
a 1973 Architectural Review editorial which pointed to ‘that coarsening of the 
visible man-made world which the Corbusian reality has brought’.712 The 
following year, Reyner Banham expressed what Heathcote sees as ‘the sense of 
disappointment and betrayal felt by [him] in what he saw as a reversal of the 
purpose of the Modern architecture that he had championed for so long’. 
Heathcote considers that by this time, ‘the negative moment of Postmodernism 
was upon us’.713 In the mid-1970s, the City Corporation underwent a radical 
policy-shift towards conservation. This did not happen in isolation; elsewhere in 
London, politicians and the public alike had spent a decade or more waking up to 
the effects of comprehensive redevelopment on the capital’s historic fabric, with 
the death of the Ringways, as discussed in Chapter 3, being closely followed by 
the cancellation of a vast Covent Garden redevelopment project.714 A turning 
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point had been reached in public opinion towards comprehensive planning and, in 
the City, opportunities for redevelopment slowed. The comprehensive pedway 
network therefore failed to materialize. 
 Of course, the property market bounced back in due course. The pedways 
might have re-emerged. But the politics of capital and planning had changed. 
From 1986, Margaret Thatcher’s financial deregulation project known as the Big 
Bang, with its changes in trading technologies and requirements for new office 
building layouts, combined with threats from its fast-growing younger sibling in 
Docklands, meant that conservation was all but abandoned in the City. A huge 
building programme began again—but this one was market-led, not planner-
led.715 An early casualty was London Wall’s planned purity, where a new air-
rights development, Terry Farrell’s post-modern Alban Gate office building, 
completed in 1992, straddled the roadway, unlocking the rampant redevelopment 
of the area in the years which followed.716  
 The reasons for the decline and fall of the pedway network were complex. 
But capital played a crucial role. Property developers always looked to exploit the 
planning system to make money. They were prepared to build in traffic 
infrastructure such as pedways when the market was booming but increasingly 
reluctant at times of bust. The planners had been bold in their ambitions and their 
careful use of the planning permission system to extract planning ends out of the 
developers. But the organic growth of the pedway network meant it did not 
happen quickly enough to ride the wave of the market and, when boom returned, 
the relationship between planning and capital had changed to a market-led 
approach. The pedway policy was abandoned and so, too, were the City’s ideas of 
Corbusian grids, segregation and tight modern planning control that had seen such 
a short blossoming. And, most significantly for traffic congestion, Route 11 was 
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never extended beyond the short stretch built in the 1950s, as the zeal for major 
urban road construction in London’s heavily built-up areas was tempered and then 
crushed by public opposition and the rise of conservationism and 
environmentalism. As early as 1967, Oliver Marriott had described Route 11 as ‘a 
fairly unimportant link’ and ‘one of the more absurd stretches of urban planning ... 
a six-lane highway which appears to go from nowhere to nowhere’.717 In the end, 
despite Michael Caine and Benny Hill’s best efforts to prove the opposite, it was 
the computerized traffic light network, rather than the Ville Radieuse, that was 
extended into the twenty-first century. But the planning vision was not just about 
thoroughfares, tower blocks and walkways in the sky. From Tripp and 
Abercrombie to Buchanan, the local neighbourhood also came under scrutiny. The 
developers had their eyes on this too. 
8.4 The Pimlico Precinct 
Lupus Street runs up from the northern bank of the River Thames, by the railway 
bridge into Victoria station, before turning north-eastwards towards today’s 
Pimlico tube station and Vauxhall Bridge. Along its southern side is Churchill 
Gardens, the pioneering post-war Powell and Moya council housing estate, as 
well as the notorious 1930s flats at Dolphin Square, home of establishment 
scandals which still make the headlines today. The houses and flats to the north of 
Lupus Street are more modest. The area was laid out by Thomas Cubitt in the 
1830s for the Duke of Westminster as part of his St George’s Estate.718 As can be 
seen in Figure 68, Cubitt’s layout took the form of a grid which, as has been noted 
in this account, was alien to London at a large scale but fairly common in local 
areas as here. 
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Figure 68: St George’s Estate, Pimlico, north of Lupus Street, mapped in 1888 a few years after 
the estate was completed (Bacon’s New Large-Scale Ordnance Atlas of London & Suburbs, 
courtesy of Harry Margary/London Metropolitan Archives).719 
 This part of the estate was completed after Cubitt’s death in 1855, and is a 
neighbourhood of largely three-storey stucco-fronted town-house terraces. By the 
1960s, though, this quiet residential neighbourhood had become a series of 
vehicle rat-runs. As has been repeatedly observed, grid patterns reduce congestion 
in urban areas as drivers have numerous options to get from one point to another, 
even if there are blockages. This was why traffic experts from cops and engineers 
to modellers and planners yearned for a grid to replace London’s muddle of 
streets. As traffic grew in the 1950s and 1960s, this 30-acre corner of Pimlico had 
become the haunt of motorists seeking short-cuts from the south-west along the 
Thames Embankment into Parliament Square and Victoria. This led to accidents 
on the residential streets, particularly at junctions, and experts felt the problem 
would only increase. In 1965, Westminster City Council decided to act. It felt the 
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area’s 5,500 residents deserved their peace and quiet—their amenity—so it 
formed a scheme to exclude through-traffic from these streets, turning the area 
into the ‘Pimlico Precinct’.720 
 The challenge facing the council’s chief engineer, Francis Cave, was how 
to exclude through-traffic while allowing residents free access to drive to and 
from their homes. His solution was simple. By a combination of one-way streets, 
selective closures and banned turns, he was able to restrict entrance points into the 
precinct to just four streets, and no vehicle journey could be made through the 
area without making at least two turns—in other words, it became impossible to 
drive through the precinct in a straight line. Figure 69 highlights the route options 
open to motorists under the scheme.  
 
Figure 69: Route options under the Pimlico Precinct scheme, published in 1966 (Courtesy of 
Westminster City Archives).721 
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Moreover, footpaths were widened at junctions—Cave termed them ‘blips’—to 
reduce vehicle speed and aid pedestrian crossing, and roads were limited to one 
lane in each direction, additional road width being turned into parking bays.722 
Trees were planted and seats installed at the newly widened intersections. Figure 
70 shows a junction in the new scheme. Through-traffic would find it so time-
consuming and complex to drive through the precinct that the benefit would be 
lost and drivers would return to the thoroughfares surrounding the area, which had 
enough capacity to take the marginal extra traffic. Accidents would be reduced 
and this corner of Cubitt’s London would be returned to its peaceful state. The 
£39,000 scheme was approved for construction by the Council in February 1966 
and put into operation in April 1967 following the usual financial wrangling with 
the London County Council and Ministry of Transport.723  
 
Figure 70: Entrance to Alderney Street from Lupus Street, Pimlico, showing width restrictions, 
c.1969 (Courtesy of Westminster City Archives).724 
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 The Pimlico Precinct was the first scheme of its kind to be installed in an 
existing neighbourhood rather than a redevelopment area, and was hailed by 
Westminster Council as a great success. Traffic levels across the precinct were 
down, one survey location recording a drop from 260 vehicles per hour to five. 
Accidents were down, from eleven per year to one, with no increase in accidents 
on the perimeter thoroughfares. And the public’s reaction, Cave stated, was 
overwhelmingly positive—‘residents are delighted with the improved 
“atmosphere” in which they live and have taken the trouble to say so’.725 Of 
course it was modest, but then, piecemeal improvement of single streets, junctions 
or little pockets of the capital was, as has been noted throughout this study, the 
reality of traffic planning throughout the twentieth century. But this one seemed 
like it could be scaled up. Cave commented that: 
it has been suggested that the Pimlico Precinct Scheme may have added 30 years’ 
life to the buildings within its boundaries. The City Council has already resolved 
to extend the schemes both westward and eastward ... The future road pattern of 
Westminster may well be based upon a number of similar precincts between 
which the district distributor roads are located.726  
 Cave’s description of precincts divided by distributor roads is, of course, 
straight from Colin Buchanan’s Traffic in Towns report published in 1963, and the 
Pimlico Precinct was London’s first manifestation of Buchanan’s idea of 
‘environmental areas’. As Carmen Hass-Klau has demonstrated, British ideas 
about urban neighbourhoods with restrictions on traffic went back at least as far as 
the Port Sunlight scheme of the 1880s and was clearly visible in Welwyn Garden 
City, designed in 1920.727 Similar ideas were developed in Germany across this 
period and beyond.728 In the USA, the suburb of Radburn, in New Jersey, was 
founded in 1929 with a pioneering street layout separating pedestrians from motor 
vehicles that was a strong influence on town planners subsequently. The Radburn 
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layout was created specifically in opposition to the dominant grid layout of US 
cities, with their negative effects for pedestrians noted in Pimlico thirty years 
later.729 Here we have a reversal of the aforementioned planners’ desire to 
superimpose a grid—whether concrete or electronic—onto the non-grid of 
London’s streets. The environmental area idea, with its long history, was an 
attempt to de-grid the grid (visions of the perfect plan were always ambivalent 
and contested).  
 Ideas from Radburn, themselves influenced by earlier British and German 
practice, were imported back into the UK by planners such as Raymond Unwin, 
whose official government reports of 1929 and 1933 were considered in Chapter 
3. As was also shown in that chapter, Alker Tripp’s advocacy for neighbourhood 
precincts had a great influence on British town planning from Abercrombie to 
Buchanan, who renamed them his environmental areas.730 But concrete schemes 
for turning the idea into reality in London were slow to catch on. As Hass-Klau 
remarks, ‘The astonishing story was how little was made out of it’, although 
perhaps not so astonishing given the government’s clear policy at that time of 
expansion of motor-car use. Furthermore, she notes the increasing use in the 
traffic planning profession in this period of computer modelling, as discussed in 
Chapter 7, whose practitioners were: 
technically skilled ... but they had lost, maybe unconsciously, for the first time 
most of their social objectives, and had little in common with the visionary 
planners of the turn of the century. Their counterparts, the traffic engineers, were 
more concerned with building roads, and details like environmental areas could 
be considered once all the roads were built.731  
 Yet, by 1973, some 150 environmental areas were planned or in existence 
across the UK, which elevates the 1965-designated Pimlico Precinct, as London’s 
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first, to a scheme more significant than its size might otherwise have suggested.732 
As Cave explained, Pimlico was simply a pilot scheme for more general 
application throughout Westminster once the principle had been proven.733 This 
could be seen as a win for the environment. However, the other two case-studies 
examined in this chapter have revealed the hand of capital in post-war urban 
planning and traffic, focusing on property speculation and the succession of 
property booms from the 1950s onwards. With that in mind, it would be prudent 
to ask why Westminster Council decided to adopt the environmental area with 
such apparent alacrity so soon after its promotion in Traffic in Towns. One can 
then ask, why Pimlico? And who were the residents in 1969 who told 
Westminster Council that they were ‘delighted’ with the ‘atmosphere’ of the area 
following the installation of the scheme?  
 The rat-running traffic through these side streets was itself a consequence 
of congestion-relief measures taken years before. Decentralization and the inter-
war growth of the suburbs had created the daily tide of commuters flowing 
inwards each morning and outwards at the end of the working day. Originally 
built as good nineteenth-century housing for the middle classes, the 42-acre St 
George’s Estate had ‘gone to seed’, in Oliver Marriott’s words, after troops were 
billeted there during the First World War.734 The landowner, the Duke of 
Westminster’s Grosvenor Estate, had little control over the properties let on long 
leases and, in a surprise move, disposed of the entire holding in 1950.735 But some 
could see an opportunity in the seedy district. The growth of the suburbs was 
generating opportunities in the central-London properties left behind, as those 
who were sick of the daily grind of the commute were beginning to eye up the 
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centre of town again. For Reyner Banham, as was seen earlier in this chapter, this 
re-population of the centre would be done on hard, segregated modern lines with 
pedestrian networks superimposed over the streets. The reality was softer, more 
modest, and more conservative.  
 With the establishment hand of the Duke of Westminster gone from the 
housing north of Lupus Street, the field was open for the developers to move in 
and, over the years following the 1950 sale, the estate passed through the hands of 
a variety of property developers, its price rising at each sale, before ending up in 
the hands of the notorious speculator Max Joseph in 1959, who sold out to 
developer Kennedy Leigh in 1962. Kennedy Leigh’s son Gerald, a director of the 
firm, bought Hampton, the estate agent, in 1965, just as Kennedy Leigh went into 
liquidation and the St George’s Estate was sold again—Hampton’s managing the 
sale with an advertisement noting ‘redevelopment potential’.736 Property was a 
cosy, if cut-throat, world. After the 1965 liquidation sale, the estate ended up in 
the hands of the Royal Liver Assurance Company of Liverpool, which had 
become associated with Joseph a few years earlier in a Paddington 
development.737 In early 1967—just about when the Pimlico Precinct scheme 
went live—Royal Liver sold the headlease to developers Central Estates 
(Belgravia).738  
 Simon Jenkins said that this succession of developers had ‘turned Pimlico 
into a property speculators’ paradise and a residents’ nightmare’, while the 
Evening News commented acidly that ‘somebody is making a great deal of money 
out of Pimlico. Property is changing hands at vast profits to the developers, and in 
the process ordinary people are being squeezed and their lives changed’.739 What 
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was happening at Pimlico was gentrification—long-term working-class tenants 
were, it was alleged, being systematically harassed and evicted by the new 
headlease holders and their agents, in collusion with the big institutional 
freeholders such as Royal Liver, so that the properties could be turned into flats 
for sale on the open market to middle-class owner-occupiers.740 
 For Jenkins, it was not just the developers and financiers who were to 
blame for this insidious practice. ‘For all the ingenuity of the property industry in 
these years’, he remarked, ‘nothing should detract from the crucial role played in 
many of the biggest deals by public authorities, in particular the London County 
Council’. Every major property deal in this period required the LCC’s approval, 
‘and many were the direct result of its active participation’, Jenkins observed, 
going on to note that LCC planners were ‘confronted by immense pressure from 
the property industry’.741 With such a complex network of actors and conflicts it is 
impossible to say beyond doubt that Westminster Council came under pressure 
from the LCC or Pimlico’s parade of property developers to improve the amenity 
and safety of the St George’s Estate—and therefore to increase its value—by 
creating the Pimlico Precinct. There were simply too many shareholdings spread 
across all sorts of shell and holding companies, and too many institutions involved 
in any deal. Clearly, the property industry had close links with the establishment 
and government, with financial interests spread far and wide.  
 What can be said is that the community of residents polled by City 
Engineer Francis Cave in around 1969 was not the same as those living in the area 
15 years previously. In about 1973, the urban theorist Donald Appleyard visited 
the Pimlico Precinct to interview residents and it was clear to him that the area 
had undergone high population turnover owing to ‘a wholesale conversion of the 
community to high-priced apartments’. He claimed that this was due to the 
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systematic policy of Westminster Council to approve planning applications by 
developers to convert homes from family rented units to retail studio and one-
bedroom flats. They had the option to withhold permissions in order to retain low-
income family homes in Pimlico but refused to exercise it. ‘The traffic scheme 
may well have provided a catalyst for this trend’, he noted, ‘although it cannot be 
blamed as the cause’. Nevertheless, he observed, ‘the close connection between 
traffic management and housing change cannot be ignored’. He concluded by 
saying, ‘Whether the original traffic engineers were aware of the possible social 
consequences of the traffic management scheme, we do not know’.742 Aware or 
not, their actions here and elsewhere were part of a complex relationship between 
traffic, politics, planning, property and profit. 
8.5 Conclusions 
In 1954, the outgoing Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Harold Scott, 
wrote about traffic congestion in the capital as follows: ‘It is not plans, but a 
decision to put plans into operation that is needed ... The alternative is a creeping 
paralysis which in the end must prove fatal’.743 But this suggests a binary 
situation, plan or no-plan, and also it assumes the planner is the only agent in the 
decision. Here we have looked at other agencies, particularly those who pay and 
those who use, as well as alternative visions of the future shape of London, 
particularly the commercial viewpoint of post-war property speculators such as 
Harry Hyams, whose ‘dynamic individualism’ was seen by Frank Mort as one of a 
set of ‘foils to Forshaw and Abercrombie’s high-minded, ethical vision’.744 Mort’s 
approach to the nature of plans—as cultural phenomena, performed by specialists 
and the public alike—is valuable in defusing the heroic planner account and 
helping us think about planning (and planners and plans) in different ways. The 
                                                 
742 Donald Appleyard, Livable Streets (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1981), 183. 
743 Harold Scott, Scotland Yard (London: Andre Deutsch, 1954), 239. 
744 Mort, ‘Fantasies of Metropolitan Life’, 144. 
8. THE TRAFFIC PROBLEM AND THE MOBILITIES OF CAPITAL 302 
 
 
 
case studies in this chapter draw from Mort’s approach. Plans have been seen to 
work in different ways from those intended by their nominal authors. They have 
been deployed within processes of marketization, in which traffic and its physical 
configurations (whether built into the streets or temporary congestions and flows) 
has been seen to have exchange value in the intense capitalization of London’s 
urban space since the Second World War. Plans, planners and planning have 
created a diverse range of new opportunities for people to make profits. 
 The architecture critic Ian Nairn wrote an Observer piece in December 
1966 which captured the mood of the moment. Centre Point had just been 
completed—the view of it looming over Denmark Street’s Tin Pan Alley was ‘the 
kind of shock contrast that makes London unique’. But the office boom was over, 
giving London a ‘lull in the building frenzy’ which was ‘a rare opportunity, here 
and now, for saving London’. The pedestrian network covering the Cities of 
London and Westminster was struggling to be realized, and Nairn proposed it be 
abandoned, claiming that ‘the elaborate two-level system ... would wreck the 
existing environment at enormous cost, in order to support a volume of traffic 
which Central London doesn’t need’. More to his taste was the Pimlico Precinct:  
define the limits of each of London’s villages, and go to work on the things—
often small and inexpensive things—which make it more pleasant. If Pimlico 
needs to gain identity by stopping up some of the interminable intersections ... 
then do so.  
The ultimate problem, he observed, was the convoluted planning system, with 
different planning teams within and between different agencies competing with 
each other and all of them ignoring the general public.745 This was the most 
obvious change that took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s—the turn to the 
environment and to the people. 
 But this shift from planner-knows-best to planning-by-referendum—this 
degradation of the power of the professional town planner—took place alongside 
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a more insidious change. That change, as this chapter has charted, was the rise in 
the power of the post-war property industry and the ability of landowners, 
developers and capital investment funds to change London’s streetscape by 
influencing the planning process through its many loopholes and unintended 
consequences. The acclaimed analyst Anthony Sampson, writing in the thick of 
the 1960s office boom, suggested that ‘the very jumble and messiness of London, 
its zigzags, curves and old buildings, yield great prizes for those who can 
disentangle it’, meaning insurance companies and property developers.746 Streets 
and their users, as well as buildings and their inhabitants, had become the 
currency of a new form of property capitalism which sought to trade as much as 
invest, and to do so over the short-term rather than the natural long-term cycles of 
bricks, mortar, concrete and tarmac.  
 How were the grand plans of Abercrombie, Holford, Buchanan et al to be 
built? The answer, of course, came down to money, but in the new short-term 
world of trading for quick profits, with council planners struggling to keep pace 
with the loopholes of their own legislation, that meant that fragments—a 
roundabout here, a short stretch of highway there—were all that could result. 
Those who held the keys to capital took advantage of any opportunity to turn a 
relatively quick profit. This was most clear when the traffic problem was 
congestion, such as at St Giles’ Circus. Developers could leverage land-for-
planning concessions with the results, such as Centre Point, making them 
millionaires. Some planning regimes were more muscular in their relationship 
with capitalism than others, with the City of London extracting strong concessions 
from developers in return for permissions at London Wall and elsewhere, but here 
the long timescales of planning turned out to be incompatible with the short 
boom-and-bust timescales of property capital and planning failed here too, though 
for a complex set of reasons. 
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 Less obvious, though, has been the ability of property capitalists to make 
money out of much smaller scales of traffic project, which exist only at the 
margins of the literature and the built environment of London. The Pimlico 
Precinct was entirely low-key. It attracted little attention, and can be easily missed 
today, comprising trees, benches and one-way signs, not concrete tower blocks 
and elevated walkways. It hardly looks like a product of the twentieth-century 
modern planning vision. But it was not a project from the post-Ringways world of 
the environment and the humbling of the motor city. It was a mid-1960s project 
contemporary with the high water mark of the car in the city. Such projects 
showed that money could be made even if the traffic problem was not congestion, 
but rather its inverse, namely free-flowing traffic in an efficient grid pattern of 
streets. The idea was Buchanan’s (or even Tripp’s), but its implementation was 
carried out by local councils that had close relationships with property developers. 
Congestion could be engineered in by traffic-calming, pushing up property 
evictions, conversions, prices and gentrification.  
 Come boom or bust, whatever the planners and officials came up with to 
solve the traffic problem, the capital’s property tycoons have found ways to make 
money from it. They have understood the value of London’s streets and the profit 
that could be made from the public’s need to use them. And, given the complex 
interrelationships between the different actors in planning, including politicians, 
officials, funders, developers, owners and the wide range of other specialists 
including cops, engineers, scientists and economists, there were many interests in 
keeping the situation complicated and the problem unsolved. In fact, it could be 
concluded that congestion was good for everybody except the public—no, even 
the public, who held their pensions and insurance policies with the big investment 
funds and therefore held stakes themselves. Everybody had an interest in 
congestion. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusions and Epilogue 
 
Wood Lane, Shepherd’s Bush, 1964. The architectural critic Reyner Banham is 
narrating the commentary for a BBC film on the planning of London. Over scenes 
of crowded streets, he observes that ‘For most of this century, planners and 
visionaries have denounced London as congested, inhuman, restless, wasteful. But 
the margin between fullness and congestion is very slight. Often it is only in the 
eye of the beholder. London can be like a party where there are just a couple of 
guests too many ... But most of the time ... a party that really swings’.747 
 
 
Figure 71: Still from Reyner Banham’s BBC film on the planning of London, 1964 (Courtesy of 
the BBC).748 
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9.1 Introduction 
This thesis has attempted to deconstruct the traffic problem, treating traffic as 
socio-technical network of actors, both human and non-human, situated in 
sociological and political contexts with histories. To do this, the canonical plans 
and planners have been decentred, allowing an exploration of the margins. This 
has meant examining conceptualizations, rather than measurements, of 
congestion, recognizing that it must be seen as more than a case of speed, volume 
and flow. It might be possible to conclude from this that we will never be able to 
understand the traffic problem as it is just too slippery in our hands. What is seen 
as a problem from different perspectives seems soluble, but when we fragment 
things and look at it from the different perspectives considered in this thesis, it 
becomes so multi-dimensional that it resembles a kaleidoscope, an ever-changing 
resolution, interesting in each configuration but never stable. However, we can 
draw a series of wider conclusions from the patterns, even as they shift and reform 
in our hands. This concluding chapter expresses themes and connections which 
have emerged from this approach and its examination of the case studies.  
 The next section in this chapter connects aspects of the individual case 
studies together, demonstrating that we can only understand the traffic problem by 
looking across time, space, disciplines and professions. It is easy to take the traffic 
problem at face value, seeing it in turns as a chronic pathology of free movement 
and a looming acute crisis requiring drastic action. A survey of the 
characterizations of traffic congestion in London’s urban planning literature found 
a great deal of consistency in the ways it has been represented and in the solutions 
put forward—circulation, flow, ring roads, segregation, arterial routes and so on. 
The traffic problem was a failure of planning. But, as Reyner Banham claimed in 
the epigraph above, most of the time London really swings. It has been shown that 
the vast diversity of experiences of the capital’s streets cannot be reduced to a 
singular, universal problem which only reconstruction can solve. The dominance 
of professional planning in twentieth-century discourses of traffic and movement 
in cities has occluded and marginalized wider views and alternative 
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conceptualizations but we can only understand traffic by seeking and exploring 
them. 
 The second section draws together ideas about the relationships between 
traffic, capital, markets and the state. It proposes that traffic and road 
infrastructure has a distinct relationship with capitalism, and that London’s traffic 
landscape has a longer history of marketization than is commonly proposed, not 
just in the overtly neoliberal road-pricing project discussed in Chapter 6 but in the 
saturation with market decisions of a wide variety of traffic projects realised from 
the 1950s onwards. It is therefore proposed that thinking of traffic as a flat 
network need not imply that all actors have equal power—capital acts as an 
ineluctable gravitational pull on all decisions about traffic. However it is not the 
only form of social relation to do so.  
 The final section of this conclusion considers how much of what has been 
explored is particular to London and how much could apply elsewhere. It will be 
argued that London’s physical and historical geometry renders its traffic unique, 
but with powerful connections to other places which will give the present account 
value as a model for thinking about complex urban infrastructures and their 
problems more generally.  
 There will then follow an epilogue that will conclude the thesis with a 
brief survey of the traffic problem in London today using the case studies as our 
guide, demonstrating the long lives of infrastructures and the power they wield in 
shaping our conceptions of the urban experience. 
9.2 Deconstructing ‘the traffic problem’ 
The first research question addressed in this thesis asked what have been the 
dominant characterizations of the traffic problem, and what alternative 
characterizations have been obscured by the dominant framings. The evidence 
presented in the exploration of the planning literature in Chapter 3 shows how the 
urban planning discourse proposed physical reshaping of London with a new road 
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network based on circulation, fast flows and segregated access, and that this 
discourse dominated thinking about traffic problems and congestion throughout 
much of the twentieth century. The traffic problem was a failure of planning and, 
closely allied, a failure to build. However, this was not the only conceptualization 
of a traffic problem. The case studies examined in Chapters 4 to 7 show a series of 
alternative views, from the traffic problem being a machine failure, to it being a 
failure to control people, a failure of the market, or a system failure. Chapter 8 
proposed that the traffic problem is intimately linked with the accumulation of 
capital, whether overt or otherwise, and can be seen therefore in many senses as a 
manufactured problem in which solutions created markets and opportunities for 
profit—more on this presently. 
 By treating traffic as a socio-technical network it has been possible to 
reveal these marginalized accounts and place them on an even footing with the 
dominant account of reconstructionist planning. At a micro-geographical level this 
leads us to see a city of adjacencies—a calm residential neighbourhood in Pimlico 
a few yards away from the main thoroughfare of Victoria Street, for instance, or 
the East India Dock Road turning into the Victoria Dock Road. As has been 
demonstrated in the case studies, both the characterization of the traffic problem 
and the solutions enacted differed greatly as one moved a few paces from one 
place to the next—traffic calming to tower-block building in one instance, guard-
rails to an elevated concrete flyover in the other. We can only discern the fine 
grain of the problem by breaking it down. Nevertheless, focusing solely on the 
local and the microscopic risks short-sightedness. So we need at the same time to 
take a macro-geographical approach, looking at people, ideas and technologies on 
global scales, and we will return to this in a moment. History, too, has opened the 
black box of the traffic problem to scrutiny. By taking the problem at face value 
out of history, out of time, we treat it as constant and unchanging, and more 
worryingly, we risk treating and judging the actions of the past in our own terms, 
rather than those contemporary with the events being studied. Congestion in the 
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same place in 1970 and 1980, for instance—or even 1972 and 1974, either side of 
the collapse of the Ringways—meant different things each time. 
Practices of marginalization 
Given the significance of these alternative characterizations of traffic, we have 
benefitted from being able to develop an understanding of the processes of 
marginalization. Chapter 4 looked at the construction of the Silvertown Viaduct in 
east London, a location at the literal margins of the capital, straddling the London 
County Council area and the County Borough of West Ham. It was also a 
marginal location of the British Empire, a site of transit and transformation 
between the metropolis and the periphery, mediated by the ships and lorries 
transporting goods between the margins and the centre. The concrete viaduct, its 
construction partly enabled because it was located out of sight, far from 
metropolitan aesthetic concerns, became therefore an imaginary structure 
expressing an engineering world view, with concrete and grade separation lifting 
citizens up above the old tangled and inefficient road network and offering a new, 
efficient perspective on the Empire—the view of the docks from above—as well 
as a new conception of Empire—a Labourite democracy open to all, contrasted 
with a Fascist autocracy elsewhere in Europe. 
 Chapter 5 looked at the guard rails erected along the East India Dock 
Road. This was a project which sought to place pedestrians into the literal margins 
of the road, segregating road users into categories, casting some as ‘impure’ or 
‘abject’, and discriminating over their place in the mobility infrastructure of the 
capital. On the one hand, this conceptualization of the traffic problem as a failure 
of control can be seen as a contrast with the democratic view expressed in the 
previous chapter. Yet the two projects were contiguous and formed a single traffic 
route from the docks to the centre of London and vice versa. So too the world 
views can be seen as connected, as grade separation—the flyover—lost its 1930s 
democratic inclusiveness to become the dominant segregationist technology 
absorbed by the planning discipline and expressed from the 1950s onwards. 
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 Chapter 6, which explored road pricing and its later manifestation as the 
Congestion Charge, described in detail the active marginalization of the economic 
voice by Colin Buchanan’s planning team. This led to many years of lobbying by 
those involved in the neoliberal project to move the discourse of marketization of 
road space from the political margins to the mainstream, a process which in one 
sense failed, but by taking a longer view and understanding the complex 
relationships between neoliberal ideas and social democracy can easily be seen to 
have taken root, its political stock rising as that of the reconstructionist planners 
fell in the 1970s and 1980s. In the neoliberal economy, price is the means by 
which segregation is really enacted, rather than steel rails or concrete flyovers. 
 Chapter 7 examined electronic networks of traffic signals, vehicle sensors 
and surveillance cameras in an early manifestation of today’s notions of smart 
cities. Here, the conceptualization of the traffic problem was of system failure, the 
inability of older methods of traffic control to make the most of an existing 
physical infrastructure. This was expressed in clear opposition to the 
reconstructionist paradigm but, unlike the economists, could work equally well if 
new roads were built—it simply necessitated a reprogramming of the system. 
Why is this characterization of the traffic problem sitting in the margins? It sits at 
the margins of our vision, in other words it is hiding in plain sight. The sensors of 
this electronic traffic network are buried just an inch below the tarmac. Its 
switches hide in plain black metal boxes planted in the pavement—boxes we 
never notice. Traffic lights are all but invisible owing to their ubiquity. And the 
traffic cameras over our heads, connected to sophisticated computer networks, 
have multiplied and grown like Topsy to an extent few realize. The location of the 
computer rooms which run this network are secret, and the control centres are 
open only to those with high-security clearance. The market model of resource 
allocation relies on knowledge of the state of the market at any instant. The 
electronic network now installed across London’s streets is providing that 
knowledge in finer and finer detail. This may yet become the ultimate expression 
of the neoliberal state and we are barely aware of it. 
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Friction, not congestion 
Those, then, are the marginal stories brought to the centre. Now, having examined 
a range of characterizations of congestion as the traffic problem, we can conclude 
with one which emerges from the mobilities turn in the humanities, which is to 
characterize congestion not as a problem but as friction. To frame congestion as a 
problem, one must believe that it can be solved, however difficult or expensive 
the solution might be. Such a characterization sets congestion as other than 
mobility. Yet this does not hold up under scrutiny. Reyner Banham was hinting at 
this in his comments which opened this chapter. The hard-line conclusion might 
be that there is no such thing as congestion. This is a useful corrective position, 
and certainly appealing to the relativist mindset, but perhaps goes a little too far to 
be especially illuminating.  
 A more moderate position would be to consider congestion (however one 
wishes to define it) as constitutive of mobility, in other words, it is an inevitable 
experience of being mobile. Peter Adey has commented that the flows of 
mobilities are not smooth but disrupted, often in political ways—the security 
queues at airports are an example.749 This is friction. Tim Cresswell has 
commented in a similar fashion on friction as ‘the stubborn stickiness of what is 
often called “the real world”’.750 He has defined friction in the sense of 
impediment to motion but also as a means of enabling it.751 He reacts against 
critics of the mobilities turn who argue that its focus on flows ‘turns our attention 
away from the stickiness of space and place’, as he terms it. He argues instead 
that: 
an approach to the world that foregrounds mobilities should, instead, provide a 
position that highlights friction ... Sometimes it slows and stops the mobility of 
                                                 
749 Adey, ‘Mobilities: Politics, Practices, Places’, 794. 
750 Tim Cresswell, ‘Friction’, in The Routledge Handbook of Mobilities, ed. Peter Adey et al. 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 107. 
751 Ibid., 108–9. 
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people, things and ideas, and sometimes it enables them. Mobility is often 
impossible without friction.752  
This helps explain the Silvertown Way which offered a new view over the docks, 
a sticky site where the products, ships and citizens of empire came temporarily 
together before flowing away in all directions again. The flyover smoothed the 
flow but was also designed to allow people to gather and gaze. Friction also helps 
explain the guard-rails at the East India Dock Road, which ended up doing 
nothing to prevent lateral flows across the street: shopkeepers had the keys to 
gates in the rails; people ducked under and over the rails; and life continued to 
happen in the street as well as in places connected by the street. They rubbed 
along together. In this characterization, there is no such thing as free-flow, just 
frictional flow. This, then, is our more moderate position. Rather than claiming 
that there is no such thing as congestion, we can say that all movement is 
congested. 
 Viewing congestion as friction, and thus essential to movement, is a shift 
in the way we consider traffic, and raises the stakes somewhat. It is an argument 
that congestion is not a by-product but the product, and all studies of traffic 
mobilities must inherently be studies of traffic congestion. Congestion is not a 
failed state, but rather it is the normal state, a required state, and should thus be 
treated not as a problem requiring solution but a state requiring understanding. We 
could go further. Taking into account Deirdre Boden and Harvey Molotch’s 
argument that human societies have a ‘compulsion of proximity’, even with 
advanced technologies that might dilute needs for co-presence, we might conclude 
that congestion does not just constitute mobilities, it constitutes cities. Boden and 
Molotch argue that ‘Copresent interaction remains ... the fundamental mode of 
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human intercourse and socialization’.753 Therefore it is logically impossible to 
have a city without congestion, because congestion forms cities. 
9.3 Traffic infrastructure and capital 
The second research question asked about the relationships between London’s 
traffic infrastructure and capital. Traffic congestion is about people as much as 
vehicles and roads, and characterizations of the traffic problem, and solutions put 
forward to solve them, shed important light on the politics of mobilities. De-
centring the heroic planning story and focusing on people and ideas at the fringes 
of professional urban planning has thus allowed us to see beyond the canonical 
plans, as well as seeing those plans as unstable artefacts. Yet a flat network need 
not imply a flat ontology. We returned to the planning profession in Chapter 8, 
examining ways in which aspects of the canonical plans were negotiated into 
reality. In doing so we have been able to consider the complex relationships 
between capital, planning and mobilities, helping us understand some of the 
motivations behind the characterizations people have constructed of traffic and 
congestion. Here, we can conclude that those involved with the accumulation of 
capital have marginalized themselves from the traffic problem—because by doing 
so they have been able to take advantage of the opportunities it has created to 
extract profit. Some of these have been obvious—the ultra-secretive Harry Hyams 
hiding behind his architect, Richard Seifert, in the building of Centre Point. Other 
opportunities have been more surprising—at the Pimlico Precinct, congestion was 
engineered into residential streets, at least for drivers wishing to pass through, 
increasing amenity and opportunities for gentrification. This work was done by 
Westminster Council planning officials and (allegedly) a parade of property 
developers whose identities cannot be recovered owing to the byzantine 
complexity of their company structures. Marginal figures one and all. Profit can 
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be extracted whatever the traffic problem looks like, and it can often be hard to 
follow the money. 
The exchange value of infrastructure 
We can find answers to this research question in broadly Marxian accounts of 
place-making and cities as spaces of capital. David Harvey has explored the ways 
places have been ‘erected as permanences within the flux and flow of capital 
circulation’.754 Such studies come down, at a micro scale, to accounts of property, 
specifically buildings. But the spaces in between—traffic infrastructure—have 
been intensely capitalized too, and they bring their own opportunities to make 
profit as well as feeding into efforts to profit from conventional property. They are 
not gaps but structures in their own right. Thus, roads, flyovers, pavements and 
precincts can all be read in this mode, particularly in terms of Harvey’s comments 
on the ‘strongly differentiated’ landscape that results, and ‘the rise of spatially 
ordered (often segregated) social distinctions’. Infrastructure has exchange value. 
The tensions of capitalism discussed in this thesis between, say, Centre Point and 
London Wall (the problem was congestion, leading to an opportunity to profit) 
and the Pimlico Precinct (the problem was traffic flowing too freely leading to an 
opportunity to profit) can be explained as part of the ‘speculative element’ in such 
schemes.  
 There is much to learn from this approach. The ‘speculative element’, 
claims Harvey, means that whilst capitalism is involved in making places, this ‘is 
not to argue that the geographical pattern is determined in advance’. This all helps 
to explain the apparent failure of planning to solve the traffic problem. Top-down 
holistic planning would deny capital’s opportunities to profit through speculation 
and to pit one opportunity against another—competition. Harvey goes on to 
discuss creative destruction—spatial reorganization—and its role in enabling 
further capital accumulation. His account places the surge of such reorganization 
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from around the year 1970, which fits with conventional chronologies of 
neoliberal activity. Yet in the case studies examined here, we have seen evidence 
of capitalistic place-making and creative destruction rather earlier—certainly back 
to the 1950s and strongly evident in the 1960s. The streets of London have been 
‘saturated with market decisions’ (in David Gilbert’s words) throughout the 
period of the post-war consensus as well as after its collapse.755 
 What this all points to is the absurdity of the ‘economic cost of 
congestion’ trope, in which economists, business leaders, motorist organizations 
and the national press claim repeatedly that London’s traffic jams cost the 
economy so many billions of pounds per year. By looking differently at the 
situation, congestion can be clearly seen as a crucial part of the money-making 
system, albeit in ways that can be unexpected or apparently contradictory. 
Capitalism or neoliberalism? 
In many respects, this is an age-old story of laissez-faire capitalism. Property 
speculation off the back of infrastructure improvements is, of course, at least as 
old as industrialization—with Metroland and the ribbon development of the 
arterial roads just two examples from London’s history. Left alone, capitalists will 
speculate to accumulate, and capital is therefore present in every urban process. 
But there is a new story here too, which is to do with the extent of the state’s 
involvement in this activity, and the setting up of structures (of governance or 
planning) which enable marketization and capital accumulation. By looking 
askance at the post-war planning of London—conventionally a top-down story of 
holistic technocratic state intervention and the power of the planner—we can 
sketch out a revised periodization of the history of neoliberalism, and a new way 
to see capital in the traffic landscape. 
 There are three aspects to this revision. The first is the example of road 
pricing told in Chapter 6. If the surge of neoliberalization of the capital’s economy 
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has usually been placed in the 1970s, the road pricing story has pulled that 
periodization back to the late 1950s and 1960s with the Smeed Committee and the 
work of the IEA. This was neoliberalism in opposition to state planning. The 
second aspect comes from other accounts considered here—Centre Point, London 
Wall and the Pimlico Precinct. It would be wrong to see neoliberalism as an 
ideologically pure doctrine of small-statism. Philip Mirowski has suggested that 
neoliberals, amongst themselves: 
would admit that their agenda was to take over existing governments, and maybe 
even make them larger, more intrusive, and more powerful, as long as they 
managed to implement explicitly neoliberal policies.756  
The three 1950s/1960s episodes discussed in Chapter 8 have shown the intimacy 
(albeit messy and manipulative and taking different forms) between property 
speculators and council planning departments. This was something different from 
laissez-faire capitalism. The state did not leave the capitalists well alone, as that 
description might suggest. In the neoliberal reading, the state and the speculators 
manipulated each other in order to advance their goals in a process which saw the 
marketization of infrastructure. The third aspect of the new periodization of 
London’s neoliberal story, albeit one which might only be coming to maturity 
today, concerns the 1960s traffic sensor and surveillance network described in 
Chapter 7. If, as Mirowski has argued, neoliberalism expands the classical liberal 
tradition to ‘encompass the whole of human existence as a political animal and a 
knowing being’, then knowledge of the market is the crucial currency of the 
movement. Mirowski has claimed that ‘the market was deemed a greater 
information processor than any human being and the only reliable arbiter of truth’, 
so there is distinct value in viewing real information processors—such as the 
computer-controlled electronic network under and over the capital’s streets—in 
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this light.757 Now, vehicle sensors and plain CCTV cameras have been joined by 
automatic number-plate recognition cameras, face-recognition cameras, and 
audio-recording devices, and these are increasingly connected to databases—of 
banking details, of vehicle identities, of individuals, of conversations, of telephone 
calls, and many other vast sets of data.758 Opportunities for capital accumulation 
arise from knowledge and predictions of the flows of the market. Here, the vehicle 
sensors and computer modelling can be seen as providing that and thus might 
become vital tools of the neoliberal project, if we accept that the neoliberals don’t 
really care about small states and your individual freedom so long as they are in 
control. 
Agency and power in infrastructure 
Yet, this is not just about capital, which might be the most obvious and powerful 
form of power in the history of congestion but not the only one in town. We wish 
to understand more widely how power intersects with disaggregated assemblages. 
We have therefore examined episodes in characterizing the traffic problem where 
the hand of capital seems if not absent, at least detached. Alker Tripp’s concerns 
were about categorization and control inflected more by a social and body politics 
than an overtly economic one. Thus his segregation was a moral crusade and 
needs to be understood in a wider frame. Similarly, the world views of engineers 
Henry Maybury and Charles Bressey were formulated through ideas of efficiency, 
flow and circulation, where efficiency related to governance as well as traffic 
routes (Tripp held this view too). Thinking of the traffic problem as a set of 
networks of interrelationships, with no hierarchical precedence of people or 
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artefacts, raises interesting challenges about the nature of traffic, and considers 
how artefacts as well as human actors have agency.  
 Put simply, is the traffic problem socially constructed or technologically 
determined? As has been suggested, the answer must be neither, or rather both. 
Congestion is itself a network characteristic, and the case studies have 
demonstrated time after time that the ways people see, characterize and attempt to 
solve the traffic problem are inflected both by social contexts and the affordances 
of technologies, both novel ones and ones already embedded in the urban 
landscape. Reinforced concrete gave engineers a technology with which to 
imagine new roads soaring over old ones in more rational formations. But ideas 
about replacing cluttered street layouts with more geometrically efficient ones 
dated back at least to Christopher Wren. Silvertown Way was built just as much 
out of a desire to open up working-class areas with wide straight roads as it was 
the consequence of the invention of reinforced concrete. Traffic signals, guard 
rails and, later, electronic computers, vehicle sensors and CCTV cameras gave 
police officers and traffic controllers a technology with which they could imagine 
bringing the users of streets to order. But guard-rails along the East India Dock 
Road were installed just as much because of 1930s ideologies of segregation and 
prohibition. CCTV cameras flourished only after Vietnam War demonstrations. 
The technologies were necessary but not sufficient to explain why the police 
wanted to keep people in their place. Similarly, developments in metering 
technologies enabled both neoliberals and social democrats to construct traffic 
problems, but the political and economic ideas behind their characterizations—
market failure and environmental damage—were much bigger than the 
technology. 
 We must therefore conclude that issues such as segregation tell us as much 
about race, gender, class and the effects of colonialism as they do about capital, 
and the ideas put forward in Chapter 5 of this thesis—the racist guard-rails and 
promiscuous pedestrians—would tend to reinforce that view. Capital strongly 
affects the shape of the network of mobilities but is not the only form of power 
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relation that does so. What has been described here is a historical geography of 
human agency and the particularities of places, albeit operating within political 
systems broadly construed. It is messier than any simple account could describe, 
and it is argued that its consequences are for the most part unintended. It has been 
constructed by actors over long periods and in many places taking advantage of 
opportunities presenting themselves in particular circumstances. Specific local 
conditions have affected the construction and materialization of congestion, as 
well as the global ideas we have considered here. At the risk of sounding like a 
stuck record, there is no single traffic problem, so there can be no single account 
of congestion. What has been proposed here is a set of wider concerns that a study 
of congestion can shed some light on. 
9.4 London—the unique city? 
The third research question asked what is distinctively ‘London’ about London’s 
traffic problem, and what the relationship is between London and other places. 
The first conclusion is rather banal, and is to say that there is something 
distinctive about the traffic problem in London as opposed to other places. The 
Danish planner Steen Eiler Rasmussen certainly believed London was a unique 
city as he lobbied for the rejection of ‘all pattern-made recipes for town planning’ 
in favour of what Frank Mort has described as London’s ‘innately democratic and 
localized use of space’.759 Time and again, discussions about the problem have 
focused on ideas of grid layouts, and attempts made either to rebuild London with 
such a layout of streets or somehow to impose onto its existing layout grid-like 
behaviour. This has included planning visions such as those of Le Corbusier and 
the MARS group, realized in small part as the London Wall development. It has 
included visions of control, with Alker Tripp’s proposed grid-like temporal pulses 
of traffic along highways. The engineers such as Charles Bressey tried literally to 
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overlay a grid of concrete streets over the existing pattern. The scientists building 
an electronic traffic city had to experiment in grid-plan Glasgow to make sense of 
their models. The Pimlico Precinct, on the other hand, was set up to de-grid the 
behaviour of a localized grid neighbourhood. All this alongside the constant 
refrain about Christopher Wren’s lost opportunity.  
 It must be concluded that the congestion in London is formally different 
from that in New York or Glasgow, because the street pattern differs so formally. 
It has fewer parallel routing options. It must also be concluded that the river 
matters—for all sorts of historical and topographical reasons the Blackwall 
Tunnels are a nightmare. In a geographical study, a conclusion that physical 
geography affects mobility is inevitable. There are other particularities of London 
which have been observed repeatedly in this account, with its patchwork multi-tier 
governance structure perhaps the most significant. London is a unique product of 
such structures, and the particular people who have acted within them. 
 On the other hand, a second banal conclusion is that there are aspects of 
this story which would apply equally to other places, however one wishes to 
compare and contrast. Every time we try to focus on one place—London, in this 
instance—we have found ourselves making mental jumps to other places to see 
how their cultures have influenced London, and London has influenced them. 
This is what happens when one thinks in terms of networks. Time and again in the 
account presented here, ideas developed elsewhere have found their way to 
London, helping shape the traffic landscape, as well as making their way out to 
other places. We have recovered detailed stories of the technologies, debates, 
practices and implementations constituting those networks—the unexpected 
connections. We have glimpsed an international circulating network of people and 
ideas about traffic. These ideas have been applied (and of course modified and 
appropriated) in a wide variety of cities, whether they are planning visions 
moving between English Garden Cities, American Beautiful Cities or French 
Radiant Cities; policing visions moving between the Chicago Police Department 
and Scotland Yard; economic visions circulating between the universities of Iowa, 
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Yale, Birmingham and Cambridge; or visions of electronic surveillance and 
control in Washington DC, Los Angeles, Glasgow or Hammersmith. There has 
been a globalization of conceptualizations of traffic problems through the 
twentieth century. 
From ‘the traffic problem’ to ‘world city traffic’ 
But, beyond these straightforward conclusions there is a more significant one if 
we consider this globalization from the point of view of world cities.760 The work 
of Doreen Massey offers important insights here, and connects with ideas 
expressed earlier in this thesis about seeing congestion alternatively as friction. 
The first point to make is that whilst there might have been a globalization of 
approaches to traffic, this does not equate to homogenization, nor does it mean 
people with more mobility must be richer than those with less. The experience of 
mobilities in cities is by no means common from city to city or person to person. 
This draws on Massey’s ideas of ‘power geometry’ explored in her seminal work 
looking at places such as Kilburn High Road. ‘Different social groups’, she 
claims, ‘have distinct relationships to this anyway differentiated mobility: some 
people are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and movement, 
others don’t; some are more on the receiving-end of it than others; some are 
effectively imprisoned by it’.761 The conclusion must be that actors in the network 
of traffic are unevenly placed with respect to congestion (or friction, in the new 
characterization) and the experience depends on how in-charge the actor is. 
Massey’s argument is that we need to consider the specificities of places, as well 
as the social power-relations emerging out of places, to understand stories of 
globalization. She observes, ‘a local–global politics would be structured 
differently from place to place’.762 In this mode, each actor in their own context 
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constructs a different traffic problem. This local construction of congestion points 
up the value in studying micro-geographies of traffic, but in open-ended ways. 
 This, then, is the final conclusion of this thesis. The image on the front 
cover, captioned ‘The traffic problem’ in the Penguin version of The County of 
London Plan and set into historical context in Chapter 3, is repeated in Figure 72. 
Let us examine more closely at what it is showing us.  
 
Figure 72: ‘The Traffic Problem’, County of London Plan, 1943–45 (London County Council).763 
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Firstly, the motor cars to the bottom-left do not appear to be in the queue for the 
junction. They are taxicabs waiting at the centre of the road, the position where all 
West End taxi ranks were located at that time.764 The cabbie standing chatting by 
his vehicle might have been somebody like Herbert Hodge, who had lived and 
worked in North America as a lumberjack, farmhand, political activist, playwright 
and hobo before returning to his native London to drive a taxi (and narrate Charles 
Bressey’s 1939 film, The City, discussed in Chapter 4).765 Or the taxi driver in the 
picture might have been somebody like Maurice Levinson, born in Russia, who 
had been forced to leave aged six months following an anti-Semitic pogrom. His 
family travelled as refugees across Europe before settling in Stepney.766 These 
taxi drivers hardly express ideas of stasis. They had travelled the world—albeit 
with varying control over their journeys—and settled in London for the 
opportunities it brought. Taxi driving, for them, was about freedom, not 
imprisonment. Perhaps the taxi driver in our photograph was discussing that. 
 Or let us look at the buses waiting to cross over the junction into Charing 
Cross Road. The 24 bus route is one of the oldest in London. We can just make 
out on its destination blind some of the places it passed through on its journey that 
day. It started at Hampstead before reaching Chalk Farm and on through Camden 
Town to Euston before reaching Tottenham Court Road. After that it ended up 
travelling down Whitehall on its way to Westminster, before reaching Victoria 
and finally Lupus Street towards its terminus at Pimlico. It passed by two major 
teaching hospitals, the Royal Free and University College Hospital, and would 
have carried the lower-paid hospital staff to and from work—nurses and orderlies 
from around the country and the Empire who had ended up in the great imperial 
                                                 
764 Herbert Hodge, It’s Draughty in Front: The Autobiography of a London Taxidriver (London: 
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metropolis. When the picture was taken in 1943, the foundation of the NHS, and 
the great voyage of the Windrush, were just five years away. The 24 bus was part 
of a global network of mobility. Perhaps its passengers were talking about job 
opportunities in the capital. Maybe some of them were returning to their rented 
rooms in Pimlico houses north of Lupus Street, little suspecting that seven years 
later the Duke of Westminster would sell the estate and begin a process of 
developer-led gentrification that would see them driven from their homes. The bus 
also carried civil servants and countless thousands of government functionaries 
and officials to and from Whitehall and Westminster as they prosecuted the 
business of a world city and an imperial nation. It carried factory workers, too. 
Camden Town was home to industry and manufacture, including global brands 
such as Gilbey’s gin (now part of Diageo) and Idris soft drinks (now part of 
Britvic). The 24 bus carried their employees to work, and into the West End for 
play.  
 We can focus on the rear bus. It shows an advertisement for Craven Plain 
cigarettes, made by Carreras, a firm founded in Somers Town in the nineteenth 
century by an immigrant Spanish family. The area had seen a huge influx of 
Spanish refugees like them in the 1820s, all fleeing political unrest. In 1928 (and 
then owned by Bernhard Baron, a Russian–Jewish refugee) the firm had opened a 
huge new tobacco factory in Mornington Crescent (also on the 24 bus route) 
which employed new air-conditioning technologies imported from America and a 
concrete construction system brought over from France. It was built in the 
Egyptian style, influenced by the opening in 1922 of Tutankhamun’s tomb, and 
was a famous landmark on the Hampstead Road, passed and marvelled at by 
passengers on the 24 bus as well as being visited by architecture and engineering 
specialists from around the world. The factory was opened by Leslie Hore-
Belisha, who was to become transport minister six years later. Its 400,000 square 
feet of maple flooring was imported from Canada where Carreras had a factory.767 
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Asphalt for the external landscaping was mined from Pitch Lake in Trinidad, 
owned by a British company.768  
 This could go on and on. For instance, we could see where each vehicle in 
the photograph was manufactured, and think about the automotive industry which 
was scaling up production to meet wartime needs and an expected post-war 
consumer and export boom which would rely on generating demand for 
driving.769 We could look at the theatre at the edge of the picture, and consider the 
centrality of London’s theatre-land to the global circulation of plays and movies. 
Most of London’s theatres were in the middle of changing ownership from actor–
managers to financial speculators, who sought profit and needed crowds.770 We 
could think about the life journey of everybody in this picture—there would be 
hundreds, if we saw past the vehicles. The point is simply that. We should see 
beyond the gathering of vehicles, and to see this in an open way—to see it inside 
out, as Massey has said. This was a moment of friction in a world city—a moment 
when countless global human mobilities came together in a bit of stickiness amid 
the energy and restlessness of the capital. A moment which happened because of 
London’s standing in the world—because of what London is. A moment 
expressing the complex power geometries of globalization. Why have we not 
solved London’s traffic problems? This thesis has shown that it is a multi-
dimensional set of constructions, rather than a singular problem, and therefore 
cannot be treated in isolation from wider concerns. Moreover, it is shot through 
with capital and other forms of power, creating advantages as well as 
disadvantages. Congestion in a world city—world-city traffic—is inextricably 
intertwined with globalization, and it is a safe bet that those who benefit from 
globalization will always find ways to benefit from London’s traffic.  
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9.5 Epilogue: London’s traffic problem today and tomorrow 
It is January 2016. In a building 100 yards from the traffic crowding up 
Tottenham Court Road, an exhibition opens to the public entitled Streets Ahead: 
The Future of London’s Roads. It has been curated by New London Architecture 
(NLA), a non-profit information and discussion organization chaired by architect 
Peter Murray that seeks to ‘bring people together to shape a better city’ through 
debating architecture, planning, development and construction.771 The exhibition 
is laid out like a network diagram, with coloured lines on the floor (akin to those 
on the tube map) guiding visitors from one exhibit to the next. Unlike the tube 
network, though, there is only one linear route through the exhibition, which 
begins with ancient history—the failure of London planners to solve the problems 
of the streets, from the London Society to Colin Buchanan and the Ringways—
and ends with futuristic visions of autonomous vehicles and freight deliveries by 
drones. Opening the exhibition is the claim that ‘Working well, streets and roads 
keep London thriving, but when they are clogged up and overcrowded, the city’s 
health, economy and environment suffer’.772 A few paces on, visitors are told that 
‘Congestion is undoubtedly one of the biggest challenges, as Londoners already 
spend 70 hours on average in traffic jams every year’, and that ‘Too much 
congestion can damage economic competitiveness’. Later in the exhibition, 
figures are deployed: ‘The cost of congestion is forecast to increase by up to an 
additional £800 million per annum, on top of the present £5 billion’. 
 Streets Ahead presents a version of the holistic, networked view of traffic 
explored in this thesis. It concludes that ‘There is no one solution which tackles 
all of the challenges’. There are multiple voices here, reflecting the diverse world 
views examined in the case studies, as opposed to a singular statement expressing 
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‘the traffic problem’. Marie-Claude Hemming of the Civil Engineering 
Contractors Association comments that ‘Providing London’s road users with a 
network fit to keep London moving is a continuous task for civil engineering 
contractors’. David Leam of London First, representing London’s business 
leaders, claims that ‘Without radical interventions such as more sophisticated 
congestion charging, journey times and reliability on London’s roads will only get 
worse’. London Mayor Boris Johnson explains that ‘we are doing our utmost to 
cut congestion and delays through the use of innovative new traffic light 
technology’ and the exhibition reveals plans for ‘smart systems’ that combine 
‘live data on road use with a predictive signalling system’. Soon, visitors are told, 
the surveillance systems and sensors embedded underneath and watching over the 
streets will be joined by mobile sensors fitted to every London bus, which will 
‘act as “intelligent” sensors: to pinpoint congestion, to measure the condition of 
the road ... and to learn more about passenger movements’. And NLA chair Peter 
Murray recognizes a shift in ideas about segregation on the streets, commenting 
that ‘There is a growing realisation that we need to change the hierarchy of our 
streets—while 20th-century policies focused on the speed of vehicular movement, 
today we place more significance on health and wellbeing, on safety, and on 
walking, cycling and public transport—while still permitting the wheels of 
commerce to function efficiently’. London’s traffic authorities have been 
systematically removing pedestrian guard rails since the mid-2000s.773 
 It is common, in public exhibitions about technology, to present ‘the past’ 
and then to express the present as a watershed moment. Here, then, we hear that 
‘The scale of London’s growth and its associated challenges means that once-in-a-
lifetime changes and investment in how our roads work need to be made’. But, as 
this thesis has shown, the proposals for addressing ‘how our roads work’, ranging 
from construction to charging, and from planning to smart sensing, have long 
histories. Indeed, it is possible to see the ghosts of old schemes creeping back in. 
                                                 
773 The Times, 8 April 2006, 38. 
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The Ringways, the exhibition claims, were abandoned ‘due to local campaigns 
and spiralling cost’—no sense of national outrage and a political and cultural shift 
to the environment in this assessment. Two-thirds of the way round the exhibition, 
softened up by streetscape improvements and cycle schemes, visitors are told that 
‘we need to investigate ways of replacing or creating new space over the coming 
decades’. The solution is new tunnels, fly-unders and decking over main traffic 
routes. We come back to the Ringways, then, but under rather than over the 
capital—just as Forshaw and Abercrombie originally wanted. One visitor was 
transported back to the past, commenting that ‘this exhibition has been dug out of 
the 1960s’. They could equally have said the 1940s or even earlier. 
 
Figure 73: Visitor comment card left at Streets Ahead exhibition, photographed on 13 February 
2016 (David Rooney). 
 Above all this can be read as an exhibition about profit. It has been curated 
by a consortium of industry professionals rather than the lone academic voice of a 
Patrick Abercrombie or a Colin Buchanan. The characterization of traffic 
expressed here is one of opportunities, not problems. Road improvements, the 
exhibition’s curators claim, ‘can act as catalysts for wider regeneration, inward 
investment and local economic growth’. Boris Johnson comments on plans to 
build traffic tunnels across the city’s central areas, claiming that they ‘could bring 
income and investment to those areas’. On work to unravel one-way systems such 
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as that at Tottenham Court Road, as well as other 1960s traffic projects such as 
gyratories and roundabouts, the exhibition observes that ‘These are now being 
removed or altered to create public spaces, many part-funded by developers and 
through commercial support’. Big datasets will be connected together, which will 
‘drive efficiencies in resources and budgets’, according to John McCarthy of 
transport consultants Atkins. The commercial drone market for freight delivery ‘is 
predicted by some to grow by up to £7 billion in the next decade’, the exhibition 
claims. This characterization of London’s traffic is not a failure of planning, or of 
control, or of markets or systems. It is a failure to seize opportunities to make 
money from traffic. 
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